# BIT China Economy Advantage Affirmative/Negative

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## 1AC

### Frontline

#### 1. US foreign investment is starting to drop in the SQUO. A B.I.T. would reverse this. Investment key to check major declines in China’s Economy.

Schneider ‘13

Howard Schneider covers international economics at the Post. He has been at the paper for 20 years in a variety of reporting and editing roles, and served abroad as bureau chief in Jerusalem, Cairo and Toronto. The author also holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Economics from the University of Maryland College Park - “China agrees to broad investment talks” – Washington Post - July 11, 2013 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-agrees-to-broad-investment-talks/2013/07/11/2d535930-ea63-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html>

China and the United States have agreed to restart negotiations over a possible investment treaty that could substantially open the Chinese economy to more American companies. During high-level talks over the past two days, Chinese officials agreed to drop a longstanding demand that negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Treaty would have to exclude sensitive or developing sectors of the economy that it wanted to protect. Although many American companies have businesses in China, investment there is governed by a strict set of rules that often limits foreign ownership — a policy, U.S. officials argue, that will crimp China’s growth in the long term and which limits the benefits American companies and workers can gain from China’s economic expansion. American officials characterized the change in negotiating policy as a major concession and a sign that the new Chinese government wants to speed economic opening. The concession is no guarantee that a treaty will ever be signed, or that any future pact will be as comprehensive as U.S. officials and business executives hope. Indeed, BIT talks have technically been underway for five years but have been stalled for much of that time. Still, “the commitment made today stands to be a significant breakthrough,” Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. It marks the first time China has agreed to talks that “include all sectors and stages of investment.” The United States has BITs with 41 developing countries, from economic successes such as Poland to strategic allies such as Egypt and small countries such as Albania. While the world’s industrial countries are generally open to foreign investors and have trustworthy courts and political institutions, BITs are used to open up developing markets, encourage the flow of capital across borders and protect it once it gets there. In China’s case, U.S. officials say they hope such a treaty would mark a turning point in U.S.-China economic relations — allowing American companies, particularly in services and other areas where they hold a competitive advantage, to benefit from China’s large population and growing wealth. The announcement of the investment talks was the most prominent outcome of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue held over the last two days. Although it may signal the reformist intentions of new President Xi Jinping, it also reflects China’s anxiety over the economic constraints it is starting to feel. Foreign investment has been key to the country’s growth over the last 20 years, for example, but in the case of capital from the U.S. that has begun to flag.

#### 2. Xi’s avoided the temptation of diversionary war. This will end if the Chinese economy declines.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

One downside to Xi's breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his government's policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xi's image and political position vulnerable to China's economic downturn, his country's external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years, with China's economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not fundamentally influenced Xi's foreign policy. Xi has been able to be continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take China's foreign policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Deng's injunction to keep a low profile and has reclaimed islands, created international institutions, pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed regions. Xi's foreign policy has been assertive, confident, and, importantly, a diversified mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken firm steps on territorial issues, it has used geoeconomic instruments to offer generous loans and investments, and even created new organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 By combining inducements with intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of opposing it, especially on issues important to Beijing. Today, China's thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent, and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true growth rate is far lower—and will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xi's external policy is in question. Some elements, including China's geoeconomic policies, will endure; nevertheless, China's foreign policy may well be driven increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism—long a pillar of the state's legitimacy—to compensate for the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image. Chinese nationalism has long been tied to foreign affairs, especially memories of foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors, use increasingly strident rhetoric in defense of China's national interests, and take a tougher line in relations with the United States and its allies to shift public focus away from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism. These changes come at a time when Xi's tight control of the decisionmaking process has made it harder for U.S. policymakers to anticipate China's next moves. Familiar interlocutors at the State Council and Foreign Ministry, who once provided much-needed insight into an often mysterious policymaking process, are no longer central within it. As the shroud of secrecy surrounding Chinese decision-making thickens, what remains clear is that dealing with China will require a more nuanced understanding of the man with singular control over the country's foreign policy future. It will also necessitate an appreciation of the interaction between his internal political requirements and his foreign policy agenda. Finally, it will demand a clear-eyed acceptance of the fact that Xi has ushered in a new era of Chinese regional and global diplomacy, one that will push the West to evaluate its overall approach to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to the powerful but exposed leader who makes its foreign policy.

#### 3. Chinese econ growth checks nationalist flares that escalate territorial disputes. Checks won’t solve.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989, the party has deliberately and carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the country's economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites. On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country's economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious "foreign forces" that seek to sabotage the country's rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given that Japan is a prominent target of China's propaganda and media, and that memories of Japan's brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China and Japan may continue to worsen.

#### 4. SCS conflict causes huge death tolls.

Wittner ‘11

(Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", [www.huntingtonnews.net/14446](http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446))

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

#### 5. And nationalist spats over the ECS will escalate - death tolls would be enormous.

Baker ‘12

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China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over. The island dispute would then escalate to possible mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the West. If the allies were then to turn on each other it would spell the end of the human race. Bear in mind that it will take an estimated 10,000 years for Chernobyl to become safe to walk around and you’ll get an idea of what state land masses will be in after a war of such magnitude. I say ‘land masses’ as countries and nations would cease to exist then and it would be a case of ‘if’ and ‘where’ could human beings, plant life and animals could exist, if at all possible, which is very doubtful. Even with underground bunkers, just how long could people survive down there? With plant and animal life eradicated above? I would say maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.

#### 6. Prior economic declines hasn’t undermined Xi to the point of playing the nationalism card. The next one will

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

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The real risk to China's economy, and to Xi's fortunes, comes not from the stock market's raw economic impact but from the damage done to the government's credibility. Xi's strongman image suffered in the wake of the market collapse. His government had vocally encouraged average Chinese citizens to enter the country's stock market under the premise that good returns would incentivize higher spending, and was embarrassed when those investors were singed by the crash.24 The government then publicly staked its credibility on a commitment to arrest the stock market decline, but its ill-conceived market manipulations and hasty currency devaluations were of limited effectiveness. Eventually, China was able to reverse the declines, but similar or repeated episodes will undermine the party's legitimacy. Aside from the perceptual costs posed by such economic downturns, Xi faces the considerable risk that a prolonged slowdown will directly affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen. The possibility of a hard landing looms, and an economic wreck or a serious financial crisis could produce years of prolonged stagnation and slow growth that could shake the party to its core. Even absent such a disaster, if growth continues to slow, it will worsen a number of internal trends. The labor market already struggles to absorb the eight million college graduates China's universities produce each year. Blue-collar wages that had risen for a decade have been stagnant for well over a year as layoffs continue in coastal factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.25 Chinese companies also face challenges, as corporate debt grows to 160 percent of China's GDP, up from 98 percent in 2008 and more than twice the current U.S. level of 70 percent. The fragile recovery in the country's property market could face a reversal that would undercut what is the biggest store of household wealth for Chinese families. These problems could intertwine with the psychic impact of another stock market swing or economic crisis, which could further erode consumer confidence and jeopardize China's economic reorientation.26 Business and investor trust have similarly been hit, largely because the government's panicked attempts to control the market signaled the hesitancy of its commitment to reform. If the government's reputation is diminished and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow increasingly worried about social unrest. Past economic crises contributed to outbreaks of mass protests, including those in 19 86 and 1989 that brought down two Chinese leaders, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and led to the violence in Tiananmen Square. Although the party weathered the stock market slumps reasonably well, there is no guarantee it will be so fortunate in a future crisis.

#### 7. And, economic growth is key to overall CCP stability – *most valued* source of legitimacy.

Lam 13 - Jon-Jon Lam, Investment Analyst at Yale Investments Office and Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Economic Review, 2013 (“Performance Legitimacy: An Unstable Model for Sustaining Power”, The Politic, January 10, 2013, Available Online at <http://thepolitic.org/performance-legitimacy-an-unstable-model-for-sustaining-power/>, Accessed June 30, 2016, KC)

Since the 1980s, China has relied on “performance legitimacy,” a model for sustaining power that entails consistently accomplishing concrete goals to justify its rule.[1] These goals include economic growth, social stability, governing competence, and accountability.[2] Performance legitimacy is fundamentally different from “ideological legitimacy,” a model for maintaining power that is based on a common ideology. Although one could argue that performance legitimacy itself is an ideology, for all intents and purposes of this article, ideology and ideological legitimacy will refer to the body of ideas and ideals that reflect the collective social needs and aspirations of the people. Similarly, “moral legitimacy” is a regime legitimation approach grounded in shared ethics. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will have to complement its performance legitimacy with moral and ideological legitimacy if it is to sustain its power into the future. Though the past 30 years suggest otherwise, performance legitimacy is inherently a flawed model for retaining power because consistently delivering on concrete goals is unsustainable. Moreover, in the absence of moral or ideological justifications of rule, performance legitimacy is insufficient for maintaining power.¶ It is important to first address the origins of performance legitimacy. According to Yuchao Zhu, Professor of Political Science at the University of Regina, the CCP derived its original justification of power from two sources: the Chinese citizenry’s consent to revolutionary dialogue and Marxist ideology.[3] However, after Mao’s rule, these two sources of legitimacy faltered, and the CCP adopted a new regime legitimation approach based on performance.[4] To this day, the CCP’s main goal is not to regain an original justification of rule but to retain its legitimacy.[5] Therefore, the CCP must convince its people that its governmental action is sufficient, appropriate, and beneficial.[6] Western scholars, such as Zhu, use performance legitimacy to explain regime legitimation. However, from a conventional Western perspective, a government that relies solely on performance legitimacy and lacks civil liberties, universal elections, or political participation does not have political legitimacy.[7] Thus, performance legitimacy is a concept unique to China and other Eastern countries.¶ Surely, the CCP’s hold on power for the past three decades suggests that performance legitimacy is a workable model for justifying rule. However, China’s economic growth of the past 30 years was unprecedented in magnitude and duration, as the country averaged 10% growth annually.[8] Thus, the effectiveness of China’s performance legitimacy model was perhaps augmented in ways that normal economic growth would not make possible. Therefore, looking into a future in which China expects high, but more ordinary growth rates, performance legitimacy will inherently be a less effective method of justifying power. Moreover, accustomed to rapid economic progress, Chinese citizens will take growth for granted, reducing the effectiveness of performance legitimacy and elevating the importance of alternative justifications of power.¶ Performance-based legitimation is also unstable because the government must reach ever-higher benchmarks of performance to maintain its rule. Improvements in official accountability, a key tenet of performance legitimacy, can actually make future legitimacy harder to achieve.[9] Specifically, by increasing transparency and accountability, the Chinese government makes its mistakes more noticeable to the Chinese citizenry. Thus, China’s achievements are increasingly at risk of being overshadowed by even minor missteps.[10] In this way, as transparency is increased, China’s achievements produce “diminishing marginal gains” to its performance legitimacy. In other words, over time it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain performance legitimacy. The Chinese government must constantly re-legitimate its rule, as achievements and setbacks keep its performance legitimacy in fluctuation. Therefore, sole reliance on performance legitimacy is unstable because it progressively becomes a less effective method of maintaining power.

#### 8. [Insert Impact Here]

### 1AC — Laundry List Conflicts

#### CCP collapse decimates the stability of the international order — multiple escalation scenarios

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.¶ It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

### 1AC — South China Sea Impact

#### CCP instability prompts Chinese lash-out to tap into nationalist tendencies, specifically in the South China Sea

Cole 14 — J. Michael Cole, editor and chief of www.thinking-taiwan.com, a web site operated by the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—an educational foundation, former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2014 (“Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” *The Diplomat*, July 10th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/>, Accessed 6-30-16)

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability?¶ Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States.¶ While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military.¶ Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.”¶ This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater.¶ With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction.¶ 1. South China Sea¶ The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests.

#### SCS conflict causes huge death tolls.

Wittner ‘11

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While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

### 1AC — Taiwan Impact

#### CCP instability causes a Taiwan war – goes global.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

However, a period of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take advantage of the CCP and PLA’s distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a protracted conflict between the two regions.

### 1AC — East China Sea Impact

#### CCP instability causes a conflict over the Senkaku islands – goes global.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

A third region that has a deep interest in China’s political stability is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by 2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169 Tension in the region has been rising as China has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the islands, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to China’s stance and actions. However, should the CCP undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already weakened Japanese economy. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the East China Sea region could draw the countries’ regional neighbors and international partners into a protracted conflict between the two nations.

### 1AC — India War

#### CCP collapse causes China-India war

Cohen 2 — Stephen Philip Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2002 (“Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future,” Brookings Institution, May, available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2002/05/southasia-cohen>, accessed 6/30/16) JL

Political Stability in India, China and Pakistan India, China and Pakistan have each undergone periods of profound political instability in the past. India underwent an “emergency” in the 1970s that turned it into a virtual dictatorship; China experienced a prolonged internal upheaval in the form of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s; Pakistan has oscillated between military rule (sometimes with martial law), and weak civilian governments for its entire history. Further, Pakistan was physically divided in 1971, and all three face several separatist threats, sometimes encouraged by each other. As a variable, political instability affects their nuclear futures in two ways. First, there is the question of control over nuclear weapons—a state riven by political conflict may have problems in storing and safeguarding, let alone using, its nuclear weapons and fissile material stocks. Second, there is the question of perception: does political instability in one state raise the prospect in the minds of the leadership of its adversary that a moment of great opportunity or danger is approaching? While in the short run it seems improbable that instability in India could be of a magnitude that would affect the nuclear balance, it is not unimaginable. It would be especially likely in the aftermath of armed conflict or serious economic crisis. India is metastable, but a chronically weak center, or disorder in states where there were significant nuclear assets, might raise questions concerning India’s ability to protect its nuclear assets and its vulnerability to nuclear blackmail. A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject Cohen/South Asia Nuclear Futures -13- to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation. A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States or both might become involved in a major crisis with India, perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly with American assistance.

### 1AC — India Economy

#### CCP instability decks India’s economy.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

In addition, any political stability within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy, which is becoming increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations’ conflict, India and China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant on China’s continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that India’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s. The consistency of China’s message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However, if China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India’ economy in the process.

#### India is key to the global economy.

Chotai 16 — Suresh Chotai, graduate of Arts from Mumbai University, 2016 ("Blogs: India Set to Play Key Role in Global Economy," *Jewellery Net Asia*, May 9th, Available Online at http://www.jewellerynetasia.com/en-us/editorial/Blogs/555/6792/india-set-to-play-key-role-in-global-economy)

India is set to become the world’s youngest country with 64% of its population in the working age group by the end of 2020. With the population in the West, Japan and even China aging, demand for Indian workforce would pick up to its peak. This potential offers India and its growing economy an exceptional edge that global economists believe could add a significant 2% to the country’s GDP growth rate. India’s Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi has called upon the country’s universities and educational institutions to produce more trained professionals to enable them avail the job opportunities that would be created globally as well as in domestic sectors. Accordingly, every industrial sector and educational institution has geared up to train huge workforce here to meet the global and domestic opportunities.¶ Gems & Jewellery Skill Council of India (GJSCI) recently launched the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL Program) as the first step to uplift the artisans in the country’s Gem & Jewellery Sector (G&J). GJSCI has been persistently contributing towards Mr. Modi’s ‘Skill India’ program and has been taking several measures and steps to cultivate the 3.5 million skilled yet uncertified labour-forces of the G&J industry.¶ Identified as one of the priority sectors by the Government, India’s G&J industry contributes 6% to 7% of the country’s GDP. It is estimated to grow by 100% in terms of manpower requirements and will have job openings for another 3.5 million candidates by 2022. The RPL program will help candidates to identify their inherited skills and get certified for the same which will equip them to get better and more stable jobs and avail of entrepreneurship opportunities.¶ On the other hand, the Indian Institute of Gems & Jewellery (IIGJ)-Mumbai has recently tied up with Welingkar Institute of Management to offer three years’ Jewellery Design & Manufacturing Techniques programme. The course will begin from academic year 2016-17. IIGJ thus has become the first institute in the country to offer a complete graduate course on Gems and Jewellery including Operations Management for emerging jewellery professionals and entrepreneurs.¶ Mr. Vasant Mehta, Chairman of IIGJ says, “Training our students in professional management techniques is very important part of the process of making India the top jewellery manufacturer in the world. It will arm the industry with additional skills to take this leap. Our institute has trained 8,000 students during past 11 years and it has been following up with Mumbai University to grant jewellery degree course accreditation.”¶ IIGJ has been playing instrumental role in creating and nurturing the future of India’s G&J industry. The gems and jewellery industry has been growing rapidly over the years due to domestic and global demands and the sector is on the cusp of shortage of skilled staff. Most of the jewellers in the industry are of multiple generations. With such professional management courses the IIGJ Aims to bring new talent in the industry as well as to groom the existing talent.¶ Every third individual in an Indian city today is a youth. During next seven years, the median person in India will be 29 years of age. This would make India the youngest country in world. So India is all set to play a key role in development of the global economy and to experience a dynamic transformation because the population burden of the past would turn into a demographic bonus.

### 1AC — EU-China Relations

#### CCP instability hinders EU-China cooperation —that solves terrorism, disease, failed states, and energy security.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

The second concern that the EU has with potential political instability in China is their cooperation alongside China in international organizations. In her book The European Union and China, May-Britt Stumbaum discusses why China’s continued cooperation, which is contingent on their political stability, is critical to the continued stability of EU foreign policy and security of the international community. Stumbaum writes, “Having been the source of global pandemics such as SARS and the Avian Flu, China’s willingness to cooperate with international institutions and other states will be crucial in order to cope with these new threats. In general, given the enormous scope of 21st century challenges, as diverse as terrorism, failing states and the securing of energy, China’s cooperation will be crucial for the required concerted responses and financial and physical contributions”.178 However, if China’s government encounters a period of instability that interrupted its ability to participate actively in international institutions, other nations such as the EU member states attempting to address the problems listed by Dr. Stumbaum would find themselves without a primary financial and physical contributor to the struggle for international security and peace.

### 1AC — US–China Relations

#### CCP instability prevents effective US-China relations.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service, 2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University, April 19th, Available Online at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson\_american\_0008N\_10238display.pdf?sequence=1)

Though the potential consequences of Chinese political instability for the international community are grave and vast, there are few regions of the world whose cooperation with China is more important than that of the United States. The hegemonic leader of the international system and of all major international institutions for more than the last two decades, the stability and continuation of the US’s growing cooperation with China are more critical to the stability of the entire global order than any other relationship. Because the United States continues to grow both its economic and security commitment not only with China, but with the entire East Asian region, it is increasingly critical that China’s government maintain a stable and secure internal environment. Various aspects of US national security that could be affected by Chinese political instability include its military commitment to East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, its interests in the denuclearization of Iran, and the stability of its already volatile economy.

#### [Insert Impacts from Relations Advantage]

### 1AC — Diversionary War

#### CCP collapse hurts the global economy and sparks Chinese aggression

Bandow 15 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, J.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“Can Economic Dynamism and Political Stability Survive China’s Battle against Freedom?” *Forbes*, July 24th, Available Online at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2015/07/24/can-economic-dynamism-and-political-stability-survive-chinas-battle-against-freedom/#1c7f34111bab>, Accessed 6-29-16)

An unstable China is in no one’s interest. Certainly not for the Chinese people, rulers or ruled. And not for the rest of us. A poorer PRC means a poorer world: China is a major supplier and increasingly important source of global demand. Moreover, a politically unstable Beijing would have unpredictable effects on its neighbors: the PRC could use military confrontation in an attempt to shift popular attention from domestic economic problems.

## 2AC

### A2: Warming Turn - China’s Growth = Green

#### China’s growth is key to its climate control

Henderson et al 16— Geoffrey Henderson, Project Specialist for China FAQs within WRI's Climate and Energy Program, Ranping Song, Developing Country Climate Action Manager @ WRI, Paul Joffe, Senior Foreign Policy Counsel @WRI, 2016 (“5 Questions: What Does China’s New Five-Year Plan Mean for Climate Action?,” World Resources Institute, March 18, Available Online at http://www.wri.org/blog/2016/03/5-questions-what-does-chinas-new-five-year-plan-mean-climate-action, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China plans to develop its economy by more than 6.5 percent per year over the next five years. Under the plan, this growth will increasingly come from services—which will rise from 50.5 to 56 percent of the economy by 2020—and more innovative and efficient manufacturing. These sectors typically have lower air pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions than China’s traditional growth engines, like heavy industry and infrastructure construction.¶ The plan sets out a new round of targets for the carbon and energy intensity of China’s economy. With China’s new target for an 18 percent reduction in carbon-intensity from 2015 levels, we estimate that China will actually reduce its carbon intensity 48 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, exceeding its original target of a 40-45 percent reduction by that year. It will also be a first step toward achieving its Paris Agreement pledge to reduce carbon intensity 60 to 65 percent by 2030. The plan also includes a goal to reduce energy intensity by 15 percent, suggests that China’s most-developed eastern regions will be the first to peak their carbon emissions, and builds on efforts to increase China’s forest stock. ¶ For the first time, the plan includes quantified guidance on energy consumption control, stating that China should limit its energy use to 5 billion tons of standard coal equivalent. As energy is the largest source of carbon emissions, limiting energy consumption is an important component of China’s implementation of its Paris commitments. This guidance seems to be an effort to ensure an upper limit on energy consumption, as there are signs that China’s energy use could be lower than 5 billion tons in 2020. Growth in China’s energy use has slowed in recent years, and China has the potential to achieve its economic goals with less energy through energy efficiency initiatives.¶ The new targets in the plan underscore the fact that the country is no longer merely concerned with the pace of growth, but with the quality of growth. China’s efforts on sustainable development and climate action are driven by strong national interests, such as concern about the impacts of climate change, hazardous air pollution and energy security. There’s also evidence that China’s leaders recognize the economic benefits of clean energy, and that new drivers will be required for the economy to continue its rapid economic growth.¶ To achieve these targets, the plan calls for controlling emissions from energy-intensive industries like power and steel, building a unified national carbon emissions trading market, implementing emissions reporting and verification for key industries, and establishing a green finance system, among other measures. The plan also states that China will be actively involved in the global effort to address climate change, including advancing its own contribution, and will deepen its bilateral dialogue with other countries. These efforts will provide momentum toward stronger climate action both in China and internationally.

#### Chinese economic growth has granted it the resources to manage climate change

Khan 16— Nausheen, first year candidate for the Master of International Development Policy (MIDP) at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown University, 2016 (“INDIA AND CHINA: BALANCING ECONOMIC GROWTH WITH CLIMATE CHANGE OBJECTIVES,” Georgetown Public Policy Review, February 26, Available Online at http://gppreview.com/2016/02/26/6091/, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

China has made some progress in combating some of the problems of climate change. The Chinese government in 2009 had promised to cut carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent from its 2005 level, by 2020 and Prime Minister Li further announced a new goal to extend the cut to 60-65 percent by 2030. Government data revealed that by the end of 2014, China had reduced carbon intensity by 33.8 percent from its 2005 level, making good on the commitment they made (Buckley, 2015). India has also announced its long-term plan to address global climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. The plan commits to reducing the intensity of fossil fuel emissions 30 to 35 percent from its 2005 level, by 2030, while producing 40 percent of its electricity from non-fossil-fuel sources such as wind, solar power, hydropower and nuclear energy by the same year (Barry and Davenport, 2015). On the international stage, a binding agreement has just passed that sets target levels for greenhouse gas emissions and formulating strategy plans and timelines to achieve those goals. In COP21 that took place in Paris, the U.S. said it would reduce its carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions as much as 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, while China said its emissions would peak no later than 2030. ¶ A new global framework comprising the Sustainable Development Goals, was also passed that addresses the issue of global climate change. This framework, along with other negotiating platforms such as the Green Climate Fund, Financing for Development and World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction aims to address the allocation of resources, funds or finance packages for developing countries to deal with the consequences of climate change, mitigation actions including details such as the origin of the funds, who will contribute to the funds and who will receive the funds. ¶ As we transition towards more sustainable development, addressing global climate change remains both a challenge and an opportunity. Advanced economies as well as the developing economies need to reevaluate their use of fossil fuels and contributions to greenhouse gas emissions as a means of stimulating economic growth. History has shown that the two are inextricably linked, but as new technologies and better governance emerges, this does not have to be the case going forward.

#### Chinese economic growth helps tackle climate change

Baker 15— Matt, program officer in its Environment Program at the Hewlett Foundation, 2015 (“China Steps Up on Climate Change Leadership: What’s Different This Time,” The Hewlett Foundation, December 7, Available Online at http://www.hewlett.org/blog/posts/china-steps-climate-change-leadership-what%E2%80%99s-different-time, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

One hundred eighty countries are meeting in Paris right now to address climate change for the first time since the 2009 United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen. The disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen Conference had many causes but no country was more castigated than China. Some of this was scapegoating but China’s role in that conference was ambiguous at best.¶ The Paris meeting is happening against a very different backdrop. The science of climate change is more widely accepted. Low carbon development is not just a hypothetical. Countries have invested billions into clean energy deployment and solar and wind are now cost competitive with fossil fuel in many parts of the world. The plans submitted by over 150 nations for the Paris meeting envision hundreds of gigawatts of growth in clean energy. But the biggest change is the role that China is playing. It’s worth taking a closer look at how far China has come since Copenhagen.¶ To begin with, China has found ways to produce more energy to support its economic growth with less carbon. In the run up to the Copenhagen conference, China was building three coal-fired plants a week. China burned 60 percent of the world’s coal. Last year, China's consumption and production of coal declined for the first time in decades. China’s total coal consumption dropped by 2.9 percent in 2014 and we’ll probably see a 4 percent decline this year. At the same time, China’s wind energy production has increased tenfold since 2009. This year alone, the country will add as much solar energy capacity as currently exists across the entire United States—and China expects to add even larger amounts in the years ahead.¶ Prior to the 2008 recession China’s GDP growth was over 10 percent; even in 2009 it was 8.7 percent. Today’s official GDP growth is lower than 7 percent and most experts believe the real economic statistics are even less robust. This much lower level of GDP growth has been dubbed the “new normal” and could have profound structural effects on the Chinese economy. As a result Chinese policy makers are pushing for “quality” GDP growth that is less energy/carbon intensive. Practically, this involves removing some of the favorable economic incentives enjoyed by state owned heavy industries and ‘rebalancing’ the economy to one that is more geared towards the internal Chinese market. A recent study from the London School of Economics argues that economic structural change will be one of the biggest drivers of emission reductions in China.¶ The day the Paris meeting started, Beijing was in the middle of another round of toxic smog. Since early 2011, the crippling air pollution episodes across the country have led to public outcry, especially among China’s new urban middle class. Public concerns over air pollution and associated health impacts have changed the domestic debates on environmental measures. While it took Great Britain and the U.S. more than thirty years to effectively address air pollution, China has vowed to address this problem in less than five years. Mitigating climate change can be an important co-benefit of addressing air pollution.¶ Copenhagen marked a turning point where China could no longer sit quietly and comfortably in the developing countries camp. In 2009 China overtook the United States and became the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter and both developing and developed countries pushed China to exert some leadership at the Copenhagen meeting. But in 2009 China was not yet prepared to lead. That’s changed over the last few years, as China has begun to play a much larger role on the world stage.¶ Last but not least, the improved collaboration between China and the U.S. helped create a more constructive atmosphere for the Paris negotiations. Climate change is indeed one of the very few topics in the China-U.S. bilateral relationship where more positive progress is likely. Both President’s Xi and Obama have invested political capital and resources to cultivate the relationship. The fact that China chose to announce its 2030 emission peaking target as part of the bilateral agreement with President Obama last year, rather than on any U.N. occasions, marks the change of China’s climate diplomacy strategy. Earlier this year, again in the U.S., a number of Chinese cities announced the “Alliance of Peaking Pioneer Cities,” committing to “peak” their carbon emissions earlier than 2030.

#### China’s economic growth is key to successful management of climate change

Mahindra et al 15— Anand G. Mahindra, chairman and managing director of Mahindra Group, an Indian multinational conglomerate holding company, TK Kurien, Indian chartered accountant, Zhang Xin, Chinese business magnate, Pan Shidi, Chinese business magnate, 2015 (“Economic growth and climate change,” The Hindu Business Line, December 13, Available Online at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/economic-growth-and-climate-change/article7983536.ece, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

In India and China, as in many emerging markets, business leaders now recognise the business case for sustainable, low-carbon development. We see the benefit of a shift towards low-carbon, climate-resilient growth, driven by innovation, cleaner energy and greater efficiency. By driving investment in more productive infrastructure, such growth can help us regain our growth momentum, from the years before the global financial crisis.¶ Indeed, the opportunities are immense.¶ Take the example of urbanisation. To date, the expansion of cities in India and China has gone hand-in-hand with strong economic growth. And this urbanisation is a global trend, which will continue over the next several decades, and most especially in developing countries.¶ To give a sense of scale, the world’s urban population is expected to grow by 2.5 billion between now and 2050 — more than a quarter of these will be in India and China. Around 25 million Chinese are currently moving to cities every year — that’s around three times the population of New York or London moving to cities every year.¶ Urbanisation has been, and will continue to be, an engine of emerging market growth. But the present model is posing a threat to the very cities we are creating. Problems such as air and water pollution have been well documented; if unaddressed they can undermine health, quality of life, and productivity.¶ By building low-carbon cities, using smarter electric and mass public transit, by investing in buildings efficiency and a digital, decentralised electric grid, by growing in a planned way, to help people commute and live more safely, we will create more jobs, cut poverty, reduce investment costs, and improve air and water quality. These are cities where people will want to bring their talent. They will be more competitive.¶ But there are challenges to harness this innovation, create these jobs and build these cities. It won’t happen automatically — it will need both public and private sectors working together. Ambitious policy and smart business decisions can accelerate and scale the needed transformations.¶ And as business leaders, we must mobilise capital and divert resources. For this, we will need direction. A new climate agreement, to be reached next month in Paris, can give that direction we need, if governments can agree national and global, short and long-term goals to cut carbon emissions, and a commitment to review and strengthen emissions targets over time.¶ If governments can show that a low-carbon transition has already started and is inevitable, we can show them the innovation, know-how, skills and investment to make it happen, both more swiftly and with greater benefits, both to the economy and climate.

#### Chinese economic growth enables crucial green investments

Hilton 15— Isabel, London-based international journalist and broadcaster. She is the author and co-author of several books and is founder and editor of chinadialogue.net, a non-profit, bilingual online publication based in London, Beijing and Delhi that focuses on the environment and climate change, 2015 (“COP21: China Prepares to Act on Climate Change,” Yale Global Review, December 1, Available Online at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/cop21-china-prepares-act-climate-change, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

But China is among the main hopes for COP21, the climate conference taking place in Paris. The United States and China substituted cooperation for mutual recrimination more than a year ago, when their respective leaders agreed on a climate accord, one of the few bright spots in a troubled bilateral relationship. China has also begun a radical transition from its fossil-fuel dependent and polluting model of growth towards a low-carbon economy.¶ Furthermore, China has promised to peak its emissions by 2030 or earlier, a significant change in attitude since 2009 when the nation not only refused to name a peak year but also blocked others from naming theirs. China has become the world’s largest investor in national renewable energy and the world's leading market for clean-energy finance, attracting US$54.2 billion investment in renewables in 2013, rising to $89.5 billion in 2014. By manufacturing at scale, China has also reduced the global price of solar technologies by roughly two thirds. The country’s wind power capacity, just 126,000 kilowatts in 2005, reached 96 gigawatts in 2014, with installed solar capacity reaching 28 gigawatts.¶ China also announced plans to set up the world’s largest national cap-and-trade scheme by 2017 and installed green ambitions at the center of the 13th Five Year Plan launching in 2016. It pledges to set up a fund to help the poorest adapt to climate change.¶ The beginnings of China’s green revolution were present at COP15: Senior leadership had been well briefed on climate-change impacts and the toxic legacy of three decades of high carbon, highly polluting industrialization. But China was still building massive infrastructure, racing to expand cities designed around roads and cars, and churning out steel and cement, all fueled by the coal-fired power that provided more than 70 percent of the country’s energy.¶ Despite this unpromising panorama, the end of the era of cheap, investment- and export-led growth, the era of high GDP growth at all costs – was in sight. China was close to pricing itself out of the market in cheap goods, in part because of its success: wages had risen and labor, one of China’s competitive advantages, was less abundant, in part because of China’s extreme family-planning policies. The pollution crisis was becoming too great to ignore.¶ Climate and energy began to feature prominently in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, 2006-2010, which promised “a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society.” The Five-Year Plans are key policy documents, setting out integrated frameworks for China’s economic development. In the course of the 11th plan, the government closed small and inefficient coal plants and reduced energy consumption per unit of GDP by almost 20 percent, saving more than 1.46 billion tons of CO2. ¶ ¶ The need for China’s maturing economy to become more efficient and move up the technology ladder became increasingly urgent. The 12th Five-Year Plan, 2011-2015, was an explicit blueprint for a greener China, with a 7 percent growth target, the promise of a further 16 percent reduction in energy density and, for the first time, a 17 percent reduction in carbon density. At the same time, the plan committed to deliver 11.4 percent of China’s energy with alternatives to fossil fuels by 2016 and 20 percent by 2030, to make major investments in a range of technologies that included electric vehicles, energy saving and environmental protection, new generation information technology, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energy and new materials The plan also directed rebalancing the economy in favor of services and domestic consumption, upgrading industries and stimulating innovation.¶ As part of its strategic economic shift, China aims to become a global leader in low-carbon technologies – supplying low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies to a carbon-contained world. Such ambitions motivate China to secure a strong climate deal in Paris.

#### China’s regulations for green tech have taken off and are becoming a common practice with incentives

Barlow 15 ([Edward Barlow](mailto:ebarlow@gcis.com.cn) is a senior analyst at GCiS China Services in Beijing “Opportunities in China’s Green-Tech Sector” Jan 12 2015 http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/opportunities-in-chinas-green-tech-sector/ )ski

Regulatory reform has paved the way for green-tech opportunities, but economics will determine what succeeds.by Edward BarlowThree decades of torrential economic growth have created significant opportunities for green technology in China. Green technology is a new and imprecisely defined term that is often applied to production, distribution, disposal, and products. Products and processes that use green tech are energy efficient, have a low environmental impact, and are consistent with best practices in environmental monitoring and management standards.The scale of China’s environmental damage, and the burgeoning awareness and commitment to rectify it, will drive demand for commercial solutions for years to come. But with an intense focus on short-term profit, most buyers respond primarily to the price and speed with which technology can deliver value, instead of its environmental impact.The fact that green tech is in play shows that environmental concerns are widespread. Recognizing that China’s development cannot be sustained without environmental reform, senior PRC leaders tasked with boosting the country’s technological development, infrastructure, and employment are also promoting plans for industrial scalability, efficiency, and quality. Identifying and understanding specific investment opportunities and their pros and cons will enable foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to play a significant role in China’s green-tech boom, mapping out long-term strategies in a country that rewards long-term commitments.¶ Enforcement of PRC laws often falls to local-level officials. They may interpret a law differently than central-level officials, who tend to understand the law and its intended effects better. Proper implementation of national-level laws at the provincial or county level, where environmental damage is most severe, thus takes time. Last year the PRC State Council elevated the State Environmental Protection Administration to ministerial status to emphasize the importance of environmental issues and give the new ministry the power to codify and enforce environmental regulations. But the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s power is still relatively weak, especially in the face of established pro-growth policies and the resulting mindset of local officials who tend to prioritize economic growth. Green objectives have long been a part of China’s economic plans. But it was not until the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP, 2006-10) that China set targets for the energy intensity rate at which resources are converted to gross domestic product, resource dependency, and pollution. Though China will fall far short of its energy intensity targets, renewable energy capacity will meet and perhaps exceed targets (see Figure 1). (China aimed to reduce its energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 percent over the five-year period but has reported annual reductions of about 3 percent.) NDRC announced in May that it would invest ¥3 trillion ($439.2 billion) in renewable energy, electric cars, energy-saving construction materials, and other green technologies between now and 2020.The government’s emphasis and encouragement has made green tech desirable in many industries. Industry is in many instances keen to toe the line and win favor by demonstrating energy efficiency and reducing pollution. The greening of a company has become synonymous with its maturity, and in some sectors “green” is marketed as high status. The government is also using its stimulus package to encourage the use of green tech. Of the State Council’s ¥4 trillion ($585.2 billion) stimulus package, ¥210 billion ($30 billion) has been earmarked for “energy efficiency, emissions reduction, and eco-construction projects.” The package, which reportedly advances the 12th Five-Year Plan for Energy (2010-15) by a year, makes separate provisions for green tech in water conservancy, a smart grid, and the development of transportation, healthcare, and education. Airports, hospitals, and schools will incorporate green building materials under the plan. Thus, green-tech interests could be directly and indirectly served in up to 50 percent of the stimulus.

#### Growth key to green economy – solves warming

Canadian Press 15(The Canadian Press 10/21/15 “Apple Announces Factory Upgrades In Plan To Help China Reduce Air Pollution” <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/10/21/apple-china-air-pollution_n_8353408.html> )ski

Apple is cleaning up its manufacturing operations in China to reduce the air pollution caused by the factories that have assembled hundreds of millions of iPhones and iPads during the past eight years.¶ The world's most valuable company is working with its Chinese suppliers to produce 2.2 gigawatts of solar power and other renewable energy by 2020.¶ The commitment announced Wednesday represents Apple's latest attempt to prevent the popularity of its devices and digital services from increasing the carbon emissions that are widely believed to changing the Earth's climate.¶ Apple Inc. estimates 20 million metric tons of greenhouse gas pollution will be avoided in China between now and the time all the projects are completed. That's like having four million fewer cars on the road for a year.¶ Panels capable of generating about 200 megawatts of solar power will be financed by Apple in the northern, southern and eastern regions of China, where many of its suppliers are located. The Cupertino, California, company is teaming up with its Chinese suppliers to build the capacity for the remaining 2 gigawatts of renewable energy, which will be a mix of solar, wind and hydroelectric power.¶ Foxconn, which runs the factory where the most iPhones are assembled, is pledging to contribute 400 megawatts of solar power as part of the 2-gigabyte commitment. The solar panels to be built by 2018 in China's Henan Province are supposed to produce as much renewable energy as Foxconn's Zhengzhou factory consumes while making iPhones.¶ Apple has made protecting the environment a higher priority since Tim Cook replaced the late Steve Jobs as the company's CEO four years ago.¶ "Climate change is one of the great challenges of our time, and the time for action is now," Cook said in a statement. "The transition to a new green economy requires innovation, ambition and purpose."¶ Apple just completed projects in China that generate 40 megawatts of solar energy to offset the power required by its 24 stores and 19 offices in the country. All of Apple's data centres, offices and stores in the U.S. already have been running on renewable energy.

### A2: No Taiwan War

#### The PLA attacks Taiwan when stability begins to fade—even if we don’t win collapse we just need to win China perceives self weakness

Chang 1 --- Gordon G. Chang, trustee of Cornell University and popular China expert, 2001 (“The Coming Collapse of China,” Random House New York, not available online, pp. 263-4, ES)

“But Kinmen and Matsu would just be appetizers tor the PLA. Like a wolf, the Chinese Communist Party will only be satisfied when it has the sheep in its stomach," said exile Wei Jingsheng, referring to Taiwan. The famous dissident knows that conquering outlying islands will not be enough, especially for military leaders who think they can swallow the entire enchilada. Senior Mainland generals have boasted that they can take the main island of Taiwan in one day. That statement is nonsense, so we assume they don't actually believe what they say. Yet grave miscalcu- lations and undiluted sentiments launch armies. When military leaders lose their sense of reality and political masters have their own selfish agendas, a nation can choose the wrong path. That's true especially if the survival of the Party is at stake. In the spring of 2000, Jiang Zemin commissioned briefings on the collapse of Communist and authoritarian regimes around the world. He undoubt- edly learned the theory that the Second World War deferred the demise of the Soviet Union by dampening corruption and reinforcing the notion of self-sacrifice. Perhaps Beijing talks war these days because China's leaders share the notion that minor hostilities, even a minor excursion such as China's forray into Vietnam in 1979. are generally beneficial for the People’s Republic. Or perhaps we are hearing those bellicose words because Beijing thinks that it is now or never. Taiwan is drifting away, and someday it will be too late to bring it back into the fold. Some think that if China has to fight, it should do so while there are still serving generals who have seen combat. In a few years' time all experienced officers will have retired, in- cluding Defense Minister Chi Haotian and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian, both of whom are scheduled to leave their posts in 2002. And the PLA argues that the time for an invasion is now, before Taiwan can rearm with the next generation of American weapons. So the stars are aligned toward war. Twice Jiang Zemin has threat- ened conflict, and twice he has backed down. No government, especially one in a country' where "face" is critical, can afford to do that a third time. Beijing's leaders think that war will be popular, so it won't take much to start the next crisis. Maybe it will be a mistake or perhaps a de- liberate act, but the next crisis looks as if it will be the one that leads to conflict. And if there are hostilities, they will be the last for the People's Republic. We need a war, which we will lose," said a Chinese journalist in May 2000. "That will destroy faith in the present dynasty." If there is war, the Mainland will lose. And the losses will be high. For the Communist leaders, losing ten thousand or one hundred thousand soldiers is noth- ing," said one Taipei resident recently. "They consider the life of a Chi- nese worthless." The Party didn't even blink at its horrendous Korean War casualties and probably will not care about those in the future even if they are high. Beijing's leaders will just talk about glory and say that the human sacrifice was worth it. But that's not how our Wang Chuanning will see it if his Jason is needlessly lost in a misconceived military adven- ture. Wang and grieving relatives may not immediately take to the streets, but the populace will lose its faith that the Communist Party can lead. It will be then that the Chinese demand the right to govern them- selves.

### A2: Warming Turn – No Warming

#### Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increase

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

#### No warming – models are wrong, feedbacks are negative and its cyclical

Evans ‘11

(David, doctor in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system, “Climate models are fundamentally flawed as they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide,” 3/23, <http://www.ted.com/conversations/2533/climate_models_are_fundamental.html>)

The core idea of every official climate model: for each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide warming by a factor of three – so two thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors), only one third is due to extra carbon dioxide. This is the core of the issue. All the disagreements spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere. There is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960’s. The climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot-spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about 10km up. Weather balloons have found no hot-spot. Not even a small one. This evidence proves the climate models are fundamentally flawed and they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide. There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. In the US, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has leveled off. So what is really going on with the climate? The earth has been in a warming trend since the Little Ice Age around 1680. The Pacific Decadal Oscillation causes alternating global warming and cooling for 25 – 30 years at a go in each direction. Having just finished a warming phase, expect mild global cooling for the next two decades.

#### Aerosols block warming now

Biello ‘11

(David Biello- award-winning online associate editor for environment and energy for Scientific American- Stratospheric Pollution Helps Slow Global Warming-July 11 2011- [http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming](http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming))

Now, research suggests that for the past decade, such stratospheric aerosols—injected into the atmosphere by either recent volcanic eruptions or human activities such as coal burning—are slowing down [global warming](http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/01/08/new-paper-agw-may-save-us-from-the-next-ice-age/?id=global-warming-and-climate-change). "Aerosols acted to keep warming from being as big as it would have been," says atmospheric scientist John Daniel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Earth System Research Laboratory, who helped lead the [research published online in *Science*](http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-01/human-co2-emissions-could-avert-next-ice-age-study-says) on July 21. "It's still warming, it's just not warming as much as it would have been." Essentially, sulfur dioxide gets emitted near the surface, either by a coal-fired power plant's smokestack or a volcano. If that SO2 makes it to the stratosphere—the middle layer of the atmosphere 10 kilometers up—it forms droplets of diluted sulfuric acid, known as [aerosols](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerosol). These aerosols reflect sunlight away from the planet, shading the surface and cooling temperatures. And some can persist for a few years, prolonging that cooling. By analyzing satellite data and other measures, Daniel and his colleagues found that such aerosols have been on the rise in Earth's atmosphere in the past decade, nearly doubling in concentration. That concentration has reflected roughly 0.1 watts per meter squared of sunlight away from the planet, enough to o/ffset roughly one-third of the 0.28 watts per meter squared of extra heat trapped by [rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases](http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=a-24-degree-c-rise-by-2020-probably-2011-01-20) such as carbon dioxide. The researchers calculate that the aerosols prevented 0.07 degrees Celsius of warming in average temperatures since 2000.

#### Temperatures this decade have balanced out- no changes

Totty ‘9

Michael Totty, 2009 news editor in the WSJ's San Francisco bureau. reporter, editor and podcaster ([http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574551303527570212](http://standeyo.com/Reports/Ice_age/050614.ice.age.html).html) Wall Street Journal, “What Global Warming?”, December 6, 2009)

But this isn't evidence of a cooling planet. Partly, it's a result of picking an exceptionally hot year—1998—as a starting point. That year experienced an unusually strong El Niño, a natural and periodic warming of the Pacific Ocean that can have powerful effects on global climate. The long-term trend since the mid-1970s shows warming per decade of about 0.18 degree Celsius (about 0.32 degree Fahrenheit). That temperatures this decade have hardly increased demonstrates how natural year-to-year variations in climate can either add to or subtract from the long-term warming trend caused by the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The '00s still have been exceptionally warm: The 12 years from 1997 through 2008 were among the 15 warmest on record, and the decade itself was hotter than any previous 10-year period. While 2008 was the coolest year since 2000—a result of the cooling counterpart of El Niño—it was still the 11th-warmest year on record. And 2009 is on track to be among the five warmest.

### A2: Warming Turn – Not Anthropogenic

#### Sunspots cause warming – new isotope records prove

Watts ‘11

(Anthony, Meteorologist and president of IntelliWeather Inc., citing “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar irradiance leads to large historical solar forcing,” a study conducted by the World Radiation Center in Switzerland, “New solar reconstruction paper suggests 6x greater solar forcing change than cited by the IPCC,” 5/10, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstruction-paper-suggests-6x-tsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/>)

This is interesting. This recent paper published in the journal Astronomy & Astrophysics here has done a reconstruction of TSI using Beryllium 10 isotope records combined with sunspot records. The paper suggests that the Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) has increased since the end of the Little Ice Age (around 1850) by up to 6 x more than cited by the IPCC. Here is how they did it:

For the reconstruction to the past this amplitude is scaled with proxies for solar activity. Two proxies are available for the reconstruction: Group sunspot number, which is available from the present to 1610 AD, and the solar modulation potential extending back to circa 7300 BC. The latter is a measure of the heliospheric shielding from cosmic rays derived from the analysis of cosmogenic isotope abundances in tree rings or ice cores, and is available with a time resolution of 2-3 solar cycles (Steinhilber et al. 2008). Although sunspot number dropped to zero for a long time during the Maunder minimum, the solar cycle was uninterrupted (Beer et al. 1998; Usoskin et al. 2001) and the modulation potential did not fall to zero. Hence, a reconstruction based solely on sunspot number may underestimate the solar activity during theMaunderminimum. Therefore in our reconstruction we used the solar modulation potential to calculate the long-term variations and sunspot number to superpose them with the 11-year cycle variations (see the Online Section 6.2). The modulation potential used in the calculations is based on the composite of data determined from the cosmogenic isotope records of 10Be and neutronmonitor. 10Be data are available up to about 1970 (McCracken et al. 2004) and neutron monitor data, which are used to calculate the current solar modulation potential, are available since the 1950s.

#### Prefer our methodology – cites ice cores and monitoring

Shapiro et al. ‘11

(A. I. Shapiro, W. Schmutz, E. Rozanov, M. Schoell, M. Haberreiter, A. V. Shapiro and S. Nyeki, researchers for the World Radiation Center, Switzerland and Institute for Atmospheric and Climate science ETH, Switzerland, “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar irradiance leads to large historical solar forcing,” 2/22, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstruction-paper-suggests-6x-tsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/>)

The variable Sun is the most likely candidate for the natural forcing of past climate changes on time scales of 50 to 1000 years. Evidence for this understanding is that the terrestrial climate correlates positively with the solar activity. During the past 10 000 years, the Sun has experienced the substantial variations in activity and there have been numerous attempts to reconstruct solar irradiance. While there is general agreement on how solar forcing varied during the last several hundred years – all reconstructions are proportional to the solar activity – there is scientific controversy on the magnitude of solar forcing. Aims. We present a reconstruction of the total and spectral solar irradiance covering 130 nm–10 μm from 1610 to the present with an annual resolution and for the Holocene with a 22-year resolution. Methods. We assume that the minimum state of the quiet Sun in time corresponds to the observed quietest area on the present Sun. Then we use available long-term proxies of the solar activity, which are 10Be isotope concentrations in ice cores and 22-year smoothed neutron monitor data, to interpolate between the present quiet Sun and the minimum state of the quiet Sun. This determines the long-term trend in the solar variability, which is then superposed with the 11-year activity cycle calculated from the sunspot number. The time-dependent solar spectral irradiance from about 7000 BC to the present is then derived using a state-of-the-art radiation code.

Conclusions

We present a new technique to reconstruct total and spectral solar irradiance over the Holocene. We obtained a large historical solar forcing between the Maunder minimum and the present, as well as a significant increase in solar irradiance in the first half of the twentieth-century. Our value of the historical solar forcing is remarkably larger than other estimations published in the recent literature.

### A2: Warming Turn – Feedbacks Are Negative

#### Positive feedback models wrong, their impacts exaggerated

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

The direct warming due to doubling CO2 levels in the atmosphere can be calculated to cause a warming of about one degree Celsius. The IPCC computer models predict a much larger warming, three degrees Celsius or even more, because they assume changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct warming from CO2. Many lines of observational evidence suggest that this "positive feedback" also has been greatly exaggerated. There has indeed been some warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the so-called Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a substantial fraction of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with mankind.

#### Empirics proves feedbacks are negative

Worstall ‘12

(Tim, writer for Forbes, “If the MWP Was Global What Does That Tell Us About Climate Change Now?” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/23/if-the-mwp-was-global-what-does-that-tell-us-about-climate-change-now/>)

That the Earth has temperature cycles isn’t a surprise, we all know there were Ice Ages. So that we had a time when temperatures were higher than now and everything was just dandy doesn’t mean that it will all remain dandy if we carry on in our current manner. However, the great unknown of climate change science is “climate sensitivity”. This is how much temperature will rise given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (technically, CO2-equivalent, converting all the methane etc to one handy unit). We know how much will come directly: 0.7 of a degree. That isn’t something to worry overmuch about. The question then becomes, well, what happens then: when the ice melts and albedo lowers, when warmer weather and higher CO2 increase plant growth, what happens to clouds and so on through a list of hundreds of possible feedbacks. We don’t even know if some of these will be positive or negative, will further increase temperatures or reduce them and we certainly don’t know what the cumulative effect will be. Currently the best guesses are in the 2 to 4.5 degree range but these are indeed guesses. Well informed guesses, being done with a variety of methods by very good scientists trying to get at the truth but they are guesses. And the most important information underlying them is, well, what happened previous times the Earth got warmer? Did it carry on doing so? Or did it get so far and stop or even retreat? Which is where the MWP comes in. If it was a truly global phenomenon then we’ve more evidence (only more evidence, nothing conclusive at all) that rises in temperature similar to what we’re seeing don’t, always, carry on. Sometimes at least they stop of their own accord: could be solar action, could be feedbacks. From which the takeaway point is that perhaps climate sensitivity is lower than currently thought and thus climate change is less dangerous than currently thought.

#### Err neg – if feedbacks are somewhere in the middle adaptation solves

Ridley ‘12

(Matt, writer for Wired Magazine, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” 8/17, <http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all>)

So, should we worry or not about the warming climate? It is far too binary a question. The lesson of failed past predictions of ecological apocalypse is not that nothing was happening but that the middle-ground possibilities were too frequently excluded from consideration. In the climate debate, we hear a lot from those who think disaster is inexorable if not inevitable, and a lot from those who think it is all a hoax. We hardly ever allow the moderate “lukewarmers” a voice: those who suspect that the net positive feedbacks from water vapor in the atmosphere are low, so that we face only 1 to 2 degrees Celsius of warming this century; that the Greenland ice sheet may melt but no faster than its current rate of less than 1 percent per century; that net increases in rainfall (and carbon dioxide concentration) may improve agricultural productivity; that ecosystems have survived sudden temperature lurches before; and that adaptation to gradual change may be both cheaper and less ecologically damaging than a rapid and brutal decision to give up fossil fuels cold turkey. We’ve already seen some evidence that humans can forestall warming-related catastrophes. A good example is malaria, which was once widely predicted to get worse as a result of climate change. Yet in the 20th century, malaria retreated from large parts of the world, including North America and Russia, even as the world warmed. Malaria-specific mortality plummeted in the first decade of the current century by an astonishing 25 percent. The weather may well have grown more hospitable to mosquitoes during that time. But any effects of warming were more than counteracted by pesticides, new antimalarial drugs, better drainage, and economic development. Experts such as Peter Gething at Oxford argue that these trends will continue, whatever the weather. Just as policy can make the climate crisis worse—mandating biofuels has not only encouraged rain forest destruction, releasing carbon, but driven millions into poverty and hunger—technology can make it better. If plant breeders boost rice yields, then people may get richer and afford better protection against extreme weather. If nuclear engineers make fusion (or thorium fission) cost-effective, then carbon emissions may suddenly fall. If gas replaces coal because of horizontal drilling, then carbon emissions may rise more slowly. Humanity is a fast-moving target. We will combat our ecological threats in the future by innovating to meet them as they arise, not through the mass fear stoked by worst-case scenarios.

### A2: Warming Turn – Models Fail

#### Observational evidence disproves climate models

Evans ‘12

(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system, Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.",7 Apr. 2011)

The planet reacts to that extra carbon dioxide, which changes everything. Most critically, the extra warmth causes more water to evaporate from the oceans. But does the water hang around and increase the height of moist air in the atmosphere, or does it simply create more clouds and rain? Back in 1980, when the carbon dioxide theory started, no one knew. The alarmists guessed that it would increase the height of moist air around the planet, which would warm the planet even further, because the moist air is also a greenhouse gas. This is the core idea of every official climate model: For each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, they claim it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide warming by a factor of three—so two-thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors); only one-third is due to extra carbon dioxide. That's the core of the issue. All the disagreements and misunderstandings spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere, and there is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960s, many thousands of them every year. The climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about 10 kilometres up, as the layer of moist air expands upwards into the cool dry air above. During the warming of the late 1970s, '80s and '90s, the weather balloons found no hot spot. None at all. Not even a small one. This evidence proves that the climate models are fundamentally flawed, that they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide. This evidence first became clear around the mid-1990s.

#### Models aren’t detailed enough – prefer observational evidence

Spencer ‘8

(Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08, [http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/14/ice_age/))

What I have presented here is, as far as I know, the most detailed attempt to reconcile satellite observations of the climate system with the behavior of climate models in the context of feedbacks. Instead of the currently popular practice of building immensely complex and expensive climate models and then making only simple comparisons to satellite data, I have done just the opposite: Examine the satellite data in great detail, and then build the simplest model that can explain the observed behavior of the climate system. The resulting picture that emerges is of an IN-sensitive climate system, dominated by negative feedback. And it appears that the reason why most climate models are instead VERY sensitive is due to the illusion of a sensitive climate system that can arise when one is not careful about the physical interpretation of how clouds operate in terms of cause and effect (forcing and feedback). Indeed, climate researchers seldom (if ever) dig into the archives of satellite data and ask the question, “What are the satellite data telling us about the real climate system?” Instead, most climate research money now is funneled into building expensive climate models which are then expected to provide a basis for formulating public policy. Given the immense effort that has been invested, one would think that those models would be more rigorously tested. There is nothing inherently wrong with a model-centric approach to climate research…as long as the modeler continues to use the observations to guide the model development over time. Unfortunately, as Richard Lindzen at MIT has pointed out, the fact that modelers use the term “model validation” rather than “model testing” belies their inherent preference of theory over observations. The allure of models is strong: they are clean, with well-defined equations and mathematical precision. Observations of the real climate system are dirty, incomplete, and prone to measurement error. The comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and cursory. They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either the models or the satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming problem will be.

### Ext – Growth Low Now

#### China’s economy slowing – forecasts and second quarter data

Glenn 16— Elias, Correspondent, China Economy at Thomson Reuters, 2016 (“China economy to grow 6.6 percent, needs policy support: government think tank,” Reuters, June 28, Available Online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-growth-idUSKCN0ZE0CM, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

China's economy will grow at about 6.6 percent this year, and will need to be underpinned by policy support in the second half to counter downward pressures, according to the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The forecast from one of China's top government think-tanks was reported by the official Shanghai Securities Journal newspaper on Tuesday, and marked a slightly more downbeat outlook that one given in May, when CASS had forecast growth of 6.6 percent to 6.8 percent for the year. Consumer price inflation will likely rise 2 percent for the year, while the decline in producer prices will

slow, according to the CASS forecasts. Inflation was running at 2.1 percent for the first five months of the year. Retail spending growth will be stable, but money supply growth will slow, as will growth in investment in fixed assets and property development. CASS said China should deepen economic reform and restructuring in the second half of the year, optimize leverage levels, and clean up zombie firms.

#### Bottoming of China’s economy expected in 2017

Xinhua 16— the official press agency of the People's Republic of China, 2016 (“

Economic Watch: China's economy on alert for multiple shocks,” Xinhua Net, June 26, Available Online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/26/c\_135467828.htm, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

Experts have warned of stronger downward pressure and recommended policy tools to cushion shocks as China's economy confronts challenges such as slowing investment, high debt and weak exports. China's gross domestic product (GDP) expanded 6.7 percent in the first quarter, the slowest reading since the global financial crisis in early 2009. Experts with Renmin University of China estimated in a report the economy would expand 6.6 percent annually this year, 0.3 percentage points lower than last year. Liu Yuanchun, an economist at Renmin University of China, said although the economy steadied earlier this year, downward pressure will weigh due to a volatile overseas outlook and rising financial risks. Structural reform will also increase the pain. The report observed that the world's second largest economy will reach a bottom between late 2016 and early 2017. Li Daokui, an economics professor with Tsinghua University, cautioned the investment boom will not persist, and consumer spending has shown risks. Wage growth lags behind GDP growth, and exports will not bottom out until the second half of 2017. Authorities have predicted that China's economy will follow an L-shaped path as downward pressures weigh and new growth momentum has yet to pick up.

#### China’s economy facing downward pressure

Wong 16— Jacqueline, Filing Editor at Thomson Reuters, 2016 (“China's economy faces relatively large downward pressure: central bank report,” Reuters, June 21, Available Online at http://in.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-cenbank-idINKCN0Z70T4, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China’s economy still faces relatively large downward pressure, the central bank said in its 2015 annual report, adding that it hopes to keep economic growth within a reasonable range. The People’s Bank of China reiterated it would keep monetary policy prudent and pledged to strictly control additional industrial capacity, the central bank said in the report which also contained the outlook for China’s economic conditions. The central bank expects mild acceleration of inflation, but said the inflation outlook faces uncertainty due to rising housing prices and volatility in agricultural product prices.

#### Growth declining – trade and PMI indicate slowing rates

Chandran 16— Nyshka, writer for CNBC.com, with a focus on Asia-Pacific economies and politics. She holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and History from the University of Toronto, 2016 (“Asian economic indicators show China set to post a subdued Q2,” CNBC, June 1, Available Online at http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/01/china-economic-news-asian-indicators-likely-to-confirm-slowdown-continues.html, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

With only a month left until the end of the quarter, there are tell-tale signs that China is set to log a subdued April-June performance. But it's not mainland data that economists are looking at; the tea leaves lie instead in the teapots of Beijing's Asian neighbors. Amid the high amount of skepticism surrounding the accuracy of Chinese data, a look at recent economic indicators of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, some of China's biggest trading partners in the region, could be more fruitful, noted Julian Evans-Pritchard, China economist at Capital Economics. "South Korean exports, in particular, are a good proxy for how China is performing given the high amount of intermediate goods that Seoul exports to Beijing," Evans-Pritchard said. China buys around one-fourth of South Korea's exports and data on Wednesday revealed South Korea's total May exports contracted 6 percent on-year, marking nearly one year of straight declines and a major miss on the 1.6 percent expansion Reuters had anticipated. Exports to the world's second-largest economy meanwhile fell 9.1 percent on year, down for the 11th consecutive month. This indicates Chinese import demand is weakening on the back of tepid appetite from mainland consumers and enterprises, Evans-Pritchard said. Japanese exports paint an equally glum picture. April data showed a 10.1 percent annual fall, the fastest decline in three months, with exports to China falling 7.6 percent. China's share of Japan's exports amounts to 17.5 percent¶ Taiwan, which counts China as its biggest export market, witnessed an 11.4 percent annual plunge in April exports, with orders to China tanking 10.9 percent.¶ It's not just Asian trade data that suggest a slowing China, manufacturing Purchasing Manager's Index (PMI) are also helpful, Evans-Pritchard added. "These PMIs correlate with Chinese export performance simply because when Asian factories get more new orders, that likely signals an increase in Chinese intermediary goods." But regional factory activity declined in May. Japan's PMI stood at 47.7, its fastest pace of decline in over three years, South Korean factories reported a reading of 50.1. in May, little changed from the previous month, and Taiwan's PMI declined to 48.5, its fastest fall since October.

#### China’s economy slowing as a result of new consumption-driven economy

Chang 16— Sue, markets reporter based in San Francisco. She previously worked for Dow Jones Newswires in Asia and served as the agency's bureau chief in Seoul, South Korea, 2016 (“China’s first-quarter GDP growth likely slowed to a seven-year low,” Marketwatch, April 13, Available Online at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-first-quarter-gdp-growth-likely-slowed-to-a-seven-year-low-2016-04-12, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China’s economy likely lost more momentum in the first quarter, with its gross domestic product growth slowing to the weakest level in seven years. “We expect first-quarter real GDP growth to edge down to 6.7% year on year from 6.8% in fourth quarter, with modestly slower growth in both secondary and tertiary sectors,” said Bank of America Merrill Lynch analysts in a report. The outlook is in line with the average of 6.7% projected by economists in a survey by The Wall Street Journal. If the predictions bear out, it will be the slowest quarterly growth since the GDP rose 6.2% in the first quarter of 2009, during the global financial crisis. Beijing will release official first-quarter GDP data on Thursday, which will provide more context to how the world’s second-largest economy is faring amid lingering worries that China’s economic woes could spill over to other regions and even derail the U.S.’s fragile recovery.¶The Bank of America analysts expect China’s GDP data to show tepid industrial activity and a contraction in the financial sector, due in part to a high comparison base a year earlier on the back of a surge in stock trading volume. Economists have warned that China’s economic performance will suffer as the government presses ahead with its ambitious plan to transition away from a manufacturing-intensive model to a consumption-driven economy. “We expect this trend in slowing growth to continue into 2016, likely contributing to a first-quarter 2016 year-over-year growth rate below 6.8% as GDP growth moves toward the lower end of the Chinese central government’s target range,” said Peter Donisanu, global research analyst at Wells Fargo Investment Institute.

#### Major decrease in in growth do to lack of investment

Wong 4/11 (Cal Wong is the Hong Kong Correspondent for *The Diplomat*’s China Power blog and an award winning multimedia journalist based in Hong Kong. His work has been featured on the*BBC*, Australia’s *ABC*, and Hong Kong’s *South China Morning Post*. In 2015 he won a Human Rights Press Award for a documentary he made on the universal suffrage movement in Hong Kong. Prior to writing, he worked as a banker and was a qualified Chartered Accountant in Australia before moving to Hong Kong. 4/11/16 “As China's Economy Slows, Workers' Anger Soars As workers face layoffs and unpaid wages, they are increasingly taking to the streets. “ <http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/as-chinas-economy-slows-workers-anger-soars/> )ski

HONG KONG – As the demand for products from China has decreased due to increasing labor costs and declining capital investment, the closure of factories that employ many thousands of individuals has revealed a major deficiency in the Chinese market: the protection of the roughly 270 million migrant workers China’s stellar economic rise saw the increase of employment in the manufacturing and retail sectors. Spurred on by a growing middle class and a booming export economy, jobs were plentiful and the wages appeared to be ever increasing. Since 2006, the national average yearly wages for urban workers has grown by 273 percent, according to [Trading Economics data](http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/wages" \t "_blank). China’s three decades of growth has been driven by millions upon millions of new workers moving from the agricultural countryside to urban factories — factories that have been built on the back of government investments along with government funded infrastructure and heavy machinery. That same engine of growth produces a paradox that has long been known to economists — an increase in education levels results in a decline in fertility rates, and therefore, declining population growth. In China, the problem was exacerbated by the “one child policy,” which artificially limited China’s population growth even before increasing wealth and education levels set in. According to a 2012 [report by Accenture](https://www.accenture.com/hk-en/insight-outlook-beyond-capital-and-labor-china-productivity-frontier.aspx" \t "_blank) (updated in 2014), the Chinese working-age population may have already peaked. Adding to this problem has been the debt binge of the Chinese government, households, and corporations. The credit hole has quadrupled to 282 percent of GDP since 2007 according to a [McKinsey report](http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/debt-and-not-much-deleveraging" \t "_blank) and has left country with a heavy debt repayment obligation. Growth and productivity is a function of changes in labor and capital; conversely, so is its decline. To put it simply, the combined result is a faltering, debt-laden economy. As the cost of labor and capital has increased, demand has fallen. The decrease in demand for manufactured goods and the tendency of some manufacturers to over leverage has resulted in many factory closures. Oftentimes, this has left workers in the dark with many factory owners simply refusing to pay staff; some even go as far as to close up shop and disappear entirely. With no compensation for work already performed, workers have increasingly taken to the streets in protest. On April 18, hundreds of workers went on strike at SAE Magnetics in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, after it announced the closure of one of its departments, threatening the livelihoods of hundreds of workers, according to the Hong Kong based NGO China Labour Bulletin. Before taking to the streets, the workers had demanded that they receive their legally-entitled compensation but had received no response from management. The factory produces hard disk components for global customers and employs approximately 10,000 people. It was once held as a shining example of Chinese manufacturing and economic progress by former President Hu Jintao. This example is emblematic of the wider situation

#### China’s economy slumping – multiple statistical indicators

Dresbach 16— Jim, Digital Writer at Voice of America, 2016 (“The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance,” VOA News, March 1, Available Online at http://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/china-economy-declines/3214549.html, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

China’s economy continues to weaken, according to recent surveys.¶ China is the world’s second-biggest economy. Figures released Tuesday show the country’s factory production is at its lowest level in four years. The official Purchasing Manager’s Index, or PMI, tracks activity in factories. The manufacturing PMI in China is reported by Markit Economics. The index dropped to 49 in China in February. In January, the PMI was 49.4.¶ Any reading of the PMI below 50 signals contraction. It was the seventh month in a row the PMI dropped.¶Observers of the Chinese economy say February’s PMI reading could have been affected by the New Year holiday. Many factories close for an extended time and workers stay home during the holiday. Another survey showed China’s economy is slumping. The Caixin/Markit purchasing managers’ index fell to a five-month low of 48 last month. It was the 12th month in a row that the index declined. The index calculates economic output, new orders and employment. The economy in China grew at an annual rate of nearly 7 percent in 2015. That was the slowest amount of growth in 25 years. To give the economy a boost, the Chinese announced a round of spending to help the economy and added to the money supply. The People’s Bank of China late Monday announced it was cutting the amount of money that banks must hold as reserves.¶ The People’s Bank also added $100 billion in cash into the banking system to aid in new lending.

### Ext – BIT Solves China Econ

#### The BIT boosts China’s economy – innovation, entrepreneurship, competition

Schwartz ‘14

Mark Schwartz is The Chair of Goldman Sachs Asia Pacific. Mark earned an MBA, an MPP and a BA from Harvard University and is on the Boards of Dean’s Advisors at Harvard College, Harvard Business School and the Harvard School of Public Health. - “A BIT of Help for the U.S. and China” – Wall Street Journal - April 2, 2014 - <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303532704579476720853893300>

For China, the BIT will help advance the economic reform goals reiterated by its leaders at last month's National People's Congress. It can help China achieve these goals by increasing capital available to private firms (especially small- and medium-sized businesses), which often rely on informal lending. The foreign capital, and the management expertise that so often comes with it, would promote innovation and entrepreneurship, which are critical to any economy's long-term success. Deploying private capital also helps foster healthy competition, making state-owned enterprises more efficient and better suited to compete in the global marketplace. Nor are business benefits the only advantage to a U.S.-China investment treaty. There would also be considerable political advantages to concluding a deal. The difficulties faced by each country's investors in the other's economy have created significant friction between Washington and Beijing over the years. This is the case both when Chinese investments in the U.S. generate political controversy, and when American companies discover they aren't allowed to invest in booming Chinese industries. An investment treaty would help ratchet down such tensions by improving market access and ensuring greater predictability. Leaders of the two largest economies in the world should focus on policies and initiatives big enough to result in meaningful economic growth but modest enough to be achieved. The U.S.-China investment treaty is one such initiative. Both sides have a great opportunity to advance their countries' interests and the global economy. The business communities on both sides of the Pacific have much to gain and should come together to play a constructive role supporting the negotiations and seizing the opportunity to do our BIT for global growth.

#### The BIT allows China to transition into the service sector – frees up capital and balances economy

Paulson ‘13

Henry Paulson was formerly the U.S. Treasury secretary and now serves as the Chair of the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago – “The Path to Double Happiness” – Wall Street Journal - June 4, 2013 - http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323469804578523144222235104

In addition to addressing these two key issues, promoting cross-border investment flows is also necessary. One vehicle for doing so, while advancing negotiations on market access and securing equal competitive conditions, is the Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT. Such a treaty would enhance investor protections for both sides. If China is to achieve its new economic model, it must introduce competition into its economy. In financial services, for example, allowing foreign financial firms to compete equally will create more open and efficient capital markets and help transition China to a nation of investors, not just savers. Beijing should also introduce more competition to help its own private sector. Anticompetitive practices hurt Chinese private firms nearly as much as foreign ones. For all their subsidies, benefits and preferential access to credit available only to state-owned enterprises, it is private firms that are the major source of Chinese job creation. Weaning state-owned companies off subsidies will benefit them by making them more competitive. It also would ensure market rules for the private, small and medium-size businesses that create most Chinese jobs, yet are largely excluded from state-backed loans and resource subsidies. Ultimately, both countries need capital to flow more freely: Americans because they need job-creating capital flows, including direct investment from China, and the Chinese because Beijing wants to invest more in the U.S. China complains about a lack of clarity in the U.S. regulatory framework. The U.S. could help address that concern by enacting more transparent investment policies, which would lead to more Chinese investment in the U.S. This is a rare moment of opportunity for both countries. We can continue to play defense, or we can play offense by using negotiations to make our economies more balanced. If we squander the moment, we will regret it.

#### A BIT is key to economic stability and reform---spurs competition, job growth, and infrastructure investment

Peterson 15 [Doug, president and CEO of McGraw Hill Financial., JUL 27, 2015, “China And The U.S. Need To Come Together--At Least Economically”, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/07/27/china-and-the-u-s-need-to-come-together-at-least-economically/#3e288f5d23d3>, Accessed 7/1/16, JS]

China’s growth has slowed in recent quarters. Yet with about 20% of the world’s population in China, the opportunities are vast, the talent pool is highly qualified, and American businesses want to invest. It’s crucial we get this relationship right and engage at all levels in a productive and cooperative dialogue. We must continue to make progress on all fronts to support economic growth that will augment China’s enormous unleashed potential as an economic partner. China’s economy expanded seven percent year-on-year in the second quarter, official data showed on July 15, **beating expectations but with weak investment and trade acting as a drag.** We’ve taken some steps, but we need to go further The recent vote in the Senate to give President Barack Obama a key tool in negotiating the Trans-Pacific Parnternship, which will allow him to create the best environment for U.S. businesses operating in the region, was an important one. But TPP excludes China, a country with which we need that same level of bilateral investment cooperation. That’s why leaders from both countries gathered last month for the seventh session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The talks come at a crucial time for both countries, as China and the U.S. face economic challenges that greater cooperation could help mitigate. The U.S. has reached 36-year lows in economic growth and labor force participation; China is wrestling with a “new normal” of slower economic growth and rising public sector debt. Both countries share a competitive spirit that’s alive and well among their people, and both want policies to match that enthusiasm. These dialogues were the right place for finding solutions, and the last six meetings have helped make progress on critical issues such as a bilateral investment treaty. At McGraw Hill Financial, we’ve been doing business with China for more than 20 years. We’re now faced with an opportunity for the world’s two largest economies to come together for mutual economic benefit. We hope to see progress in three key areas: a U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, infrastructure finance and pro-trade policies. How bilateral investment would improve the economy A U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) would foster investment in each country by reducing the barrier to entry for foreign investors. For U.S. investors, this treaty would have several benefits. It would prevent China from favoring its own companies at the expense of U.S. business; it would open investment into industries that are largely restricted today; and it would establish dispute resolution procedures to help investors negotiate with the Chinese government. Encouraging the free exchange of U.S. and Chinese business will also create more jobs in America. Chinese companies accounted for 70,000 U.S. full-time jobs in 2013, more than eight times the figure for 2007. More of this business means more U.S. jobs, as well as expanded opportunities and protections for U.S. investors. Furthermore, increased capital flows from the implementation of a BIT would address the projected global shortfall in government spending on infrastructure. The U.S. and China are in dire need of infrastructure upgrades, and both could see economic returns from doing so. Every $1 allocated for infrastructure in China generates $2.20 in real gross domestic product over three years, while generating $1.70 for every $1 allocated in the U.S., according to research from Standard & Poor’s. China has already taken steps in this direction It is encouraging that China is taking a leadership role to boost infrastructure investment in the region through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China and the U.S. should also discuss how to collaborate to effectively bring infrastructure investment to developing Asia. Not all of this has to come from public financing. A BIT would increase investor confidence in the security of their Chinese investments, but private investors may still hesitate without more information on long-term investments. Public-private partnerships have a track record of success in the United Kingdom, the U.S., Canada and the Netherlands, and these projects owe much of their success to a greater standardization of project finance structures in those countries. Already, China has been a leader among emerging nations by opening capital markets to foreign investment, and increasing transparency and available information on public investments is a natural next step. **Open markets are crucial** Finally, leaders should use the recent dialogue to emphasize the importance of market access to goods, services and investment. Both countries are pursuing regional and multilateral trade liberalization policies, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the U.S. and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in China. I urge both countries to support another Doha Development Round to further express support for increased global trade dialogue. **China’s willingness to open its markets to foreign trade will benefit its economy and be a positive example to other developing countries**. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy will benefit from access to China’s markets and use its own dynamic and vibrant capital markets as a strong example of why it’s important to embrace these types of policies. Progress on a BIT, infrastructure finance and pro-trade policies would demonstrate to the world that keystone economies can work together to adapt to the changing global environment. Furthermore, it would build on an important and profitable relationship. In 1979, total two-way trade between the U.S. and China was just $2 billion. Last year, it was $590 billion. For both economies to realize their full potential, trade volumes need to surpass $700 billion by 2020. The new economy requires bilateral investment In the last 25 years we’ve seen a new world take hold, one where money moves at the speed of light and old systems get replaced in a flash. Our dynamic people know this and have adapted to this new reality, and are working hard to capitalize on the potential it holds. Our collective populations deserve public policy that makes it easier to do this. Right now neither country is delivering. We can find mutually beneficial common ground. A bilateral investment treaty, infrastructure finance and pro-trade posture are good places to start.

#### Exposing SOEs to the international competitive market is crucial to China’s economic strength

ACC Shanghai 14 [American Chamber of Commerce Shanghai, AUGUST 18, 2014, INSIGHT, “China Domestic Reforms Key to International Success Says US Ambassador”, <http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/china-domestic-reforms-key-international-success-says-us-ambassador/>, Accessed 7/1/16, JS]

The key to international success for Chinese companies may just lie in pushing forward with reform of the country’s domestic markets, at least according to the U.S.’ top envoy to China. US Ambassador Max Baucus was in Shanghai recently and he had some advice for Chinese companies seeking success globally, including in the U.S. “A Chinese company will not do well (internationally) until it also abides by worldwide standards,” The American envoy said in an interview in Shanghai. “That means competing on the basis of price, the basis of quality of product, marketing, and developing a brand that anyone in the world knows means good quality and knows what that product is.” Key to being able to compete at that level is the removal of government subsidies and preferential treatment for domestic firms in China, Baucus indicated. State support for government-owned enterprises and other large domestic firms is seen as a challenge to foreign investors in China. Many international businesses find it hard to compete with state-owned enterprises which benefit from land subsidies, access to cheap credit and preference in government procurement opportunities. The top U.S. envoy to China made his views known in an interview following his appearance at a joint meeting hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the U.S.-China Business Council (U.S.C.B.C.) in Shanghai during late July. Opening Up Markets to Achieve Growth Besides the potential for growing individual companies, Baucus saw the acceleration of economic reforms as having benefits for China’s larger economy. “I think that the more Chinese companies concentrate on building up standards, where they can compete on a sustained basis worldwide, the more quickly China will prosper.” The former senator’s statement is in line with long-held U.S. advocacy for further privatization of China’s economy and the removal of subsidies for state-owned enterprises. The near-monopoly status that the country’s large state-run companies have in sectors such as oil, aluminum, coal, banking, telecommunications, electricity, and transportation and other fields is seen by many analysts as a significant hurdle on the road to China’s economic development. Building Ties for Mutual Benefit In addition to pointing out the need keep vigilant on economic reform issues, Baucus pointed out the importance of the U.S. China relationship, and the key role of building economic ties based on transparency and open markets as part of that relationship. “It behooves us – the United States – like it behooves China to work even harder, more creatively, to develop a fair, transparent economic relationship, where the playing field is in fact level, and I think we have a ways to go yet. “ The career law maker stressed the need for the rule of law and for both countries to respect intellectual property and build trust. Baucus remained positive about the prospect for continued improvement in US-China economic ties, and mentioned the need to keep working towards a bilateral investment treaty between the two nations and indicated that the recent Security and Economic Dialogue had been constructive in moving that relationship forward.

#### A BIT solves China’s economic reform goals by encouraging competition

Lehr 15 [Deborah, Senior Fellow Paulson Institute, 02.13.2015, “Why the Bilateral Investment Treaty Matters”, Caixin Online, <http://english.caixin.com/2015-02-13/100784042.html>, Accessed 7/1/16, JS]

A BIT would benefit the economies of both the United States and China, by creating new streams of two-way trade and investment. The growing and interdependent economic relationship between the two countries is the underlying fabric that binds our countries together. It provides a foundation that allows us to disagree on specific issues without threatening the overall relationship. As China becomes a more active player on the world stage, it is important for the United States to work with China and to support its entry and full participation in global, rules-based institutions. To delve into the importance of a BIT to both countries, the Paulson Institute – with its partners, Goldman Sachs, the U.S.-China Business Council and the China Development Reform Foundation – convened a U.S.-China CEO Investment Dialogue to explore the implications of a possible agreement for both countries. The discussions included the U.S. secretary of commerce, the U.S. trade representative, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the Chinese ambassador, and leading U.S. and Chinese CEOs, mayors and high-level opinion leaders. A lively discussion ensured about potential opportunities for increasing jobs, investment and exports. All agreed that it was important that China continue to be part of the rules-based systems on trade. As a former U.S. trade negotiator with China during the WTO and other negotiations, I witnessed firsthand how bringing China into the rules-based trading systems pays off. In the early 1990s one of the most transformational commitments we obtained came down to one important line. It simply required China to publish its own trade laws. Previously, its trade laws and regulations had been confidential; while companies were expected to abide by them, they could be arrested if they actually read or owned a copy. This requirement of transparency fundamentally changed the trading regime to the benefit of both Chinese and U.S. companies. Two decades later, laws are published and commented on, making the playing field more balanced. China's WTO accession provided a 10-year road map for opening and reform of its economy. It outlined how sectors would open to foreign competition, and both countries benefited from this transparency. Low-cost Chinese exports to the United States have increased over 330 percent since the signing of the agreement, and U.S. exports to China rose by 533 percent since then. Yet that 10-year road map ran out four years ago. A high standard BIT can fill the resulting gap. It would bring greater transparency and consistency to the investment environment for both countries. A BIT would be good for China because the required opening of the market would bring in investments, encouraging more competition in the consumer and services sectors. That in turn would help China achieve its ambitious plan to transform its economic model away from export-led growth to a more consumption-based model. Such a treaty would also help clarify regulations for Chinese companies investing in the United States. And why would a BIT be good for the United States? For one, it would create a more transparent and level playing field for its companies in China, leading to greater opportunities for investors. It would also encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the United States as part of their government's "going out" initiative to encourage overseas investment. This would create jobs and opportunities for American workers. There is enormous opportunity to increase trade and investments between the United States and China. So far, China's actual investment in the United States, less than US$ 4 billion in 2014, is less than 5 percent of the US$ 101 billion that China invested overseas last year. Clear, transparent regulations about investment in the United States might open the doors to more money coming in, creating new jobs. U.S. investment in China, more than US$ 50 billion, is still less and no doubt would increase as the playing field becomes more level. President Xi Jinping has set out an ambitious economic reform agenda; just as premier Zhu Rongji had done at the time of China's WTO accession. China's large state owned enterprises and cheap exports are no longer reaping the economic gains they once did. The United States has a unique opportunity to work with China on a new road map for future growth. More engagement with China can lead to positive outcomes for both countries. Indeed, we think it's crucial.

### Ext – Decline Causes Diversionary War

#### Xi’s avoided the temptations diversionary war. This will end if the Chinese economy declines.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

One downside to Xi's breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his government's policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xi's image and political position vulnerable to China's economic downturn, his country's external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years, with China's economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not fundamentally influenced Xi's foreign policy. Xi has been able to be continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take China's foreign policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Deng's injunction to keep a low profile and has reclaimed islands, created international institutions, pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed regions. Xi's foreign policy has been assertive, confident, and, importantly, a diversified mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken firm steps on territorial issues, it has used geoeconomic instruments to offer generous loans and investments, and even created new organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 By combining inducements with intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of opposing it, especially on issues important to Beijing. Today, China's thirty-year era of 10 percent annual growth appears to have ended, with official statistics placing gross domestic product (GDP) growth below 7 percent, the government reducing its growth target to 6.5 percent, and a number of major banks and respected forecasters arguing the true growth rate is far lower—and will remain below 5 percent for years.3 In light of this deepening economic slowdown, the future trajectory of Xi's external policy is in question. Some elements, including China's geoeconomic policies, will endure; nevertheless, China's foreign policy may well be driven increasingly by the risk of domestic political instability. For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese nationalism—long a pillar of the state's legitimacy—to compensate for the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish his own image. Chinese nationalism has long been tied to foreign affairs, especially memories of foreign domination and territorial loss. For example, Xi may be less able or willing to compromise in public, especially on territorial issues or other matters that are rooted in national sentiment, for fear that it would harm his political position. He may provoke disputes with neighbors, use increasingly strident rhetoric in defense of China's national interests, and take a tougher line in relations with the United States and its allies to shift public focus away from economic troubles. He may also turn to greater economic protectionism. These changes come at a time when Xi's tight control of the decisionmaking process has made it harder for U.S. policymakers to anticipate China's next moves. Familiar interlocutors at the State Council and Foreign Ministry, who once provided much-needed insight into an often mysterious policymaking process, are no longer central within it. As the shroud of secrecy surrounding Chinese decision-making thickens, what remains clear is that dealing with China will require a more nuanced understanding of the man with singular control over the country's foreign policy future. It will also necessitate an appreciation of the interaction between his internal political requirements and his foreign policy agenda. Finally, it will demand a clear-eyed acceptance of the fact that Xi has ushered in a new era of Chinese regional and global diplomacy, one that will push the West to evaluate its overall approach to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to the powerful but exposed leader who makes its foreign policy.

#### Chinese econ growth checks nationalist flares that escalate territorial disputes. Checks won’t solve.

Blackwill & Campbell ‘16

Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

Economic growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. Since 1989, the party has deliberately and carefully laid the foundation for such a strategy through patriotic education, censorship, government-backed protests against Japan, and relentless news and popular media that have reinforced a nationalist victimization narrative. As a powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy, burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. For example, an emphasis on territorial disputes and historical grievances could partially divert attention from the country's economic woes and arrest a potential decline in his public approval; in contrast, a visible setback or controversial concession on such issues could undermine his standing with Chinese citizens and party elites. On economic matters, concerns over growth and employment may lead China to become increasingly recalcitrant and self-interested. In the future, Xi could become more hostile to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country's economic slump on efforts undertaken by insidious "foreign forces" that seek to sabotage the country's rise. Even if Xi does not seek more combative relations with the West, he will nonetheless find it difficult to negotiate publicly on a variety of issues, especially when nationalist sentiment runs high. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record. A dangerous but unlikely possibility is that Xi may even be tempted to use military force to instigate limited conflicts against the Philippines, Vietnam, or Japan. Given that Japan is a prominent target of China's propaganda and media, and that memories of Japan's brutal occupation are still influential, ties between China and Japan may continue to worsen.

#### Econ decline forces Xi to start diversionary wars.

Haass ‘16

Richard N. Haass – President, Council on Foreign Relations internally quoting Blackwill and Campbell. Robert Blackwill is a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Blackwill was the Belfer lecturer in international security at Harvard Kennedy School. During his fourteen years as a Harvard faculty member, he was associate dean of the Kennedy School, where he taught foreign and defense policy and public policy analysis. He also served as presidential envoy to Iraq and was the administration's coordinator for U.S. policies regarding Afghanistan and Iran. Kurt M. Campbell is the chair and chief executive officer of the Asia Group, LLC. He also serves as chairman of the Center for a New American Security, is a nonresident fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” - Council Special Report No. 74 - February 2016 – pdf can be accessed at: http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569?cid=otr-marketing\_use-Xi\_Jinping\_CSR

This Council Special Report by Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, two experienced practitioners and long-time observers of American foreign policy, is based on a straightforward premise: Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, one who has taken a number of steps to limit collective leadership and the political clout of the army. But the authors also argue that this same concentration of power is a double-edged sword, one that leaves President Xi exposed and potentially vulnerable to internal political challenge. The vulnerability comes from several sources, but none is more critical than a slowing economy. The trajectory of the Chinese economy is the subject of active debate among outside experts, but there is consensus that China is experiencing a substantial slowdown and will not be able to regain the high rates of growth that characterized the last several decades. The report suggests the possibility of greater political repression at home if there are signs the economic slowdown is triggering political instability. But the authors go on to note that Xi may as well be tempted to turn to foreign policy to redirect domestic attention away from a lagging economy, in the process burnishing his nationalist credentials. They anticipate continued Chinese pressure on neighbors in the East and South China Seas and are skeptical China will use the leverage it has over North Korea or assume more than a limited role in global governance. They do, however, expect China to continue to engage in selective institution building. Overall, they foresee a Chinese foreign policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified, one that constitutes a significant challenge to U.S. interests.

#### Chinese economic decline causes diversionary war.

Lu 15 – Henry Lu, 2015 (“’Deeper’ Chinese Motivations in the South China Sea,” Fox & Hedgehog, November 4, Available Online at <http://www.foxhedgehog.com/2015/11/deeper-chinese-motivations-in-the-south-china-sea/>, Accessed 06-24-2016, AH)

Mainstream media [points](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21640403-two-case-studies-disputed-sea-oil-troubled-waters) to oil as the primary motivator for Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. While oil is certainly a compelling interest, it by no means represents the only one. According to U.S. [estimates](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/business/energy-environment/beijing-zeroes-in-on-energy-potential-of-south-china-sea.html), the South China Sea contains 11 billion barrels of oil, or a fraction of one percent of the world’s reserves. Supposing China acquires the entire South China Sea resource today, explores, and develops it in a few years, and pumps the sea dry in a decade and a half, China’s annual revenues at today’s prices would be about $22 billion a year, or 0.3% of GDP. The scale of resources at stake suggests that oil is not the sole motivation driving China to adopt policies that risk provoking war with its neighbors and the United States. Indeed, when the price of oil took a nosedive in 2014, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea increased. What deeper Chinese motivations might be at play?¶ Academics suggest that China’s growing aggression is driven in part by considerations for domestic politics and in part by the need to assert greater power on the international stage. The first idea is that mounting economic challenges and corruption are encouraging the Chinese government to divert away domestic attention. This follows the “[diversionary war](http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=18173)” thesis, which suggests that a government facing domestic discontent resort to foreign aggression in order to unite the people and bolster its legitimacy. The second idea is that as China’s economy has grown, so too have its interests in asserting power. This follows from the “offensive realism” theory, which suggests that China’s economic miracle means it can now abandon former leader Deng Xiaoping’s axiom: “hide your strength, bide your time.”¶ How do these ways of thinking inform our analysis of the South China Sea? Since political interests are driving much of China’s foreign policy in the South China Sea, it would be useful to examine Chinese political trends in forecasting its future behavior. The single most significant change affecting Chinese politics today is economic, where growth is declining and debt is mounting. Chinese officials acknowledge that China’s export and debt-driven growth model is unsustainable and are attempting to rebalance the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption. The political repercussions of this economic transition almost certainly impact Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea.¶ According to the diversionary war thesis, economic turmoil creates incentives for officials to channel domestic frustration into foreign aggression. This is particularly applicable to China because the Chinese government has a lot at stake when it comes to economic performance. After reforms in the late 1970s largely swept away Marxist principles, the Communist Party relied increasingly on China’s economic miracle for its legitimacy. Now that the era of unprecedented growth is waning, the Chinese government is inclined to promote nationalism and diversion through external means, and the South China Sea is an obvious target. The second, offensive realism approach leads to an opposite conclusion. Since China is entering a major and uncertain economic transition, it is reverting to an old strategy: “hide your strength, bide your time” while tinkering with the economy. The impact of China’s economic transition in the short-term therefore depends on a balance between two opposing tendencies.

#### Chinese economic decline causes war

Carpenter 15 – Ted Carpenter, Senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, also served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, 2015 (“Could China’s Economic Troubles Spark a War?” The National Interest, September 6, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784>, Accessed 06-22-2016, AH)

Global attention has focused on [the plunge in the Shanghai stock market](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/2015-the-year-china-goes-broke-13749) and mounting evidence that [China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-17/how-china-s-slowdown-is-worse-than-you-think). Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about [the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics](http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/15/news/economy/china-gdp-economic-statistics/). Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful.¶ The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.”¶ China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. [The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/tiananmen-could-it-happen-again-10578) was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface.¶ Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war.¶ One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s.¶ A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader.¶ [A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-the-taiwan-strait-would-china-invade-taiwan-11120), since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue.¶ The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “[the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/jnkzsl/index.htm).” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance.¶ All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.¶ [Ted Galen Carpenter](http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter), a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, is the author of ten books and more than 600 articles on international affairs. His latest book, Perilous Partners: The Benefits and Pitfalls of America’s Alliances with Authoritarian Regimes, will be published by the Cato Institute later this month.¶ Image: Wikimedia Commons[/Allen Zhao](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PLAAF_Chengdu_J-10AY.jpg)

#### CCP instability results in diversionary wars and domestic violence.

Auslin 15 — Michael Auslin, writes a column on Japan and U.S.-Asian relations for the *Wall Street Journal*, 2015 ("The Risks of a Falling China," *Wall Street Journal*, July 13th, Available Online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-risks-of-a-falling-china-1436806217)

Behind all these dangers lies one common factor: an unreconstructed Communist Party determined to hold on to absolute power. Unable to stop the stock slide, and facing growing opposition to its assertiveness abroad, the Party runs its own risk: being seen as dangerous, out of control, or incompetent, if not a combination of all three.¶ Domestic frustration with Mr. Xi’s heavy-handed suppression of dissent will easily find a new outlet in criticism of a government now creating more problems than it solves. That might augur an even greater crackdown at home, or possibly adventurism abroad to deflect attention away from failure.

### Ext – CCP Impact

#### Chinese economic decline creates public pressure on the CCP to lash out — multiple scenarios for war

Carpenter 15 — Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies and former Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds a Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from the University of Texas, 2015 (“Could China’s Economic Troubles Spark a War?,” *National Interest*, September 5th, Available Online at <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war>, Accessed 06-22-2016)

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful.

The focus on the possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.”

China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface.

Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war.

One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s.

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A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue.

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### Ext – SCS Conflict

#### SCS aggression is at a tipping point

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(Ryan, “The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?” October 26, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3>)

Conflict between a rising power and an established power **is not inevitable** as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States **are rapidly approaching this point**. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly **relying on their military capabilities** and hard power tactics. That’s **especially true** in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain **unwilling to compromise** and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and **closer to cooperation and rapprochement**. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst.¶ Failed pursuit of strategic stability¶ China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order.¶ Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed. ¶ America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. **Eventually, the dirt spills out.** Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach **is only a** temporary stop **on the road to functional strategic stability.** At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable **solution** for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, **unchecked and confrontation is** steadily evolving into conflict.¶ Drawing Lines in the “Sea”

#### SCS conflict likely despite political denials – military expansionism and willingness to attack

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After Chinese state media warned that war with the United States may be “inevitable,” Beijing has published a policy paper detailing how the military will shift its focus from land and coastlines to the open seas. China’s State Council released a white paper today that criticizes “external countries…busy meddling in South China Sea affairs” and sets out an “active defense” military strategy for the country.¶ The paper comes a day after an editorial (link in Chinese) in the state-run Chinese tabloid Global Times said conflict between China and the US will be unavoidable if the Washington doesn’t lay off Beijing for building islands and military facilities in disputed parts of the South China Sea.¶ “We do not want a military conflict with the United States, but if it were to come we have to accept it,” the paper said. (Editorials in state-run papers are not official representations of Beijing’s position, but often reflect government sentiment.)¶ The US has been calling on China to halt the construction of entire islands with ports, army barracks and at least one air strip near the Spratly Islands. The area—one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and home to fertile fishing grounds as well as possibly oil and gas—is the focus of overlapping claims by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei.¶ According to the white paper, the People’s Liberation Army Navy will expand its defense perimeter to include “open seas protection.” The air force will also expand its focus to include offensive as well as defensive military capabilities. “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked,” the paper said.¶ Chinese authorities denied the white paper had anything to do with tension over US surveillance of China’s building in the Spratlys. On Monday, China’s foreign ministry said that it had filed a complaint with the US for flying a spy plane near Chinese island construction sites last week. ¶ International security experts have long said that armed conflict between the two countries is unlikely given their economic reliance on each other. Increasingly scholars and analysts say that war may not be “as improbable as many experts suggest” because of growing dominance of hardliners in the Chinese government, increased rivalry, or general lack of trust between the countries.¶ The US and other states are preparing for any potential confrontation. Southeast Asian countries are building up their navies and coastguards—defense spending in the region is expected to reach $52 billion by 2020, up from a projected $42 billion this year, IHS Janes Defence has said.¶ Last week, US vice president Joe Biden told graduates at the Naval Academy in Annapolis that 60% of the United States Naval force will be stationed in the Asia Pacific by 2020, in order to stand up for freedom of navigation and peaceful, equitable resolution to territorial disputes. “Today, these principles are being tested by Chinese activities in the South China Sea…We are going to look to you to uphold these principles wherever they are challenged,” he said.

#### China will instigate a violent conflict in the South China Sea

Lu 15 — Henry Lu, Williams College, 2015 ("‘Deeper’ Chinese Motivations in the South China Sea," *Fox & Hedgehog*, November 4th, Available Online at http://www.foxhedgehog.com/2015/11/deeper-chinese-motivations-in-the-south-china-sea/)

Academics suggest that China’s growing aggression is driven in part by considerations for domestic politics and in part by the need to assert greater power on the international stage. The first idea is that mounting economic challenges and corruption are encouraging the Chinese government to divert away domestic attention. This follows the “diversionary war” thesis, which suggests that a government facing domestic discontent resort to foreign aggression in order to unite the people and bolster its legitimacy. The second idea is that as China’s economy has grown, so too have its interests in asserting power. This follows from the “offensive realism” theory, which suggests that China’s economic miracle means it can now abandon former leader Deng Xiaoping’s axiom: “hide your strength, bide your time.”¶ How do these ways of thinking inform our analysis of the South China Sea? Since political interests are driving much of China’s foreign policy in the South China Sea, it would be useful to examine Chinese political trends in forecasting its future behavior. The single most significant change affecting Chinese politics today is economic, where growth is declining and debt is mounting. Chinese officials acknowledge that China’s export and debt-driven growth model is unsustainable and are attempting to rebalance the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption. The political repercussions of this economic transition almost certainly impact Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea.¶ According to the diversionary war thesis, economic turmoil creates incentives for officials to channel domestic frustration into foreign aggression. This is particularly applicable to China because the Chinese government has a lot at stake when it comes to economic performance. After reforms in the late 1970s largely swept away Marxist principles, the Communist Party relied increasingly on China’s economic miracle for its legitimacy. Now that the era of unprecedented growth is waning, the Chinese government is inclined to promote nationalism and diversion through external means, and the South China Sea is an obvious target. The second, offensive realism approach leads to an opposite conclusion. Since China is entering a major and uncertain economic transition, it is reverting to an old strategy: “hide your strength, bide your time” while tinkering with the economy. The impact of China’s economic transition in the short-term therefore depends on a balance between two opposing tendencies.

### Ext – ECS Conflict

#### ECS causes accidental launch and miscalculation

Hellman 13 (Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering Stanford University, 1/22/2013, "Could Japan Drag America into War with China", nuclearrisk.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/could-japan-drag-america-into-war-with-china/)

Several earlier posts on this blog have highlighted the risk that China and Japan might come to blows over a few tiny, uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. One pathway to war is **inadvertent escalation** as a result of both nations sending jet fighters over the disputed territory. As noted in an an article in yesterday’s New York Times:¶ In the past several months, both China and Japan have sent civilian maritime vessels to the waters around the uninhabited islands. On Jan. 10, China ordered a surveillance aircraft to fly near the area. In response, Japan scrambled F-15 fighter jets to take a look, and in response to the Japanese, the Chinese dispatched J-10 fighter jets.¶ **The** tit-for-tat **moves have raised concerns that an** accident **could occur and lead to a** dangerous cycle of retaliation.¶ Under a longstanding security treaty with Japan, **the United States is obliged to defend the country,** including the uninhabited islands, a position that Mrs. Clinton referred to at the news conference. She also repeated that Washington recognized that the islands were administered by Japan.¶ For its part, China insists that the islands belong to China, a claim that it says is supported by historical documents.¶ If war should break out, the US is on record as saying that its mutual security treaty with Japan extends to these islands, meaning **the US would have to fight a** nuclear-armed **China**.

#### ECS conflict will escalate

Holmes ‘14

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College, The National Interest, January 5, 2014, "Asia's Worst Nightmare: A China-Japan War", http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/asias-ultimate-nightmare-china-japan-war-9662?page=show

Yet grok grim strategic realities we must. This competition is about more than islets or ADIZs. Nothing less than the nature of the Asian order is at stake. Making the world safe for democracy, or oligarchy, or whatever regime holds power at home constitutes a basic impulse for foreign policy. From the age of Thucydides forward, nations have spent lavishly to preserve or install regional orders hospitable to their own national interests and aspirations. By surrounding itself with like-minded regimes, a nation hopes to lock in a favorable, tranquil status quo. As it was in antiquity, so it remains today. Imperial Japan upended the Asian hierarchy in 1894-1895, smashing the Qing Dynasty's navy and seizing such choice sites as Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula. It began making Asia safe for a Japanese empire. Military triumphs often underperform their political goals. But as my colleague and friend Sally Paine notes, the first Sino-Japanese War was a limited war whose effects were anything but limited. The Qing regime remained in place following its defeat, but the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which terminated the conflict, signified Japan's eclipse of China as Asia's central power. The treaty's terms -- in particular its transfer of Taiwan to Japan -- modified the regional order in ways we still live with today. Indeed, Professor Paine points out that Chinese foreign policy since 1895 has striven to repeal Shimonoseki, while Japanese foreign policy has sought to reaffirm it. In short, Imperial Japan ousted China from its place atop the Asian hierarchy through limited war. China would like to repay the favor, regaining its rightful -- to Chinese minds -- station through similarly limited coercive diplomacy. Classical strategist Sun Tzu instructs commanders to look for opportunities to achieve disproportionate effects through minute amounts of force. Beijing evidently discerns such an opportunity in the East China Sea. It hopes to make Asia safe for its brand of communism-cum-authoritarian capitalism. But the geometry of any future conflict will be more complex than the one-on-one Sino-Japanese War. Curiously, the United States is a not-so-silent partner in guaranteeing the remnants of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as modified by the outcomes of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the Pacific War (1941-1945). American officials insist that Washington has no particular stake in whose flag flies over the islands and atolls dotting Asian waters. That's true. But it has a strong interest in preserving the system it has presided over since 1945. Permitting any one coastal state to change the rules by fiat -- to abridge freedom of the seas and skies, or wrest territory or waters from another -- would set a dangerous precedent. If Beijing gets away with amending the system once, why not again and again? And if China, why not regional powers elsewhere in the world? For the United States, then, this is a quarrel not over flyspecks on the map, but over principle. That's why the Senkakus and the ADIZ matter to Americans. Call it entrapment if you must. But it's doubtful any U.S. administration could lightly abstain from a Sino-Japanese trial of arms. So Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington all have vital stakes in this contest. What does that imply about a hypothetical war? Clausewitz urges statesmen to let the value they assign their "political object," or political aims, govern the "magnitude" and "duration" of the effort they mount to obtain those aims. The more important the goal, the more lives, treasure, and hardware a combatant expends -- and for longer. Massive interests warrant massive investment. All three Asian stakeholders thus may prove willing to spend heavily, and for a long time, to get their way. Here's the rub: Clausewitz prophesies that each contender, mindful that it could be outdone, will apply more force than the bare minimum to avoid surrendering the first-mover advantage to the adversary. Leaders fear letting the opponent get the drop on them. Doing more, sooner, helps a protagonist stay ahead of the competition and bolster its prospects of victory. An escalatory dynamic takes hold if everyone does more than simple cost-benefit logic dictates. Washington and Tokyo should acknowledge this in their internal and joint deliberations. Clausewitzian fatalism represents the beginning of strategic wisdom. It's safe to assume the contestants will all strive to achieve their goals through minimal force -- preferably without fighting at all. No one relishes the hazards of war. It's equally safe to assume that they see yielding territory, status, or maritime freedoms as even worse than war. A fight over seemingly minor stakes, then, could mushroom into a major conflagration arraying China against the US-Japan alliance. How much passion would an East China Sea imbroglio rouse among the combatants? China and Japan would be all in. Disputes involving sovereignty -- particularly territory and resources -- tend to drive the perceived value of the political object through the roof. Tokyo and Beijing, moreover, are acutely conscious that the post-1895 status quo is in play. In Clausewitzian parlance, goals of such value merit open-ended efforts of potentially vast magnitude.

### Ext – Econ Growth Key to CCP Stability

#### Slow growth causes CCP collapse

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If elite unity is the glue of the post-Tiananmen system, economic performance, as is commonly acknowledged, is the most important source of popular legitimacy for the ruling party. A quarter century of high growth has bought the CPC a long period of relative social stability and provided it with enormous resources to strengthen its repressive capabilities and buy off new social elites and the urban growing middle-class. However, as the “Chinese economic miracle” is now ending, the second pillar of the post-Tiananmen system is about to collapse as well.¶ Ostensibly, the present sharp Chinese economic slowdown may seem like a natural deceleration after decades of torrid growth. But a closer look at the causes of “the great fall of China” suggests that structural and institutional obstacles, not cyclical ones, are at work and that China is entering a phase of low to moderate economic growth that could imperil the legitimacy of the CPC. Press coverage of Beijing’s recent economic troubles has focused largely on the more visible and dramatic symptoms of the Chinese economic malaise, such as the collapse of a stock market bubble and surprise currency devaluation. However, China’s growth deceleration has much deeper roots.¶ Structurally, China’s rapid growth in the post-Tiananmen era was driven principally by one-off favorable factors or events, and not by the purported superiority of an authoritarian state. Among these factors or events, the most important is the “demographic dividend”, which provided a seemingly endless supply of cheap and able-bodied young workers for China’s industrialization. Besides their low wages, young migrants from rural areas to urban centers can gain an instant and large increase in labor productivity simply by virtue of being paired with operating capital, without need for extensive educational preparation. Consequently, the mere redeployment of the country’s excess rural labor force to factories, shops, and construction sites in the cities can make the economy more productive. According to Chinese data, an urban worker’s productivity is four times higher than that of a rural peasant. In the past three decades, about 270 million rural laborers (excluding their families) have moved to cities and now account for 70 percent of the urban work force. Some economists estimate that about 20 percent of China’s GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s came from the rural-urban labor relocation.5 But because China’s population is aging rapidly and the mass migration from rural to urban areas has peaked, this one-off favorable structural factor cannot be replicated.¶ Another one-off positive shock that powered China’s growth since Tiananmen was its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In the 1990s China’s export growth averaged 15.4 percent per annum, thanks to its integration into the global economy. But after its entry into the WTO, China achieved annual growth in exports of 21.7 percent over the period 2002–08. Export-driven growth began to slow after 2011. Between 2012 and 2014, export growth averaged 7.1 percent, a third of the growth in the prior decade. In the first seven months of 2015, exports contracted around 1 percent, the development that probably prompted Beijing to devalue its currency.¶ Perhaps the most troubling aspect of China’s long-term economic outlook is the diminishing return from its investment-driven growth strategy. As a developing country with relatively low stocks of capital, China initially benefited immensely from a sustained rise in its investment rate. In the 1980s, China ploughed an average of 35.8 percent of GDP into factories, infrastructure, and housing. The rate rose to 42.8 percent on average in the 2000s and has reached 47.3 percent since 2010. Such massive increase in investment, accounting for more half of China’s GDP growth, has been the primary engine of economic expansion in the past two and half decades.¶ However, investment-driven growth in the Chinese context has had three negative consequences. One is the diminishing returns on investments, because each incremental increase in output requires more investment, as measured by capital output ratio (the amount of investment needed to produce an additional yuan of GDP). In the 1990s, Chinas capital output ratio was 3.79. In the 2000s, it rose to 4.38. This trend—growth requiring ever-rising investment—is simply not sustainable. China is already investing nearly half of its GDP, an extraordinary number made possible by state control of infrastructure development. The extent of overcapacity and misallocation of capital are equally extraordinary.¶ Another harm inflicted on the economy is that investment squeezes out household consumption (36 percent of GDP in 2013, compared with 60 percent in India), causing a massive structural imbalance and making sustainable growth impossible. That sustainable growth must come from moving away from export-led modalities to domestic market growth, but it cannot set roots with household consumption so artificially low.¶ The final cost of China’s investment-led growth is that much of it has been financed by credit and ploughed into industrial sectors already plagued with excess capacity. With debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 280 percent of GDP today (compared with 121 percent in 2000), risks of a full-blown financial crisis have risen because the largest borrowers—local governments, state-owned enterprises, and real estate developers—have poor repayment capacity due to a narrow tax base (local governments), overcapacity and poor profitability (state-owned enterprises), and a deflating property bubble (real estate developers).

#### Successful economic growth is specifically key to offset other threats to CCP stability.

Zhu 11 - Yuchao Zhu, Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at University of Regina, PhD from Queen's University, 2011 (“'Performance Legitimacy' and China's Political Adaptation Strategy”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, June 1, 2011, Available on *EBSCO host*, Accessed on June 30, 2016, KC)

Nevertheless, mainly due to economic prosperity in recent years, there is considerable support for the Chinese government, especially from the business and bureaucratic elite. But the question remains: is this the result of good performance or other variables? Bruce Gilley rightly questions “whether high legitimacy in China was a result of ignorance about performance or a result of some rational argument about the validity of that performance related to particular circumstances (Gilley, 2008, p.75).” As discussed above, a more accountable government and a more transparent governance may earn credit for the regime. However, if China’s governance policy is evaluated through an examination of the overall conduct of state institutions, the result is very mixed. The economic growth in the last 20 years is certainly very impressive; but the social consensus supporting market oriented economic reform, and which is based on a shared belief that economic growth will benefit all people eventually, is also eroding, due to the fact of growing social inequalities, rampant corruption, widespread human rights abuse, and failed social welfare programs in education and health care. This may unfortunately offset the government’s successful economic performance. Moreover, political institution building is under critical scrutiny. On the one hand, increasing transparency and accountability is underway; government administration is also more institutionalized, regulated, and disciplined. On the other hand, however, state institutions also become clumsy, bureaucratic, coercive, and corrupt in many areas; therefore the already assertive society becomes more demanding, uncooperative, and even defiant. The interactions between state institutions and society are intensified, reflecting the pluralistic social interests and demands which may be inconsistent with government interests and development agenda. For the state, the consent of the governed is more and more difficult to retain, even with obvious achievements; this is mainly because the regime’s wrong doing or mismanagement are even more noticeable to society and the people. Thus, good economic performance may produce legitimacy but any failure in governance is closely monitored and noticed; and the operational cost to maintain good performance and to correct bad performance is also very high, therefore legitimacy is very fragile and hard to sustain. The most difficult thing, then, is that governmental performance produced legitimacy is tricky to maintain through existing institutions. Minor mistakes could damage the major achievements. Major policy blunders could heavily ~~retard~~ hurt the government’s image and then decrease its legitimacy. The government finds it increasingly difficult to fulfill all the concentrated or discursive social demands. As normal governance practice may not serve society’s needs well, innovative policies are required to promote social and economic reform through state actions. In this sense, a government’s performance based legitimacy is always “unfinished business,” which continues to face constant challenges, and reflects the dynamic interactions between state and society.

#### A strong Chinese economy is key to CCP stability

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This direct connection between China’s politics and its economy underscores the fragility of the CCP’s undisputed control. For decades, the party has presented itself as an all-encompassing force that can insulate the country from international forces that will, in its eyes, hamper the Chinese people’s road to affluence. In order to reduce risks for those rich enough to participate in it, the CCP have built a cocoon of Western-style financial markets. However, the success and failure of this state-led capitalist scheme affects the stability of China’s political situation. The current turmoil in Chinese stock prices may go a long way in determining the country’s future and a potential for reform. In the interim, the CCP is likely to continue its aggressive damage control (for its own image as much as for the stock markets and the wider economy), but further restrictions on who can buy and sell stocks may force investors to care less for the party’s stature. These investors and China’s middle class citizens rely on good financial information, especially in times of instability. But the government has largely coopted the state media and financial sector to portray Chinese markets as risk-averse and conducive for foreign investment. In the long run, the party’s obsession with managing its own image and its constant obfuscation of the country’s financial health through the state media is likely to force more and more investors to pull out. People are already turning away from mainstream Chinese outlets such as the People’s Daily and toward social media apps such as WeChat, which features myriad freelance finance experts claiming to possess useful information on how to get through a crisis. Still, there are limited alternatives. Chinese social media network, Weibo, is less censored than most of the country’s newspapers and magazines but it is also not completely insulated from tampering. (Search engines such as Google and social media sites such as Facebook are blocked in China.) The CCP’s desperate half-measures are becoming increasingly obvious. For example, it has forced prominent journalists such as Wang Xiaolu to apologize on national television for “spreading rumors.” A Bloomberg report last month suggested Chinese officials held Li Yifei, China chief for the London-based Man Group hedge fund, for questioning regarding the steep stock market plunges. Li has denied the rumors and blamed her sudden disappearance on an industry meeting and Taoist retreat. The CCP’s aggressive interventions in the economy will continue to undermine the people’s trust in the party’s ability to lead the country toward greater wealth creation and protect it in a volatile global economy. The CCP’s promise relies heavily on propaganda, but the Chinese peoples’ growing realization of its hollow narrative is almost certain to set off enormous political shifts.

#### Strong economic performances are critical to legitimacy of the CPP

**Wallace 15** --Jeremy Wallace is an associate professor of government at Cornell University. He is the host of the ChinaLab podcast and the author of Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China, August 26th (“The political implications of China’s stock market crisis”, available online at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/26/the-political-implications-of-chinas-stock-market-crisis/>, accessed 6/29/16, HDA)

The Chinese stock market has captured headlines over the past month for two reasons: its dramatic collapse and the efforts of the Chinese government to prop it up. The former isn’t much of a problem, while the latter is. Pessimists looking at this five-year chart of the Shanghai Composite Index will focus on the cliff dive that it has taken over the past three months. But optimists might take some comfort from the 52 week return — over 35 percent — which would make even the most aggressive hedgefunder or university endowment manager happy. The ultimate importance of this run-up and decline in paper value is what it signals about China’s changing economy and politics. On the economic side, it’s unclear how much the collapse will bleed over into the real economy. Many of those losing out borrowed to put money into the market when it was hitting its peak and will suffer serious losses. But the most important effects of this episode are political. Authoritarian regimes like China’s do not persist on repression and violence alone. They craft messages that induce “quasi-voluntary compliance” out of their citizens. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power through a revolution fueled by peasants excited by the prospect of taking the land that they tilled from the landlords that owned it; an excitement generated by Communist Party rhetoric. Obviously, the CCP has changed its tune on capitalism. Yet, it still maintains a large propaganda and censorship apparatus that controls the information environment. Huang Haifeng’s recent article in Comparative Politics, “Propaganda as Signaling,” points to one of the reasons that the party continues to send out propaganda messages: It signals the government’s strength, even if no one believes in the rhetoric. That is, propaganda can serve a purpose even without any successful “indoctrination.” A government might have incentive to spend the resources to flood the airwaves with propaganda as a way to separate itself from a weak government that couldn’t spare the resources on propaganda. Using survey responses of Chinese students who are forced to take propaganda-filled political education classes, the paper finds that: Chinese college students with more exposure to state propaganda in the form of ideological and political education do not have a more positive view of China’s government and political system, but they are more likely to believe that the regime is strong in maintaining political order and social stability, and less willing to participate in political dissent. While the signaling value of propaganda that Huang highlights is surely there, that doesn’t mean that no one believes the messages of the Chinese government. The propaganda apparatus does continue to push out messages of an ever more convoluted socialism with Chinese characteristics. But the main message that the Chinese government sends to its citizens and the world is that it is competent. Officials ordering companies and employees to buy their own stocks to prop them up only to have their market collapse further undermines this narrative. The Chinese government has for decades relied on trumpeting statistics to send positive signals. Economic growth statistics, kilometers of high-speed railway lines, tons of trade shipments, trillions of foreign currency reserves and subsidized housing units all point in one direction: Growth! Success! The implicit message is that the Chinese Communist Party-led government must be competent to produce such growth. The internal governance of the party-state was also determined by the numbers, with local officials promotions based on these metrics. Even if there are questions about the veracity of these statistics (especially of gross domestic product, as I’ve written about previously), the droning on and on of metric after metric that has improved, jumped, sky-rocketed or increased creates a sense in which this government must know what it is doing. Thus, the rank incompetence of the government’s efforts to prop up its equities markets was damaging to that image. As Paul Krugman put it in a column entitled “China’s Naked Emperors” (which the New York Times helpfully translated into Chinese): This is the context in which you need to understand the strange goings-on in China’s stock market. In and of itself, the price of Chinese equities shouldn’t matter all that much. But the authorities have chosen to put their credibility on the line by trying to control that market — and are in the process of demonstrating that, China’s remarkable success over the past 25 years notwithstanding, the nation’s rulers have no idea what they’re doing.

#### High value economic sectors are key to avert CCP collapse

Hung et al 15

HO-FUNG HUNG, associate professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University ARTHUR R. KROEBER, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics, an independent global economic research firm, HOWARD W. FRENCH, associate professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, he is working on a book about the future of Chinese power, SUISHENG ZHAO, Professor and Director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2015 – (Foreign Policy, 3/13/15, “When Will China’s Government Collapse?” <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/> date accessed 6-29-16 EAKJ)

I defer to others on the specifics of China’s known challenges, but a few points seem fairly obvious. The early, and one might say easy, phase of China’s takeoff is over.. That period consisted in large measure of stopping doing stupid things and inflicting damage on oneself. Moving forward now from here becomes exponentially more difficult. This means finding a way to sustain relatively high growth rates, when almost everything points to a natural, secular slowdown. It means coping with environmental challenges on a scale never seen before. It means dealing with the emergence of a middle class, and everything that political science suggests about the difficulties that this poses for authoritarian regimes. It means finding a way through the middle-income trap. It means restraining corruption that is, if anything, even worse, meaning more systemic, than commonly recognized. It means coping with the accelerating balancing of nervous neighbors. It means coping with issues of ethnic and regional tensions and stark inequality. It means drastic and mostly unfavorable changes in demography. And it means doing all of these things, and facing any number of other serious challenges that space doesn’t allow one to detail here, without the benefit of a coherent or appealing ideology other than nationalism and, tentatively, budding personality cult-style leadership. We don’t know how this is going to turn out. For every success one can point to involving China, it is easy to point to at least one stark and serious problem, or potential failing. I don’t share Shambaugh’s confidence in predicting the demise of the party, but it does not strike this reader as a reckless prediction. It should not surprise us, and neither should its opposite, China’s continued relative success. Such is the degree of uncertainty we must all live with.Yes, the CCP regime is in crisis. But it has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the chaotic, decade-long Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too difficult to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now. This current crisis comes after more than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under one-party rule, which has produced a corruptive brand of state capitalism in which power and money ally. The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have formed strong and exclusive interest groups to pursue economic gains. China ranks among the countries of the highest income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the world’s most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as China’s economic growth is slowing. As the worsening economic, social, and environmental problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently, Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could come when economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to sustain the regime’s legitimacy with its economic performance.

### A2: Growth High Now – Brexit

#### Brexit kills China-EU trade flows – threatens exports

Mullen 16— Jethro, reports, writes and edits for CNN Digital out of Hong Kong with a focus on news in the Asia-Pacific region. He's worked at CNN since 2011, 2016 (“China-U.K. 'golden era' at risk from Brexit,” CNN Money, June 28, Available Online at http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/27/news/economy/china-brexit-uk/, Accessed 06-28-2016, AV)

"The impact of the Brexit vote is already showing in the international financial markets, adding new uncertainties for the world economy and making it more difficult for the economy to rebound," Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said Monday.¶ China's huge economy is far from the most vulnerable to the turbulence unleashed by British voters' decision to divorce the EU. Chinese exports to the U.K. account for a tiny portion of its GDP.¶ But the EU as a whole is a different story: It's China's biggest trading partner, buying 350 billion euros ($385 billion) of Chinese goods last year. The risk of Brexit fallout taking a heavy toll on European growth is already prompting warnings about tougher times for Chinese trade.¶ "This will only add downward pressures on exports," said economists at HSBC, calling for China to take steps to stimulate its economy.

#### Brexit will result in a decline of the Chinese economy

Beech 16— Hannah, journalist for TIME Magazine. She specializes in Asia, and is sometimes credited as TIME's Southeast Asia bureau chief, 2016 (“The Brexit Result Will Have China Worried,” Time, June 24, Available Online at http://time.com/4381309/china-brexit-eu-trade-uk-economy/, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

“The U.K. has stated that it will be the western country that is most open to China,” Xi said in written comments to Reuters. “This is a visionary and strategic choice that fully meets Britain’s own long-term interest.”¶ Now, as Britain prepares to exit the European Union after Friday’s historic referendum, that golden relationship looks decidedly tarnished. Cameron, Europe’s China booster, will resign by October. Brexit means that Beijing will lose its strategic access to Europe through Britain. The global market turmoil that followed Friday’s vote sent the Chinese yuan, already propped up by strenuous official intervention, to its lowest point against the dollar in more than five years.¶ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying tried for a balanced approach on Friday afternoon, according to Chinese state media, noting that China respected the British people’s choice while also hoping that the U.K. and E.U. could reach a successful agreement. Yet during his British tour, Xi was clear about China’s position, saying he supported a “prosperous Europe and a united E.U.”¶ Brexit undermines China’s economic relationship with the E.U. at the precise moment that the Chinese economy is slowing and in search of global partners. Over the past few years, Chinese companies have invested heavily in Britain. Everything from London cabs to Weetabix now survive with help from Chinese investors. These totems of Britannia, though, may lose some of their power when Britain no longer serves as a launching pad for Chinese investment into Europe. Beijing will lose a British ally that had been pushing for completion of an E.U.-China trade deal, as well as for China to gain Market Economy Status—a designation that would shield the world’s second-largest economy from certain E.U. trade tariffs. (Last month, the European parliament, amid protectionist sentiment across the continent, rejected granting market economy status to China, although a further vote is planned for December.)

#### Brexit hurts Chinese economy – loss of major trading partners

Horwitz and Timmons 16— Josh, correspondent for Quartz who covers internet business and technology in Asia, Heather, Asia Correspondent for Quartz, based in Hong Kong, where she writes about everything from ramen to derivatives to censorship, 2016 (“The British Brexit vote is awful news for China,” Vox, June 24, Available Online at http://qz.com/715805/the-british-brexit-vote-is-awful-news-for-china/, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

During a visit to the United Kingdom last year, Chinese president Xi Jinping not-so-subtly called on Britain to remain in the European Union.¶ “China hopes to see a prosperous Europe and a united EU, and hopes Britain, as an important member of the EU, can play an even more positive and constructive role in promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties,” said China’s foreign ministry, paraphrasing Xi’s remarks (paywall).¶ Xi’s remarks about Brexit were a major break from tradition. China doesn’t typically comment on the domestic affairs of other countries. This is in hopes that other countries will also refrain from commenting on China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors, human rights record, or heavy handedness toward Hong Kong and Taiwan.¶ Behind Xi’s opposition to the UK leaving is China’s difficult trade situation with the European Union. The European Union is currently China’s largest trade partner. In 2015, it sent 350 billion euros (about $389 billion) worth of imports into the trading block. The EU has been a key source of growth for China, too. The EU’s imports from China more than doubled between 2005 and 2015. But some members of the European Commission want tighter trade restrictions on China. European lawmakers voted in May to deny China “market economy” status, a designation that would make it more difficult to place tariffs on Chinese goods. China was supposed to receive the designation after its entrance into the WTO in 2001.¶ The EU has also been trying to increase tariffs on China’s super cheap state-supported steel, whose overproduction has upended global markets. The UK has been blocking these measures since 2014, the Independent reported citing EU Council documents.¶ UK chancellor George Osborne, meanwhile, promised a “golden decade” for the China-UK relationship in 2015, if only the two countries would “stick together.” His optimistic speech, delivered at the Shanghai Stock Exchange just weeks after one of the worst stock market meltdowns in Chinese history earned him the derision of economists and analysts, including many fellow Brits.¶ With the UK gone, the EU’s restrictions on China could get a lot tougher. Beijing, and Chinese citizens, view Britain’s departure from the EU as dangerous for that reason. In the run-up to the referendum, party mouthpiece, The Global Times, pointed out the risks of Brexit to the Chinese economy:¶ The EU is the biggest trading partner of China, while the UK is the one with the highest degree of free trade in the block and it has backed China’s market economy status. London is an important hub of the internationalization of the yuan. A Brexit will undoubtedly cast a shadow on the trade relationship between China and the EU.¶ With its largest advocate officially out, Beijing will now face more even pressure to liberalize its economy, lest it risk losing access to its most important trade partner.

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## 1NC

### Frontline

#### The advantage isn’t unique - Brexit will boost Chinese economy

Schuman 16— Michael, journalist based in Beijing and author of "Confucius: And the World He Created”, 2016 (“Who Wins From Brexit? China,” Bloomberg, June 24, Available Online at http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-24/china-could-be-the-biggest-winner-from-brexit, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union is creating a lot of losers: London’s finance industry. British Prime Minister David Cameron. The pound. The grand cause of European integration. But out of all of the market turmoil and uncertainty will emerge at least one big winner: China. In the short term, of course, China’s struggling economy may take a hit from the chaos in the EU, its second-largest trading partner. A smaller, less-stable European market and more cash-strapped consumers aren’t good news for Chinese exporters. Over the longer term, though, Brexit is almost certainly in China’s economic and political interests. Even a fully united Europe -- burdened as it is by debt woes, high costs, overbearing bureaucracy and, in some cases, dubious competitiveness -- has had a tough time competing and contending with China. Now fractured, the EU can't help but pose less of a counterweight to China’s rise on the world stage. Remember why the European Union was formed in the first place. Proponents like to stress the EU's mission to promote peace and democracy. More practically, a key goal of unification was to enhance the region’s clout in the global economy. The varied nations of Europe understood that they'd be much stronger if they forged a common market with shared institutions and even a regional currency, the euro, than if they tried to compete as independent units. Europe hoped to evolve from a collection of rich but contentious states into a giant economic bloc on par with the U.S. and more recently, China. In reality, Europe has struggled to fulfill that ideal and has suffered for it. Persistent nationalism has repeatedly limited its ability to forge a common front on both trade and geopolitical issues. Nowhere has this failure been more obvious than in Europe's relations with China. As a whole, the EU should in theory wield significant power in pressing Beijing to open its markets and play fair on trade. Instead, European nations have routinely squandered that advantage by competing with each other for Chinese investment and favors. Shortly after the U.K.’s Cameron fawned over visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping last year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel showed up in Beijing, seeking her own business deals. The opportunities for China to divide and conquer -- both to strike better bargains and to undercut complaints about its own market-distorting behavior -- will only increase now that Europe's second-largest economy has gone its own way. European businesses would certainly have been better served if the EU could have cobbled together a common policy towards China. While Chinese companies have gone on a major shopping spree in Europe -- even buying stakes in beloved football clubs -- Merkel, on a recent visit to Beijing, was left griping that foreign firms deserved to “enjoy the same rights and privileges as domestic companies” in China. If she and Cameron and Europe’s other leaders had locked arms and fought for those rights together, they’d have had a much greater chance of success. Now instead, a truncated common market in Europe will undercut the global competitiveness of its companies. European firms -- from big banks to tech start-ups -- would be much better positioned to take on rising Chinese champions if they were able to capitalize on a full-fledged Europe-wide market. Politically, too, Brexit can only widen China's scope for action. As China challenges the West’s cherished institutions and ideals, from navigation rights to human rights, the importance of defending those rules and values is rising steadily. A united EU could have presented a serious check to Beijing's growing assertiveness. We've already seen the alternative: When the U.S. expressed concerns last year about China's plans to set up a rival to the World Bank, the Europeans stumbled over themselves to sign up, undermining any hope of extracting concessions from China’s leaders.

#### Empirically false – growth rates have been slowing, and the impacts haven’t happened. And, there have been tensions in the SCS and ECS without any escalation.

#### China’s economy resilient

Rapoza 16— Kenneth, Contributor at Forbes, Fifteen years experience reporting for the mainstream press on everything from the Iraq War to housing bubbles in Boston for The Boston Globe, to local features and international news coverage in Brazil, 2016 (“Chinese Yuan Appears 'Unbreakable',” Forbes, June 21, Available Online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2016/06/21/chinese-yuan-appears-unbreakable/#4ec9edea4e42, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

The Chinese yuan seems unbreakable. Having started the year worth 6.51 to the dollar, it’s now trading at 6.58 to the dollar and one of country’s biggest banks doesn’t see it getting much weaker from here. The Bank of Communications said in a note to clients on Tuesday that declines in net foreign exchange sales — from U.S. dollars to Hong Kong dollars and euros — means the market is not as worried about a further weakening of the yuan. No one is rushing for an exit. Chinese banks reported a combined $12.5 billion of net foreign currency purchases in May, down 47% from April, official data showed on Monday. The Bank of Communications report argued that the drop off is mainly due to closer scrutiny over capital outflow by the People’s Bank of China. Beijing has been opening up the country’s current account, allowing for Chinese businesses and individuals to take money abroad and invest in everything from real estate to financial securities. Many have taken advantage of this rule change in light of China’s slowing GDP growth. China’s burgeoning middle class, and its mega rich, have been mostly confined to Hong Kong and the mainland. But over the last few years, laws have allowed for them to take their cash elsewhere and they are doing so in greater numbers. As a result of that outflow, coupled with foreign portfolio outflows as well, the monetary authorities have put out constant warnings about clamping down on locals looking to take money out of China. China’s careful monitoring and an active central bank, have kept the currency stable at a time when investment firms were figuring a 7 to 1 exchange rate was right around the corner. The dollar has gained only 1% against the yuan year-to-date ending June 20.

#### No proof that the US is key to the Chinese Economy – they can rely on the markets of other nations

#### Chinese diversionary war will never happen.

Levi & Economy ‘16

et al; Michael A. Levi and Elizabeth Economy are both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), director of CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, and director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change. He is an expert on energy, climate change, nuclear security, and the interplay of global economics and international politics. Before joining CFR, Dr. Levi was a nonresident science fellow and a science and technology fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. Prior to that, he was director of the Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Security Project. Elizabeth Economy is the C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Economy has published widely on both Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Dr. Economy is a frequent guest on nationally broadcast television and radio programs, has testified before Congress on numerous occasions, and regularly consults for U.S. government agencies and companies. Levi & Economy hosted a workshop along with the Council on Foreign Relations' Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and Asia Studies program. This report is includes the thoughts of the CFR participants at the workshop – “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” - February 25,2016 – pdf available via: http://www.cfr.org/china/economic-geopolitical-fallout-chinas-slowing-growth/p37554

But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This "wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace. Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

#### No SCS or ECS war

Ignatius ‘14

David Ignatius is an associate editor and columnist for the Washington Post. He is a former Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and currently Senior Fellow to the Future of Diplomacy Program. “A U.S.-China ‘reset’?” – Washington Post – December 16th - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-a-us-china-reset/2014/12/16/981db07e-855f-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25\_story.html

This year began with some Chinese and American foreign-policy analysts looking back a century to World War I and wondering if confrontation was inevitable between a rising power and a dominant one. But now there has been progress on climate, trade and security issues and what seems a modest “reset” of the Sino-American relationship. Future disagreements between the United States and China are inevitable. But the surprise of a high-level dialogue here last weekend was the interest by both sides in exploring what the Chinese like to call “win-win” cooperation. “I don’t believe there will be a military confrontation between the two countries,” insisted one of China’s top American experts, who not long ago was warning about strains in the relationship. Recent disputes over maritime boundaries in the East and South China seas are “not particularly dangerous,” said another prominent Chinese scholar.

#### 7. No collapse — the CCP is resilient and other factors outweigh

Chen 15 — Dingding Chen, Assistant Professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, Founding Director of the Intellisia Institute—an independent think-tank focusing on international affairs in China, PhD and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“Sorry, America: China Is NOT Going to Collapse,” *The National Interest*, March 10th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-america-china-not-going-collapse-12389?page=2>, Accessed 6-22-16)

Second, would a slowdown, or even a massive financial meltdown lead to widespread disruption in Chinese society? The answer actually depends on how the effects of the slowdown are distributed throughout society. As Confucius pointed out long ago, Chinese people tend to get riled up more about inequality than scarcity(患均不患寡), which is just as true today. Most ordinary Chinese hate a high level of inequality, especially if such inequality is a result of corruption rather than legitimate hard work. While a severe crisis would lead to a massive loss of jobs and lower incomes, if the U.S. economy survived the 2008 global financial crisis, there is no reason to believe the Chinese economy cannot overcome a similar one.¶ Third, even if a severe economic crisis hits China and causes greater social grievances, why does this mean that social unrest will automatically lead to an uprising against the regime? In other words,, this claim is premised on the belief that the Chinese government’s legitimacy relies solely on economic performance.¶ Unfortunately this assumption, though widely held among scholars, is no longer true. Economic growth is certainly important for most Chinese people, but education, the environment, corruption, and legal justice matter just as much as growth. As long as the Chinese government seriously tackles problems in those areas, support for the CCP will remain high. This explains why the Xi administration has initiated bold reforms in all these areas.¶ Finally, even if there is political unrest will it necessarily topple the regime? This depends on the balance of power between the government and the dissenters. Where is the political opposition in China today? Does the political opposition enjoy the widespread support of ordinary Chinese people? Is there any leader who might want to play the role of Gorbachev? None of these factors exist in China.

#### 8. Western growth efforts – like the Aff – are key anti-green Chinese economic growth.

Li, ‘14

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *Peak Oil, Climate Change, and the Limits to China’s Economic Growth,* pg. 169, Routledge)

Without fundamental changes, the most likely scenario is for China to continue on the current path of capitalist accumulation. The Chinese government will undertake further "economic reforms." The remaining state-owned enterprises will be privatized. Without serious adjustment of economic and social policies, inequality in income and wealth distribution will keep rising. **Environmental conditions will continue to deteriorate.** With mass consumption depressed**, the economy will depend on** excessively high levels of investment **to sustain growth.** In Chapter 7, it is argued that these tendencies are likely to result in a general economic, social, and environmental crisis in the 2020s, leading to the collapse of the Chinese economy. Given China's central position in the global division of labor, a collapse of the Chinese economy may lead to the collapse of the global economy**.**

#### China is key to the global ecology – the impact’s massive death tolls.

Li, ‘16

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *China and the 21st Century Crisis*, Pluto Press, Pg. 11-12)

The pursuit of infinite economic growth is the defining feature of modern capitalism. But the exponential growth of material production and consumption has depleted natural resources and degraded the environment. Much of the global environmental space was used up by the global capitalist expansion during the second half of the twentieth century. In the early twenty-first century, **various global ecological systems are** on the verge of collapse**.** In particular, impending climate catastrophes threaten to undermine the foundation of human civilization. These developments suggest that the various conditions, which historically have underpinned the normal operation of the capitalist world system, are being fundamentally transformed and the basic laws of motion of capitalism can no longer be sustained. China is set to overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy. The Chinese working class is the worlds largest. In a few years, a militant working class movement is likely to emerge in China. **China is also the world's largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas emitter. Therefore, China is** at the center **of the contemporary global economic, social, and** ecological contradictions.

## 2NC Extensions

### Alt Cause to CCP — Environment

#### Environmental destruction causes CCP collapse

Pei 13 - Margot Pritzker ’72 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.(Minxin Pei February 13, 2013 “5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/?allpages=yes>) RMT

“Environmental collapse” is our last regime change scenario. Given the salience of environmental decay in China these days, the probability of a regime change induced by environmental collapse is not trivial. The feed-back loop linking environmental collapse to regime change is complicated but not impossible to conceive. Obviously, the economic costs of environmental collapse will be substantial, in terms of healthcare, lost productivity, water shortage, and physical damages. Growth could stall, undermining the CCP’s legitimacy and control. Environmental collapse in China has already started to alienate the urban middle-class from the regime and triggered growing social protest. Environmental activism can become a political force linking different social groups together in a common cause against a one-party regime seen as insensitive, unresponsive, and incompetent on environmental issues. The severe degradation of the environment in China also means that the probability of a catastrophic environmental disaster – a massive toxic spill, record drought, or extended period of poisonous smog– could trigger a mass protest incident that opens the door for the rapid political mobilization of the opposition.

#### Environmental degradation creates political mobilization — threatens CCP stability

Nankivell 6 — Nathan Nankivell, Senior Researcher at the Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, 2006 (China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability,” The Asian-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 4th, available online at <http://apjjf.org/-Nathan-Nankivell/1799/article.html>, accessed 6/30/16) JL

China’s environment is edging closer to a condition of crisis with each passing day. Pollution and environmental degradation have already left scars and will continue to create problems as the situation worsens. While it may be possible for China to mitigate the impact of environmental damage through coordinated policies, effective spending, and sound future planning, Beijing is unable or unwilling to prescribe such measures. As an undeniable fact on the ground, it is imperative for prudent policymakers to consider the geostrategic implications of not just a superpower, but of an environmentally-ravaged China as well. There is little disagreement that China’s environment is a mounting problem for Beijing. The country produces as many sulphur emissions as Tokyo and Los Angeles combined but with only a fraction of the vehicles; China is home to 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities; water pollution affects as much as 70 percent of the country; air pollution is blamed for the premature death of some 400,000 Chinese annually; crop returns are steadily decreasing in quantity and quality because of polluted land and water; and solid waste production is expected to more than double over the next decade, pushing China far ahead of the U.S. as the largest producer (The Economist, August 19, 2004). While the general accessibility of this information is creating greater awareness, trends indicate that pollution and environmental degradation will worsen. Chinese consumers are expected to purchase hundreds of millions of automobiles, adding to air pollution problems. Despite pledges to put the environment first, national planners still aim to double per capita GDP by 2010 (China Daily, October 20, 2005). Urban populations are expected to continue expanding, leading to the creation of slums and stressing urban sanitation and delivery systems. Steadily richer Chinese will be able to purchase more goods and consume more resources. The nation lacks a powerful national body able to coordinate, monitor, and enforce environmental legislation: the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is under-staffed, has few resources, and must compete with other bureaucracies for attention. The devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of officials who are more concerned with economic growth than the environment. Finally, the deficiency of capital and the lack of will to promote massive spending on environmental repair necessary to reverse more than two decades of destruction are perhaps most indicative of the fact that environmental restoration will not occur: estimates on the final cost of environmental repair range into the tens of billions of dollars (Canadian Security Intelligence Services Division; The Economist, October 20, 2005). From the examples above, it is clear that China’s environmental crisis will only worsen before it gets better. SEPA’s impotence, Beijing’s contradictory policy statements, expanding consumption, and a lack of funds to reverse already serious problems all suggest that pollution and degradation will most likely worsen in the decades to come. Pollution, Unrest, and Social Mobilization As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most. The latest statement from the October 2005 Central Committee meeting in Shanghai illustrates Beijing’s increasing concern regarding the correlation between unrest and pollution issues. There were more than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest recorded in China in 2004, up from 58,000 the year before (Asia Times, November 16, 2004). While there are no clear statistics linking this number of protests, riots, and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a strong correlation. For the CCP and neighboring states, social unrest must be viewed as a primary security concern for three reasons: it is creating greater political mobilization, it threatens to forge linkages with democracy movements, and demonstrations are proving more difficult to contain. These three factors have the potential to challenge the CCP’s total political control, thus potentially destabilizing a state with a huge military arsenal and a history of violent, internal conflict that cannot be downplayed or ignored. Protests are uniting a variety of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen, families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no easy target upon which to blame unrest, and no simple option for how to quell whole communities with a common grievance. Moreover, protests serve as a venue for the politically disaffected who are unhappy with the current state of governance, and may be open to considering alternative forms of political rule. Environmental experts like Elizabeth Economy note that protests afford an opportunity for the environmental movement to forge linkages with democracy advocates. She notes in her book, The River Runs Black, that several environmentalists argue that change is only possible through greater democratization and notes that the environmental and democracy movements united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the Cold War. It is conceivable that in this way, environmentally-motivated protests might help to spread democracy and undermine CCP rule. A further key challenge is trying to contain protests once they begin. The steady introduction of new media like cell phones, email, and text messaging are preventing China’s authorities from silencing and hiding unrest. Moreover, the ability to send and receive information ensures that domestic and international observers will be made aware of unrest, making it far more difficult for local authorities to employ state-sanctioned force. The security ramifications of greater social unrest cannot be overlooked. Linkages between environmental and democracy advocates potentially challenge the Party’s monolithic control of power. In the past, similar challenges by Falun Gong and the Tiananmen protestors have been met by force and detainment. In an extreme situation, such as national water shortages, social unrest could generate widespread, coordinated action and political mobilization that would serve as a midwife to anti-CCP political challenges, create divisions within the Party over how to deal with the environment, or lead to a massive show of force. Any of these outcomes would mark an erosion or alteration to the CCP’s current power dynamic. And while many would treat political change in China, especially the implosion of the Party, as a welcome development, it must be noted that any slippage of the Party’s dominance would most likely be accompanied by a period of transitional violence. Though most violence would be directed toward dissident Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in neighboring states through immigration, impediments to trade, and an increased military presence along the Chinese border. All of these situations would alter security assumptions in the region. Other Security Concerns While unrest presents the most obvious example of a security threat related to pollution, several other key concerns are worth noting. The cost of environmental destruction could, for example, begin to reverse the blistering rate of economic growth in China that is the foundation of CCP legitimacy. Estimates maintain that 7 percent annual growth is required to preserve social stability. Yet the costs of pollution are already taxing the economy between 8 and 12 percent of GDP per year [1]. As environmental problems mount, this percentage will increase, in turn reducing annual growth. As a result, the CCP could be seriously challenged to legitimize its continued control if economic growth stagnates. Nationalists in surrounding states could use pollution as a rallying point to muster support for anti-Chinese causes. For example, attacks on China’s environmental management for its impact on surrounding states like Japan, could be used to argue against further investment in the country or be highlighted during territorial disputes in the East China Sea to agitate anti-Chinese sentiment. While nationalism does not imply conflict, it could reduce patterns of cooperation in the region and hopes for balanced and effective multilateral institutions and dialogues. Finally, China’s seemingly insatiable appetite for timber and other resources, such as fish, are fuelling illegal exports from nations like Myanmar and Indonesia. As these states continue to deplete key resources, they too will face problems in the years to come and hence the impact on third nations must be considered. Territorial Expansion or Newfound Alliances In addition to the concerns already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a specific issue like water shortage, could have important geopolitical ramifications. China’s northern plains, home to hundreds of millions, face acute water shortages. Growing demand, a decade of drought, inefficient delivery methods, and increasing water pollution have reduced per capita water holdings to critical levels. Although Beijing hopes to relieve some of the pressures via the North-South Water Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of dollars and its completion is, at best, still several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet just to the north lies one of the most under-populated areas in Asia, the Russian Far East. While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia’s falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations. While a significant concern, the larger and more realistic implication for Western security analysts must be greater cooperation and a possible alliance with Moscow. It should be assumed that China will court Russia or even pursue an alliance with its northern neighbor to gain access to water, oil, and other natural resources. Indicative of growing strategic cooperation include a number of recent developments between the two countries, including a joint military exercise and continued investment and work on an oil pipeline. Such warming ties between Moscow and Beijing could threaten Western interests in the region and beyond. Conclusion Pollution and environmental degradation, not traditionally considered security concerns, should be accounted for in security assessments of China and the region. Social unrest, the potential for large-scale political mobilization, and democratization are increasingly challenging CCP power and legitimacy. These trends, when linked to political change, could lead to outbreaks of violence, possible large-scale emigration, economic instability, and other concerns. In facing such a serious problem, China would benefit from further foreign assistance and expertise. As the health of China and its economy is inextricably linked to all of the world’s most developed economies, wealthy states and NGOs should consider additional courses of action to help China form a credible environmental movement supported by legal experts, academics and Party officials sympathetic to change. Although not a complete solution, increased foreign assistance may be a step in the right direction. Alternatively, and if left untreated, China’s environment will worsen and threaten stability in one of the most populated and dynamic areas on Earth.

### Alt Cause to CCP — Government Repression

#### Xi’s repression cultivates dissent — destabilizes the CCP and creates support for democracy

Bandow 15 — Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, writes for Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, JD from Stanford University, 2015 (“Chinese Repression Threatens Economic Dynamism and Political Stability,” CATO Research Institute, July 27th, available online at <http://www.cato.org/blog/chinese-repression-threatens-economic-dynamism-political-stability>, accessed 6/29/16) JL

Increasingly globalized Chinese are aware of their online disadvantage compared to their peers in the West. Google, YouTube, and Twitter are verboten. Today Bloomberg and the New York Times are beyond reach. Last week as BBC television began to detail official abuses my TV went black. A couple minutes later BBC was back, after the China report had finished. While internet and media restrictions have not prevented rapid economic growth, barring the PRC’s best and brightest to a world of information is likely to dampen innovation and entrepreneurship. Moreover, those denied their full freedoms are more likely to leave home. Many of China’s wealthiest citizens have been departing an authoritarian system unbounded by the rule of law. Repression also stultifies China’s political evolution to a more mature and stable political order. Democracy provides an important safety valve for popular dissent. The Chinese Communist Party’s control may not be as firm as often presumed. The oppressive establishment which most Chinese have faced for most of their lives is Communist. Indeed, for many if not most party members, Communism is a means of personal advancement, even enrichment. President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is popular, but is widely seen as politically motivated. Moreover, Xi has abrogated the well-understood “deal” of the last four decades, that rulers can retire and be immune from future prosecution. Will incumbents so readily yield power in the future? Perhaps even more threatening for the CCP is the potential for an economic slowdown and consequent political unrest. Already protests are common against local governments, which tend to be ostentatiously rapacious. What if that antagonism shifts against the center? A poorer PRC means a poorer world: China is a major supplier and increasingly important source of global demand. A politically unstable Beijing would have unpredictable effects on its neighbors. As I wrote for Forbes online: “Since Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC has changed dramatically—and dramatically for the better. But this second revolution has stalled. Economic liberalization remains incomplete. Political reform never started. Individual liberty has regressed.” The Chinese people deserve to be free. The Chinese nation would benefit from their freedom. The rest of the world would gain from a freer Chinese nation. Everyone desiring a peaceful and prosperous 21st century should hope for the successful conclusion of China’s second revolution.

### Alt Cause to CCP — Ideology

#### Ideology is key to CCP stability and growth alone is insufficient — Chinese scholars and party leaders

Zeng 16 — Jinghan Zeng, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, M.A. from the University of Pittsburg, 2016 (“The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific,* Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-349-57455-1, p. 14-15)

Moreover, Chinese intellectuals are more pessimistic about performance legitimacy than are many Western scholars. In China, it is clearly recognized that simply relying on economics is not enough – even if the economy continues to do well (and of course, there is a clear understanding that bad economic performance will harm legitimacy). Problems caused by economic growth – changing values, socioeconomic inequality, corruption – are considered nowadays to be the most perceived legitimacy threats in China. In particular, Chinese intellectuals express their serious concern with changing values. How to maintain pro-authoritarian values has become an increasingly crucial, urgent challenge to the one-party rule in China.¶ As such, ideology has been proposed by Chinese intellectuals as a leading strategy to maintain legitimacy. Chinese intellectuals’ high emphasis on ideology is in stark contrast with many Western scholars’ insufficient attention to this issue. Indeed, not only Chinese intellectuals, but also party leaders, consider ideology to be crucial to regime legitimacy. In the past three decades, the party has invested a great deal of energy and human capital in modernizing its ideological basis.

### A2: BIT Solves China’s Econ

#### BIT’s don’t increase investment flows to a country

Neumayer and Spess 5 – Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, 2005 (“Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?” LSE Research Online, 2005, Available Online at https://core.ac.uk/download/files/67/92729.pdf, Accessed on 07-01-2016, AH)

It is most astonishing that despite the rising number of DITs, there are only three other serous studies examining the effect of such treaties on the location of FDI. The first study has been undertaken by Hallward-Driemeier (2003), looking at the bilateral flow of FDI from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries over the period 1980 to 2000. Her research design is dyadic, consisting of up to 537 country pairs. Using fixed effects estimations, she finds that the existence of a BIT between two countries does not increase the flow of FDI from the developed to the developing signatory country. This is true whether the dependent variable is measured as absolute flows, flows divided by host country's GDP or the share of the source countries' FDI outflow.

#### Research doesn’t prove a link between BITs and increased FDIs

Kerner 9 – Andrew Kerner, researcher at Emory University 2009 (“Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties”, International Studies Quarterly, Available at <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~amkerner/C%26C.pdf>, Accessed on 07-01-2016, AH)

Extant empirical work does not clearly indicate whether BITs work according to realist expectations, according to institutionalist expectations, or even whether BITs work at all. Consistent with both realism and institutionalism, several studies have found that signing more BITs correlates with greater aggregate FDI flows (e.g., Bu¨the and Milner 2008; Neumayer and Spess 2005). On the other hand, studies have generally been unable to show that signing a BIT with a specific country correlates with more FDI from that country (e.g., Hallward-Driemeyer 2003; Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Taken together, these results present a puzzle. Why do we find evidence that BITs encourage aggregate FDI flows, but fail to find evidence of increased investment by investors who are actually protected? This article is an attempt to address two holes in the literature that may account for these otherwise curious results. One hole is an under-appreciation of the different mechanisms through which BITs might impact FDI flows. While it is generally accepted that BITs might work by ‘‘tying the hands’’ of ratifying host states or by sending a broadly received ‘‘signal’’ that a country is trustworthy, the extant literature does not fully consider the theoretical distinctions between these hypotheses. Perhaps for this reason, extant empirical tests do not differentiate between the two mechanisms. The second hole in the literature is that it generally fails to appreciate the endogeneity between BITs and FDI. Developing countries are more likely to pursue BITs with developed countries when they believe doing so will significantly increase FDI inflows. This is tantamount to saying that BITs are more likely to be ratified when a country’s FDI inflows are significantly below what they would be were it not for fears of expropriation. This endogeneity can bias results if it is left un-addressed or if it is addressed insuffi- ciently.2

#### BITs take too long to come into force and don’t meaningfully increase investment

Cornell 10 – Cornell University, 2010 (“Evaluating a Potential US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty: Background, Context and Implications,” Cornell University ILR School, March 30, Available Online at <http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1738&context=key_workplace>, Accessed on 07-01-2016, AH)

An analysis of US BITs with developing countries shows that when BIT agreements are in force (compared with those signed but awaiting ratification), there is an observable positive effect on the increase of inflows of US foreign direct investment (FDI). One such study, conducted at the University of Illinois at Chicago, examined investment-flow data from 1977-2004. This study shows that an active BIT increases the level of US FDI to a partner country, whereas a US BIT that is signed but not yet in force does not. There is often a two-to-three-year gap between the time an agreement is signed and the time it comes into force. Because of data constraints, it is difficult to examine the effect of BITs on FDI into specific sectors. Research in 2005 found that a higher number of BITs increases FDI flows into a developing country. Though the finding that BITs in some manner increase the level of FDI between signatories is the most common outcome of such studies, other reports reach different conclusions. One recent analysis, for example, finds “little evidence that existing international agreements—trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), BITs or preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—tend to increase investment in partner countries from the United States.”7 Data available from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis is included in the dataset accompanying this report.

#### A BIT would be ineffective for China’s economy

Scissors 15 – Derek Scissors is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies Asian economic issues and trends, 2015 (“Bilateral investment treaty with China more than a ‘BIT’ of trouble,” The Hill, October 29, Available Online at <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/258486-bilateral-investment-treaty-with-china-more-than-a-bit-of>, Accessed 07-01-2016, AH)

While a 2016 vote is highly unlikely, the Obama administration is actively seeking a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with China. This is desirable in principle but destructive in practice. Most important, there is little indication that Beijing will meaningfully restrict state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or adopt non-discriminatory competition policies. Absent such action, a bilateral investment treaty is a bad idea. The current Chinese government is generally considered to be implementing pro-market reforms. This is true in some areas, such as finance, but manifestly not true in the corporate sector. China is discriminating more intensely against foreign companies, with an eye toward continuing to extract technology. Early this year, Qualcomm was fined almost $1 billion forsupposed antitrust violations even as China simultaneously maintains a slew of [state monopolies](http://www.sgcc.com.cn/ywlm/aboutus/profile.shtml" \t "_blank). More recently, Western Digital [finally received](http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/western-digital-corporation-announces-decision-from-chinas-ministry-of-commerce-enabling-integration-of-substantial-portions-of-hgst-and-wd-subsidiaries-300161731.html" \t "_blank) Chinese approval for its global acquisition of Hitachi Global Storage, three-and-a-half years after initial consideration. This step, however, was only taken after Western Digital agreed to sell a 15 percent stake to a [Chinese SOE](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/technology/unisplendour-of-china-buys-15-stake-in-western-digital.html" \t "_blank). France's Alcatel [learned from this](http://www.zdnet.com/article/nokia-strikes-china-joint-venture-for-swift-approval-of-alcatel-lucent-merger/" \t "_blank) and inked its China joint venture early in its own approval process. It should go without saying that competition policy which extorts multinationals is not compatible with being a good BIT partner. Another problem is far worse. China's policies with regard to its SOEs are antithetical to a core principle of the BIT — that foreign firms should receive the same treatment as domestic (national treatment). Multinationals may receive the same treatment as private Chinese firms but they are nowhere close to receiving the same treatment as SOEs. SOEs are [protected from competition](https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Making-the-new-normal-meaningful.pdf" \t "_blank) in two dozen sectors. They are [not allowed to fail](http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/09/14/chinas-state-firm-reform-plan-disappoints-some-experts/" \t "_blank) for commercial reasons. They receive [huge sums](http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/02/02/2107072/digging-into-chinas-debts/" \t "_blank) of what are essentially costless loans. These are established Chinese policies and the fall 2013 Communist Party meeting was supposed to inaugurate a new era of pro-market reform. But the principal corporate reform was allowing private firms to take [minority stakes](http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2013-11/11/content_15097730.html" \t "_blank) in SOEs. This is the exact opposite of what needs to occur, which is more competition between SOEs and the private sector. The SOE reform guidelines issued last month affirm this [harmful notion](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/13/c_134620127.htm" \t "_blank) of "reform."

### Ext – Growth High – Brexit

#### China will benefit from Brexit – unchecked expansion and currency

Cheng 16— Wy, researcher and writer on politics and economics, 2016 (“How China Can Benefit From Brexit,” The Diplomat, June 30, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/how-china-can-benefit-from-brexit/, Accessed 07-01-2016, AV)

Although President Xi Jinping explicitly supported Britain remaining in the EU, the post-Brexit European political and economic landscapes are not necessarily against China’s interests. In fact, in the long term, China may well emerge as a big winner from the market turmoil and political uncertainties in Europe.¶ Certainly, in the short term China’s economy, like other major economies, will be troubled with the financial disarray centered in Europe. Immediately after the vote for Britain to leave the EU was announced, the yuan plunged to a five-year low. A weakened European economy will also harm Chinese exports to the region and inevitably plague Chinese investments.¶ Investors hate uncertainties; so do the Chinese leaders. A “remain” vote in the historic referendum would have allowed China to avoid these blows. It is thus not difficult to conceive why Xi was unusually vocal about his views, hoping Britain would not surprise him.¶ What’s more bothersome, as various experts argue, is the loss of an associate who has a say in the EU. Last October, during his visit to the U.K., Xi signed trade deals worth some $60 billion with Prime Minister David Cameron, confirmed London as the first international financial center to launch renminbi-dominated sovereign bonds, and marked a significant advancement of the economic ties between the two countries. Having had high hopes of Britain being a keen advocate within the EU for a China-EU free trade agreement, China now seems to have suffered a major setback in furthering its economic ties with the EU.¶ However, the profoundness of this consequence should not be overrated. When observers make such a prediction, they more or less assume that the EU will continue to be formidable politically and economically, despite Britain’s departure. But the somewhat surprising outcome of the historic referendum has unveiled the sweeping prevalence of populism, which has gained grounds faster in Britain and across Europe than many reckoned. The outcome of the vote has emboldened the far-right parties to demand exit votes in other EU member states. As domestic voices become more pronounced, the near future could see a disunited, weakened, if not cracked-up, European Union. And that will be a time when China can “divide and conquer.”¶ From cold-shouldering China over the free trade agreement to criticizing the non-democracy’s disregard of human rights, the EU member states could do so because together they had sufficient bargaining power. As the EU becomes more disunited, the European states will have to count more on their own, with far fewer bargaining chips in each of their hands.¶ Having pegged China as a daunting competitor for years, the EU states have allowed protectionist sentiments to prevail and opted to turn their backs on China. But Brexit will change the chessboard fundamentally. Not only will it force the EU states to rely more on their own bargaining power, it will also thwart each of them economically, constricting their “right” to be picky in search of foreign investments and trading partners.¶ In the coming decade, exclusive bilateral negotiations between China and each EU member state will gain more significance. Certainty, for China this will be politically more complicated, compared to dealing with one single entity. But in bilateral talks, China will definitely have the upper hand.¶ Another arena where China will benefit from Brexit is currency. As the U.K. has served as a major offshore renminbi clearing center, there is no doubt that Britain’s departure from the EU will represent a setback to the internationalization of renminbi. But in the greater picture, the market of international currency is a zero-sum game. Brexit has notably undermined the pound sterling’s standing as an international currency — just as the renminbi is set to be added in to IMF’s SDR basket in October. It’s unrealistic to imagine the renminbi capturing all of the ground lost by the pound; the Japanese yen especially emerged as a sturdy alternative in the turbulent days right after the Brexit vote. However, over the next decade, the renminbi will be capable of seizing part of the vacuum.

#### China will easily survive Brexit – growth has been sustained

Hahm 16— Melody, Writer & Reporter at Yahoo Finance, 2016 (“Brexit won't break China's economy,” Yahoo News, June 29, Available Online at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/brexit-wont-break-chinas-economy-000000437.html, Accessed 07-01-2016, AV)

The Brexit vote rattled global markets, but China has been left relatively unscathed.¶ The UK’s decision to leave the European Union won’t strongly affect China’s economy, according to Leland Miller, co-founder and CEO of China Beige Book International, a leading data firm that surveys over 3,000 firms and 160 bankers across the country every quarter.¶ He says though he doesn’t expect Brexit to have much of an impact, many unknown variables may abound in the near term such as other trade re-negotations or a global slowdown that might force China to spur up stimulus. But, ultimately, it’s hard to speculate about the potential repercussions when Brexit will likely impact global markets for the next several years.¶ “It’s so new. Obviously, everyone’s going to be thinking that there’s a sea change globally,” Miller says. “I don’t think it’s going through the heads of the average Chinese business quite yet.”¶ Last summer, China experienced a massive stock market crash (the Shanghai Composite dropped 8.5% in a single day), which came after investors piled money into Chinese equities despite the country’s weak economy and company profits.¶ Miller says the Chinese economy has come a long way from a year ago and is actually on the mend. Driven by the services and construction industries, China is experiencing “moderate trend growth,” according to China Beige Book’s latest report.¶ “Markets may find this quite surprising considering all the gloominess in the aftermath of the Brexit vote,” he says.¶ Things are looking much better, with the Chinese economy rebounding from real weakness in Q1 and Q4 of last year. “We’ve had two consecutive quarters where China looked as bad as it has been since the beginning of our survey [started five years ago],” Miller says.¶ That economic uncertainty triggered the government’s decision to cut interest rates to a record low and crack down on short-sellers, among other moves. Miller’s survey is seeing these policy responses make an impact on the Chinese economy this quarter.¶ “There are finally signs of effective fiscal stimulus, with the transportation and real estate construction sectors each suddenly showing signs of life,” he says. “This is pure fiscal stimulus coursing through the country, causing a big jump in hiring as well.”¶ But now, with the Chinese economy looking healthy, he says the government should back off.¶ “This is the time [the government] should be putting fiscal stimulus away, saving it for an even rainier day. Then they can come back with it if things are problematic,” he says. “But that’s not the Chinese way. So we’ll see if this could go on for several quarters or if it’s just a one quarter blip.”

#### China’s economy resilient post-Brexit

Hamlin 16— Kevin, Economics Writer at Bloomberg, 2016 (“Brexit Seen as a Negative, or an Opportunity,” Bloomberg, June 27, Available Online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/for-china-economy-brexit-seen-as-a-negative-or-an-opportunity, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

After Britain’s vote to leave the European Union roiled global markets, economists are grappling with how best to gauge the potential impact on China. Views range from downbeat scenarios such as Brexit contagion weakening the yuan or undermining exports, to optimistic ones where China emerges as a safe haven amid the storm. Beyond the currency impact, economists are trying to untangle other issues such as whether China benefits from a likely delay of U.S. interest rate hikes, how it will respond to market turbulence, and whether the domestic economy and capital flows will suffer. Here’s what some China watchers are saying: ‘Bad News’ David Dollar, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution who previously was the U.S. Treasury attache in Beijing and World Bank country director for China: "Brexit is bad news for China, but I would not exaggerate the impact. It ushers in a period of more uncertainty in the global economy and probably slower growth, and that will affect China through trade. In addition, China had bet on the U.K. as the best entry point into the European market, and that no longer looks like a good bet. But China’s economy is primarily driven by domestic consumption now, so the effects will not be that great." "Probably China will use a bit more stimulus, especially credit for real estate and other investment, to maintain its growth. I would expect the trade-weighted yuan to rise as other parts of the world face more headwinds than China faces. China’s large capital outflow is likely to continue."

#### Brexit leaves China untarnished – too far from the eye of the storm

Zhou 16— Xin, China correspondent at South China Morning Post SCMP, 2016 (“China emerges unscathed from Brexit, at least for now, experts say,” South China Morning Post, June 24, Available Online at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1980856/china-emerges-unscathed-brexit-least-now-experts-say, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

Beijing may brush off limited, short-term turbulence brought about by Britain’s exit from the European Union, Chinese scholars said, but the dynamics of its relationships with London and the bloc may shift in the long run.¶ While China is using London as a bridgehead to expand the yuan’s global clout, treating Britain as an ideal destination for overseas property and infrastructure investment, and wooing British support for its own international initiatives, they said it was too far away from the centre of the storm to be badly affected by Britain’s exit from the EU.¶ Chinese markets reacted only mildly to the British referendum that sparked the biggest global financial turmoil since the 2008 crisis – the Shanghai composite stock index lost 1.3 per cent and the onshore yuan exchange rate weakened slightly. In comparison, the Japanese stock market plunged 8 per cent as the yen rallied 5 per cent.¶ As the world’s second-biggest economy and its largest trader, China was not immune from ripples caused by Brexit, said Sun Lijian, a finance professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, but its capital account controls could provide a buffer to manage the market fallout and Beijing might become more cautious in opening up its domestic market to a stormy world.¶ Brexit “may also add international pressure to do more in terms of growth and maintaining exchange rate stability, and China is expected to face such pressure at the G20” meeting in Hangzhou, China, in September, Sun said.¶ China’s zeal for investment in Britain might cool off a bit if the terms of its exit from the EU turned out to be unfriendly to business, said Zhang Ming, a researcher of international investment at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.¶ “China may shift some deals from London to continental European hubs such as Luxembourg or Frankfurt,” Zhang said.¶ But he said there was no need to worry too much about offshore yuan development in London – a key yuan business hub along with Hong Kong and Singapore.

### Ext – Economy Resilient

#### China’s economy resilient post-Brexit

Hamlin 16— Kevin, Economics Writer at Bloomberg, 2016 (“Brexit Seen as a Negative, or an Opportunity,” Bloomberg, June 27, Available Online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/for-china-economy-brexit-seen-as-a-negative-or-an-opportunity, Accessed 06-29-2016, AV)

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#### Chinese economy steadying – statistics prove

Fabi 16— Randi, Deputy Bureau Chief, Reuters Indonesia, 2016 (“China’s economy slowly steadying, Asia sentiment hits year high: Survey,” Reuters, June 23, Available Online at http://indianexpress.com/article/business/world-market/chinas-economy-slowly-steadying-asia-sentiment-hits-year-high-survey-2871160/, Accessed 06-24-2016, AV)

Sentiment at Asia’s biggest companies climbed to its highest in a year in the second quarter of 2016, helped by signs that China’s economy was slowly steadying, a Thomson Reuters/INSEAD survey showed.¶ During the quarter, China reported a marginal decline in May imports that was far less than market expectations, reflecting a pick-up in domestic demand as the government raises spending on infrastructure projects to support growth.¶ The Thomson Reuters/INSEAD Asian Business Sentiment Index, representing the six-month outlook of 139 firms, rose to 67 for April-June versus 65 three months prior – continuing a rebound from a four-year low of 58 in December. A reading over 50 indicates a positive view. In China, corporate sentiment is at its highest in almost a year, with respondents including China Jo Jo Drugstores Inc producing a subindex of 75, up from 71 in the previous survey.¶ “What we are seeing today relative to the past two quarters is that Chinese risk has gone down. People are a little bit less worried about the possibility that something sudden will happen in China,” said Singapore-based economics professor Antonio Fatas at global business school INSEAD.

#### China’s economy resilient – consumption proves

The Economist 16— an English-language weekly newspaper owned by the Economist Group and edited in offices based in London, 2016 (“Despite China’s economic slowdown, consumption is resilient,” The Economist, April 30, Available Online at http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-finance/21697597-free-spending-consumers-provide-comfort-troubled-economy-consumption-china-resilient, Accessed 07-01-2016, AV)

IF YOU believe that China’s economy is in trouble and that Chinese consumers are clinging tightly to their yuan, a visit to a local car dealership may make you think again. China has roared past America already to become the world’s biggest car market. In March sales of passenger cars zoomed again, by nearly 10% year on year. Shiny sport-utility vehicles (SUVs), the hottest, shiniest items at this week’s biennial Beijing Auto Show (pictured), did even better: sales jumped by 46% in March from a year earlier. The car market is forecast to keep growing briskly for the rest of this decade (see chart).¶ The Chinese consumer is flashing his wallet elsewhere, too. China’s box-office revenues shot up by nearly 50% on a year earlier in 2015, to $6.8 billion. Cinema operators led by Wanda Group, an ambitious local conglomerate that recently bought Hollywood’s Legendary Entertainment, have poured money into expansion; the number of screens across China has been rising at 36% a year since 2011.¶ After years of expansion, the smartphone market is peaking. Some firms still thrive: China’s Huawei, a telecoms giant, predicts that revenues from its consumer-devices division will rise by about 50% this year. But Xiaomi, an innovative electronics firm once seen as China’s answer to Apple, is losing steam. Apple itself announced weaker results on April 26th (see article). Revenues from sales in greater China fell by 26% year on year. As the market for devices matures, however, consumer spending is shifting to services: data usage has grown at triple-digit rates since 2012.¶ The unrelenting march of e-commerce continues. In 2010 online shopping accounted for only 3% of total private consumption, but it now makes up 15%. Alibaba, which processes more sales on its e-commerce platforms than eBay and Amazon combined, saw annual Chinese revenues grow to 63 billion yuan ($9.7 billion) in 2015, a rise of nearly 40% compared with a year earlier. JD, its main local rival, saw revenues leap by nearly 58%.¶ Chinese are still spending heavily abroad. Their international tax-free shopping shot up 58% last year, according to a new report from Global Blue, a big operator of duty-free shops. Overall, Chinese tourists spent $215 billion on outbound travel last year, a rise of 53% on the previous year. Ctrip, a big online travel firm partly owned by Baidu, a Chinese internet search giant, saw its revenues jump by nearly half last year, to 10.9 billion yuan.¶ As with cars, screens and travel, so with consumption generally. All retail sales across the economy, adjusted for inflation, rose by 9.6% during the first quarter, compared with the same period a year ago. The services sector, which caters to the growing demands of the middle class, has been rising by 8% a year in real terms since 2012 (see chart). Services made up 57% of economic output in the first quarter; electricity consumption in services rose by some 10%, but was flat for industry.¶ Not every market is as bouncy as it once was. A cooling economy and an official anti-corruption drive have squeezed luxury goods, sales of which fell by 2% year on year in 2015, to 113 billion yuan. But some firms are doing well. Rémy Cointreau, a premium liquor brand offering tamper-proof bottles on the mainland (“near field communications” tags tell your smartphone if the booze has been diluted), saw global revenues rise by nearly 10% last quarter and credited “improving trends in greater China”. According to Bernard Arnault, the boss of LVMH, a luxury goliath: “Analysts underestimate the Chinese economy… the fundamentals are good. Household spending is still increasing.”

#### China’s economy resilient – stocks recovering

Gamm 15— Scott, a correspondent for TheStreet TV and TheStreet.com focusing on markets and economics, 2015 (“IMF Chief Christine Lagarde Says China’s Economy ‘Resilient’ Despite Market Decline,” The Street, July 10, Available Online at https://www.thestreet.com/story/13236552/1/imf-chief-christine-lagarde-says-chinas-economy-resilient-despite-market-decline.html, Accessed 07-01-2016, AV)

China's dramatic pullback in stocks isn't a threat to its economy, at least according to Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund.¶ "We believe the Chinese economy is resilient and strong enough to withstand that kind of significant variation in the market,' she said during a press conference on Wednesday. Lagarde was referring to the 27% drop in the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index, since its high on June 12. But she also pointed to the index's impressive 74% increase over the past year. Lagarde said the recent volatility won't dampen China's hopes of having its yuan currency included in the IMF's emergency reserves, which countries access in times of need. The fund, also known as the special drawing rights basket, includes dollars, euros, pound sterling and Japanese yen. Inclusion of the yuan would be a prestigious milestone for China, but a final decision is still pending.¶ In a move to stem the selloff in Chinese stocks, which was sparked by too many investors buying stocks on margin, Chinese officials at one point suspended trading in roughly half of its stocks and banned large shareholders from exiting positions for at least six months. Although those measures raised eyebrows among many analysts, Lagarde wasn't fazed.¶ "No one should be surprised by the fact that they want to maintain an orderly movement and avoid a disorderly functioning of the market," she said.

### Ext – China Not Key to Global Econ

#### Chinese economic growth slowdown doesn’t spill over to world – Japan proves

Tan and Barnato 16— Huileng, writer at CNBC.com, covering a broad range of topics in Asia, Katy, reporter and editor at CNBC.com in London, where she tracks international business, economic and political news, 2016 (“Why a China slowdown will not hurt that much,” CNBC, Jan 15, Available Online at http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/15/china-slowdown-will-hurt-but-not-end-of-it-all-hsbc.html, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

After three decades of explosive growth, China's economy is slowing, sending jitters across global financial markets.¶ So if China stumbles into a hard landing, how bad will the rest of the world fall?¶ According to HSBC economist, Frederic Neumann, a slowdown in the Chinese economy is "not exactly the end of it all."¶ Possible clues to China's fate could be gauged from how the world reacted to Japan's economic malaise, he reckons.¶ At the end of the 1980s, Japan's contribution to global gross domestic product was about the same as China does today.¶ While the Japanese economy has failed to muster meaningful growth since then, the world "sailed on with barely a blip in the 1990s" after Japan's boom and stumble in the decade before, Neumann noted in a report. After three decades of explosive growth, China's economy is slowing, sending jitters across global financial markets.¶ China's share of the world's growth in terms of purchasing power parity has jumped to well over 16 percent from 10 percent in the past decade while its share of global gross domestic product (GDP) in U.S. dollar terms has also tripled in the same period to just under 15 percent last year .¶ "So, if Chinese demand stumbles, would this knock out world growth? Not necessarily. Take the example of Japan in 1989 when the bubble burst. At the time, its share of global U.S. GDP was a touch above 15 percent. The subsequent slowdown, however, didn't push the world to the brink."

#### China growth slowdown does not spill over to the rest of the world

Smith 16 Yves has spent more than 25 years in the financial services industry and currently heads Aurora Advisors, a New York-based management consulting firm specializing in corporate finance advisory and financial services. Prior experience includes Goldman Sachs (in corporate finance), McKinsey & Co., and Sumitomo Bank (as head of mergers and acquisitions). Yves has written for publications in the United States and Australia, including The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, Slate, The Conference Board Review, Institutional Investor, The Daily Deal and the Australian Financial Review.[Yves is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Business School. Jan. 30.2016 “[Chinese Slowdown and the World Economy](http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016/01/chinese-slowdown-and-the-world-economy.html)”<http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2016/01/chinese-slowdown-and-the-world-economy.html> )ski

On the effects on the world economy my impression is that there is also a great deal of exaggeration. China is the second largest economy in the world, for sure, and has become central for the global economy in many ways. But it’s role in the global economic problems has been overstated. In Brazil, for example, the Chinese slowdown played virtually no role, as I discussed [here](http://nakedkeynesianism.blogspot.com/2015/12/the-strange-and-misunderstood-reasons.html" \t "_blank). In the US the usual complaint is that the depreciation of the yuan is behind deindustrialization, and that the Chinese crisis, that has led to a more depreciated currency, is hurting the manufacturing recovery in the country. I am skeptical of the argument. The figure below shows manufacturing employment and a broad trade weighted exchange rate for the US.As it can be seen the decrease in manufacturing jobs, which started in the early 2000s (before that it was more or less constant; see discussion [here](http://nakedkeynesianism.blogspot.com/2011/05/manufacturing-jobs-have-declined.html" \t "_blank)) is connected to the entry of China in the World Trade Organization (WTO). But the collapse of manufacturing jobs went hand in hand with a depreciation of the dollar. And some of the, admittedly slow and small, recovery since the 2008 recession has gone with an appreciation of the dollar. This indicates that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and the WTO play a more important role than exchange rates.

#### China has no effect on the global econ - contributes less than 5%

Mariano 2/22/16 Keith Richard D. Mariano Posted on February 22, 2016 <http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Economy&title=not-yet-time-to-worry-about-spillover-from-china-crisis-think-tank-says&id=123459> )ski

In a statement released yesterday, the Asian Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ASFRC) noted how foreigners have “mistakenly” projected the connection between the tremors in China’s financial market onto the real economy.“The financial turmoil in China is very different from the financial turmoil in a Western economy. It does not indicate that there’s an economic crisis,” ASFRC member Leslie Young said in a panel discussion in Quezon City.The market rout in China, for instance, shows little correlation to gross domestic product (GDP) growth, according to the group of independent experts on economic policy issues relevant to financial markets in Asia and the Pacific.“This is because the stock market contributes only 5% of corporate financing and plays no role in financing pensions or as collateral for corporate loans,” the statement read.In contrast, a major collapse in a Western stock market will have serious economic implications because this would dampen consumer demand, weigh on GDP growth and magnify the pessimism over business prospects.The ASFRC also cited misconceptions surrounding the devaluation of the yuan in August, after the People’s Bank of China changed the exchange rate benchmark to a trade-weighted basket of major currencies from the dollar.The shift was intended to provide market forces greater role in determining the value of the yuan, as required if China would join the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights basket, the ASFRC noted in the statement.“Retail investors interpreted the ‘devaluation’ as a desperate attempt to stimulate China’s economy... With a current account surplus of $600 billion in 2015, China has little reason to devalue its currency for this purpose,” the statement read.The group further downplayed the $1-trillion decrease in China’s reserves, saying only a “small” portion of the amount constituted capital flight driven by fear of massive devaluation or internal collapse.The collapse in China’s financial markets creates minimal “real effect” on the country and constitutes no substantial concern for the Philippines, ASFRC member Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista said on the sidelines of the event. “When should we be alarmed with what’s happening in China? When it has real effects on us. I don’t think the financial events in China have really much of a real effect not only on its economy but also in our economy.”Nevertheless, the negative developments in China’s financial markets have spilled over to the rest of the world. The main index on the Philippine Stock Exchange, for instance, entered a bear market in mid-January amid lingering concerns about China’s economy.“If you project the importance of a stock market in a country like China [in raising] funds for firms then your conclusion is likely going to be that firms are cash-starved and there’s no money for investment, etc. so that this is going to lower the growth rate,” Ms. Gochoco-Bautista said.The misconceptions arise from a “communication problem” between China and the Western press, which tends to present developments in China on Western premises, according to the ASFRC.“When you look at the headlines, it seems that China is about to collapse but if it goes from 10% to 6% annual growth, that is not a collapse,” said Ms. Gochoco-Bautista, an economics professor at the University of the Philippines-Diliman. The slowdown in China’s economic expansion has long been anticipated and remains far from alarming, said Mr. Young, an economics professor at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business.“Yet the fear that China is going to have hard landing can end up in something like a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, if it exacerbates lower rates of investment and pessimism in the emerging markets, that would feed back into the Chinese economy,” Mr. Young noted.

#### Chinese economic decline doesn’t affect rest of world

Koesterich 15— Russ, Managing Director and head of Asset Allocation, is a member of the Global Allocation team within BlackRock's Multi-Asset Strategies Group, 2015 (“Will the Selloff in China Hurt the Global Economy?,” Nasdaq, July 17, Available Online at http://www.nasdaq.com/article/will-the-selloff-in-china-hurt-the-global-economy-cm497758, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

Chinese equities have been in freefall lately. Despite a rebound in recent days after numerous well-intentioned (if somewhat counterproductive) government attempts to break the fall, the Shanghai Composite is down roughly 25 percent from its peak.¶ It's no wonder, then, that many investors are asking: Does the selloff represent a systemic risk to the global economy? My take: Though China is the world's second largest economy, the volatility in China's stock market is unlikely to have a material impact on either the global or Chinese economy. Here are six reasons why.¶ The roller coaster ride in China is mainly a domestic one. Foreign investment accounts for around 1 percent of Shanghai-listed A-Shares, a market driven by Chinese retail investor sentiment, not fundamentals. Thus, when the A-Shares market moves, it moves sharply and quickly. On the other hand, Hong Kong-listed H-Shares, which more foreigners hold, aren't as skewed to retail and tend to be less volatile. So, while the H-Shares market didn't capture as much upside from China's bull market, it was more insulated on the way down.¶ The linkage between China's economy and its stock market isn't particularly strong. Unlike in the U.S., Chinese companies tend to access capital through bank lending rather than through equity markets, though the Chinese government is trying to encourage greater equity market capitalization via reforms. Indeed, the size of the Chinese stock market relative to China's gross domestic product ( GDP ) is fairly small.¶ Stock weakness doesn't necessarily lead to economic weakness , and this is true across economies. In fact, stock market weakness generally has less impact on the real economy than real estate weakness. In the U.S., where market cap relative to GDP is much larger than in China, the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000 only resulted in a particularly mild recession.¶ While Chinese growth is slowing, the pace is measured. While China's economic growth slowed in the first quarter, it managed to stabilize at 7 percent in the second quarter. Though most of the damage to the market didn't occur in the second quarter, thus far, the recent stock market volatility doesn't seem to be having a noteworthy impact on China's economic fundamentals.¶ Chinese officials remain in easing mode. Markets seemed to interpret Chinese government intervention to stem the selloff as coming too early and as a sign of panic from the Chinese authorities. However, some of the government measures-such as encouraging share buybacks-have helped stabilize markets. Looking forward, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has plenty of spare power to support the Chinese economy and financial markets, unlike some developed market central banks, and it will likely continue to implement strong countermeasures. Indeed, any sign of slowing growth in China should be met with further easing policies , so we're going to see lots of stimulus in various forms to help mitigate the damage from the recent rout.¶ We haven't seen much of an impact on the global economy so far. The selloff in China could impact the U.S. via its effect on the dollar, consumer confidence and business confidence. We haven't seen this. Indeed, despite all the recent drama in China and Greece, the global economy and markets aren't too far off the trajectory they were on in early 2015.

#### China controls less of the world economy than though – effect of decline is minimal

Krugman 15 — Paul Robin Krugman is an American economist, Distinguished Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times, 2015 (“Chinese Spillovers,” The New York Times, Aug 28, Available Online at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/chinese-spillovers/?\_r=0)

Let me start with the case for not worrying too much, which comes down to the fact that China’s economy, while big, is still a small fraction of the global economy — about 15 percent at market exchange rates, which both Buiter and I consider the relevant number. Now, we have a very old but still useful way to think about the simple economics of interdependence: the foreign trade multiplier. Imagine a world of two countries, A and B, in which A has a recession. This will cause A’s imports from B to fall, with a contractionary effect on B. B’s contraction leads to a fall in imports from A, leading to a further slump in A’s economy, leading to still lower imports from B, and so on.This may sound like an explosive process, but given realistic numbers it’s actually convergent, and in fact the later-round effects should be trivial. Chinese imports from the rest of the world are less than 3 percent of the ROW’s GDP. Suppose China experiences a 5 percent slump in its own GDP; given an income elasticity of 2, which is reasonable, this would mean a 10 percent fall in imports — but that’s a shock to the rest of the world of just 0.3 percent of GDP. Not nothing, but not that big a deal.

#### Effect of Chinese economic growth on world overstated - exports

Armstrong-Taylor 14— Paul, Resident Professor of International Economics at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, 2014 (“Concerns that China's slowdown will hurt the global economy are unfounded,” China Economic Review, Aug 28, Available Online at http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/paul-taylor-china-slowdown-impact-global-economy-unfounded, Accessed 06-23-2016, AV)

Earlier this year a RMB3 billion (US$487 million) trust fund issued by China Credit Trust Co. and marketed to customers at Industrial and Commercial Bank of China threatened to default. Though in the end investors did not suffer significant losses, the episode highlighted the riskiness of the rapid growth in trusts and wealth management products in China. A related and long-running concern of the China bears is the real estate sector. Construction is important for GDP and employment, but it is also connected to several other vulnerable sectors. Construction companies have been major beneficiaries of shadow bank lending; furthermore, construction is a major source of demand for producers of steel and concrete (many of which are already struggling with capacity) and land (sales of which underpin the budgets of many local governments). Financial firms, policymakers and increasingly the popular media have warned that a crisis in China's shadow banking or real estate sectors could pose a threat to the global economy – that it could even represent another "Lehman moment."¶ There are some reasons why these fears may be overstated. Most bullish commentators have focused on the possibilities of containing any crisis domestically. For example, although it has grown rapidly, China's shadow banking sector is still relatively small at 30% of bank assets (compared to 170% in the US). While real estate prices have increased sharply, incomes have mostly kept pace and demand, at least in first-tier cities, seems solid. Compared to most countries, the Chinese government has plentiful resources and tools to combat any crisis. For example, it can directly influence bank lending in a way that governments in developed countries cannot.¶ Even if China does avoid a crisis, it appears inevitable that growth will have to slow as it transitions to a more sustainable growth model. This too has caused concern that China may cease to be the engine of global growth. However, my recent research suggests that the world has little to fear from a slowdown in the Chinese economy. There are two main channels through which economic shocks can be transmitted between countries: Trade and finance. Let us consider each in turn.¶ One might expect that growth in trading countries such as China would have a bigger effect on other countries than countries that trade little. In fact, historically, openness has no statistically significant relationship with the transmission of growth internationally. However, the trade balance does matter: Growth in deficit countries affects other countries more than that in surplus countries.¶ How do we explain this? Exports are driven by foreign demand, so there is no reason to suppose that that demand would automatically decline if a country suffered a domestic recession. However, imports would probably fall and this would hurt foreign exporters and overseas growth. We would expect this effect to be particularly strong during a global recession when demand is most scarce. This is indeed what we see in the data.¶ Although China trades a lot, it runs a surplus. Furthermore, many of China's imports are supplies for their exports. If exports are not hit, there is no reason to suppose these imports would fall. For both these reasons, an economic slowdown in China may not have much effect on the rest of the world via trade.

### Ext – No Diversionary War

#### Diversionary war theory false –Japan

Frej 11— Willa, Pierson College. She writes about China’s foreign policy as she works on her senior essay discussing the topic, 2011 (“Update: Sino-Japanese Tensions,” The Yale Globalist, Feb 23, Available Online at http://97.74.206.199/tyglobalist/onlinecontent/blogs/update-sino-japanese-tensions/, Accessed 06-23-2016)

Furthermore, leadership transitions are of note in both China and Japan, making it difficult to generalize about hawkish or conciliatory behavior on either side, since diplomacy currently consists of extensive calculations about both present and future leadership. The diversionary war theory posits that states pursue a more aggressive foreign policy when faced with domestic vulnerability. It seems as though this is what is occurring between the Chinese and the Japanese. In fact, Abe’s newfound hawkish position is surprising, given his much less hostile stance on China in the past. In 2006, he was the first Japanese prime minister to pick Beijing as the first stop of foreign visits instead of the United States. Yet when considering the heated nationalism that has also overtaken the Japanese in reaction to the Senkakus, Abe’s insistence on keeping the islands in Japanese hands falls into the diversionary war line of reasoning. But the main question on everyone’s minds is what Xi Jinping is going to bring to the table on November 8, the date of the Chinese leadership transition. According to a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, Chinese people are more hostile towards rival nations than ever before. Will fresh leadership therefore adhere to the demands of the populace? Along this line of reasoning, China will react to internal turmoil with a continual display of hostility towards Japan. What this “hostility” will specifically entail is unclear. At the very least, China will most likely continue to send patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. The theory of diversionary war cannot, however, serve to predict the future of Sino-Japanese relations on its own. It would fail to explain China’s history of regional cooperation in response to territorial disputes. More importantly, national interests – namely economic and balance of power interests – are at stake. On the one hand, China fears the loss of strategically significant territory. Admittedly, these islands are nothing but a cluster of rocks in the middle of the East China Sea, but control over this territory grants important access to fisherman and supposed untapped oil reserves. So while it is clearly in China’s best interest to fight for some level of sovereignty over the Diaoyus, a diplomatic shakeup between China and Japan would be an economic disaster. China is now Japan’s largest trading partner, and a prolonging of the territorial dispute will seriously jeopardize bilateral trade. Chances are slim that a full-blow military escalation will occur. The question, therefore, is how long leaders on both sides will play the hard line and delay constructive diplomacy in order to save face.

#### No diversionary war in China – leaders won’t risk it

Fravel 10— M. Taylor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010 (“International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion,” International Studies Review, Available Online at http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.ISR.china.expansion.pdf, p. 521, Accessed 06-30-2016, AV)

One way in which nationalism may interact with the parochial interests of domestic¶ political actors would be to provide China’s leaders with a rationale or justifi-¶ cation for diversionary action. This source of expansion follows the conventional¶ wisdom of ‘‘diversionary war,’’ the theory that national leaders will initiate or¶ escalate a dispute to distract or rally a restive and dissatisfied population (Levy¶ 1989). In this case, the use of force in an outstanding territorial dispute or the¶ initiation of new claims could provide China’s leaders with an issue that can be¶ tapped to mobilize society for diversionary goals.¶ The diversionary war argument is hard to assess because it seems so intuitive¶ and is a phenomenon that might always occur. China appears prone to diversion,¶ as the authoritarian state’s legitimacy depends on economic development¶ and broad but ill-defined appeals to nationalism. Amid the rise of popular¶ nationalism and growing discontent with the social upheaval associated with¶ reform, China has been described as ‘‘prone to muscle-flexing’’ in its foreign¶ policy to deflect attention from social unrest (Shirk 2007:62).¶ Nevertheless, quantitative research shows no systematic relationship between¶ past episodes of domestic unrest in China and involvement in militarized interstate¶ disputes, whether over territory or other issues (Johnston 1998). Moreover,¶ in the 1990s, actions that might be seen as diversionary, such as the public demonstrations¶ following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999¶ or the 2005 protests against Japan, have been reactive in nature (Brittingham¶ 2007). China’s leaders mobilized society in response to external challenges that¶ questioned their domestic credibility as leaders, not in response to domestic¶ discontent from which attention needed to be deflected. Indeed, although the¶ sources of discontent are widespread and constant, large anti-foreign demonstrations¶ have been rare and infrequent. Instead, China’s leaders reflect a nuanced¶ understanding of the potential pitfalls of mobilizing nationalism and the dangers¶ of unleashing a genie of public opinion that may be impossible to contain¶ (Downs and Saunders 1998 ⁄ 99).

#### Diversionary war won’t happen in China – cooperation is more likely

Fravel 05— M. Taylor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005 (“International Security,” International Studies Review, Fall, Available Online at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228805775124534, p. 49-51, Accessed 06-30-2016, AV)

To explain why and when states might compromise in territorial disputes,¶ this article presents a counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic¶ conflict on foreign policy. Diversionary war theory asserts that leaders facing¶ domestic strife provoke conflicts with other states just to improve their¶ position at home. By contrast, I argue that internal conflict often creates conditions¶ for cooperation, producing a “diversionary peace” instead of war. Embattled¶ leaders are willing to cooperate with other states in exchange for¶ assistance in countering their domestic sources of insecurity. In territorial disputes,¶ leaders are more likely to compromise when confronting internal threats to regime security, including rebellions and legitimacy crises. Facing¶ these types of internal threats, leaders are more likely to trade territorial concessions¶ for assistance from neighboring states, such as suppressing rebels or¶ increasing bilateral trade.¶ Regime insecurity best explains China’s many attempts to compromise in its¶ territorial disputes. Most of China’s disputes are located on its long land border¶ adjacent to frontier regions where the authority of the regime has been¶ weak. Ethnic minorities dominate these frontiers, which make up more than¶ half of the country and were never governed directly before 1949. During periods¶ of regime insecurity, especially in the event of ethnic unrest near its international¶ boundaries, China’s leaders have been much more willing to offer¶ concessions in exchange for cooperation that strengthens their control of these¶ areas, such as denying external support to separatists or affirming recognition¶ of Chinese sovereignty over these regions.¶ China’s willingness to compromise in territorial disputes carries several implications¶ for international relations theory. First, China’s cooperative behavior¶ as an authoritarian state underscores the importance of moving beyond democracy¶ in the study of regime type and cooperation.14 Second, China’s¶ compromises question the role of reputation building in explaining the intractability¶ of territorial disputes between states. China offered many concessions¶ despite clear incentives that its simultaneous involvement in multiple conflicts¶ created to signal toughness and resolve, not conciliation.15 Third, China’s behavior¶ challenges existing arguments about the foreign policies of revolutionary¶ states.16 In China, radical politics at home failed to produce assertive or¶ belligerent foreign policies in most of its territorial disputes.17 Fourth, China’s¶ cooperative response to regime insecurity helps to explain a key puzzle for the¶ diversionary war hypothesis: why many periods of domestic strife fail to produce crisis escalation and the use of force.18 Violence is less common than diversionary¶ war theory predicts because, under certain conditions, leaders can¶ have strong incentives to pursue cooperation instead of war to strengthen their¶ domestic political security.

### Ext – No SCS War

#### SCS war unlikely

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijing’s approach toward the South China Sea disputes has traditionally been one of conflict deescalation. Beijing’s clear preference has been to manage such tensions **bilaterally**. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for **settling maritime disputes**. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.32 Beijing has also shown some **willingness to take the multilateral route**. Most famously, China signed a non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues, the official position of both China and ASEAN remains to establish **a legally binding code of conduct** in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for **avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence building measures, and joint development**.33 Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off limits in Asia’s multilateral forums.

#### China backs off

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

¶ But **doubts remain** over whether Beijing truly regards the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Michael Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “**failed to unearth a single example** of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC ‘core interest.’”25 By contrast, Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27¶ Explicit threats and promises of this nature **are absent** in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region **continue to be confined**, by and large, **to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels**.29

#### SCS tensions won’t escalate

Li ’15

(Xue, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 6/19/15 - )

In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing.¶ However, **this does not necessary mean the** South China Sea **will spark a U.S.-China military conflict**.¶ As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.¶ This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.¶ However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are **not core national interests for the** United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given **U.S.-China mutual economic dependence** and China’s comprehensive national strength, **the** United States **is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China** over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.¶ As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).¶ Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.¶ At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.¶ Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.¶ Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.¶ Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.¶ As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, **yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation**. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”¶ For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.¶ In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said.¶ Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.¶ The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize **cooperation**. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year.¶ But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.

#### SCS tensions won’t escalate

Xue Li and Xu Yanzhuo, June 19, 2015 – \*director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences \*\*received her doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy, "The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea", thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/

In [a recent piece](http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-should-adjust-its-south-china-sea-policy/" \t "_blank) on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, [when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-issues-8-warnings-to-us-surveillance-plane-in-south-china-sea/" \t "_blank). However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, **the United States’ main interest lies in** maintaining the current **international order** as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the [2012 Shangri-La Dialogue](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681" \t "_blank), then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel[called out](https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb" \t "_blank) China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, [while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/1-year-later-reflections-on-chinas-oil-rig-sovereignty-making-in-the-south-china-sea/" \t "_blank). In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. **Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence** **and** **China’s** comprehensive **national strength**, **the** United States **is unlikely to** go so far as **hav**ing **a military confrontation with China** over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

### Ext – No ECS War

#### China-Japan war very unlikely

Beauchamp, 14

(Zach, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/“Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely. Power One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn. The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late. But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands. That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states. Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing . Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war. Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.

#### Both sides will back down

Beauchamp, 14

(Zach, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/14 –“ Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

To some observers, the risk that these nationalist impulses pressure leaders into military escalation during a crisis is the greatest risk of war. The “toxic mix of two rising nationalisms and unresolved mutual resentments” makes “the risks of an accidental conflict becomes uncomfortably real,” Isabel Hilton writes in The Guardian. Time’s Michael Crowley agrees, writing that “national pride and historical grievance” threaten “to drag in the U.S.” into a Pacific war. But the importance of nationalism as a driving force on both the Chinese and Japanese side has been overblown. In fact, a deeper look at the prevailing ideological winds in both China and Japan suggest much more pacific forces are likely to carry the day. First, while it’s easy to see China as an aggressive expansionist power bent on retaking its “rightful place” in East Asia by force, that’s simply inconsistent with China’s track record to date. In an influential 2003 article, Iain Alasdair Johnston, a professor of “China in World Affairs” at Harvard, argued that there’s overwhelming evidence China is more-or-less happy with the current international order. Johnston tested various measures of Chinese interest in upending the global order — like its willingness to work inside the U.N. and internal dialogues within PRC strategists about overtaking the United States — and found very little evidence of China seeking to overturn the global structure, including the U.S.–Japan–Korea alliance system that sets the terms in East Asia. “The regime appears to be unwilling,” according to Johnston, “to bear the economic and social costs of mobilizing the economy and militarizing society to balance seriously against American power and influence in the region, let alone globally.” The Chinese leadership’s ideology is better understood, in Johnston’s view, as centering on expanding China’s power inside the international order rather than overturning through gambles like military aggression in the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. In the face of 2013′s flurry of headlines about a newly aggressive China, Johnston revisited his thesis. He found basically no evidence that the Chinese leadership had changed its tune. Panicked writers, in Johnston’s analysis, were focusing on minor changes in Chinese policy to the exclusion of major continuities (like continued and deepening economic ties with the United States). They were also consistently misinterpreting Beijing’s thinking during major so-called aggressive moves. Take the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu flareup, after a Chinese trawler tried to ram some Japanese coast guard ships near the islands. Johnston found no evidence of serious Chinese escalation — the most serious such step reported, an embargo on shipping “rare earth” metals to Japan, was either very weakly enforced or never happened. Moreover, Beijing took explicit steps to tamp down anti-Japanese nationalism, placing anti-war editorials in major party outlets and shutting up the most anti-Japanese voices on the Chinese web during the most diplomatically sensitive time in the dispute. In short, China’s track record in the past ten years suggests the government doesn’t share the hardline nationalist sentiment it occasionally indulges in. Rather, the Chinese government is interested in very moderate regional advances that stop well short of war, and is capable of shutting down the sort of nationalist outburst from its population that might goad the government into war well before such protests might start affecting policy. What about Japan? It’s true that Abe himself holds some fairly hardline nationalist views. For instance, he won’t admit that Japan waged an aggressive war during World War II, which is a pretty gobsmacking bit of revisionism if you think about it. In December, Abe visited a shrine that honors (among others) Japanese war criminals from that era, a move that contributed to the recent bout of nationalistic strife. But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents isn’t going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his government’s coalition partners would do their damndest to block escalation. New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power, is an odd duck: pacifict Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely serious about their pacifism — it’s at the core of their political identity, and it inclines them towards a more generous stance towards Beijing. They’d exert a calming pressure in any crisis.

### Ext – No CCP Collapse — Empirics

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause collapse — empirics disprove

Xie 15 – Xie Tao, professor of political science at the School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University. He holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern University Tao (March 20, 2015 “Why Do People Keep Predicting China's Collapse?” <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/>) RMT

Because many Western analysts (dating back at least to Seymour Martin Lipset) subscribe to the view that as long as political institutions are viewed as legitimate, a crisis in effectiveness (e.g., economic performance) does not pose fatal threat to a regime. Thus even in the darkest days of the Great Depression, according to this view, America’s democratic institutions remained unchallenged. By contrast, if a regime is already deficient in political legitimacy, a crisis of effectiveness (such as an economic slowdown, rising inequality, or rampant corruption) would only exacerbate the legitimacy crisis. China is widely believed to be a prominent case that fits into this line argument.¶ China might be facing a performance crisis, but whether it is also facing a legitimacy crisis is debatable. Beauty is in the eyes of beholder; so is legitimacy. If the Chinese party-state could survive the riotous years of the Cultural Revolution and the existential crisis of 1989, why couldn’t it manage to survival another crisis? In fact, a more important question for Western observers is why the Chinese Communist Party has managed to stay in power for so long and to produce an indisputably impressive record of economic development.

### Ext – No CCP Collapse — Nationalism

#### Nationalism is essential to CCP stability

Zeng 16 — Jinghan Zeng, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, M.A. from the University of Pittsburg, 2016 (“The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific,* Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-349-57455-1, p. 13)

In addition to government performance, nationalism is another frequently mentioned explanatory factor of regime legitimacy in China. The country’s increasingly assertive foreign policy has generated enormous academic and public interest in Chinese nationalism. Many argue that nationalism plays a crucial role in legitimizing the CCP’s rule (Breslin, 2009; Darr, 2011; Fang, 1997; Lam, 2003; Li, 2001b; Lieberthal, 2004: 334–335; Lin and Hu, 2003; Ostergaard, 2004; Saich, 2004; Shambaugh, 2001; Zheng, 2004). As Peter Gries (2005: 112) argues, “lacking the procedural legitimacy accorded to democratically elected governments and facing the collapse of communist ideology, the CCP is increasingly dependent upon its nationalist credentials to rule.” Thomas Christensen (1996) also argues, “[S]ince the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese.” Nationalism is no doubt important to the CCP’s rule. However, there is no empirical evidence to prove that nationalism is a superior source of legitimacy in China (Chu, 2013).¶ Many also argue that Chinese nationalism has gradually become the ideological foundation of the CCP by replacing the communist ideals, which have been largely marginalized and weakened (Christensen, 1996; Gries and Rosen, 2004; He, 2007; Link, 2008; Metzger and Myers, 1998; Zhao, 1997; 1998; Zhong, 1996). For example, Duke University professor Liu Kang, argues:¶ ‘The current Chinese communist government is more a product of nationalism than a product of ideology like Marxism and Communism’ ... today nationalism has probably ‘become the most powerful legitimating ideology.’ (Cited from: Bajoria, 2008)

### Ext – No CCP Collapse – Party Adapts

#### The CCP can adapt to maintain legitimacy — economic growth not key

Zeng 16 — Jinghan Zeng, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from the University of Warwick, M.A. from the University of Pittsburg, 2016 (“The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-349-57455-1, p. 71-73)

As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, there is no empirical evidence to prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relies on economic success. Arguably, there are two major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow focus of government performance.¶ The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion of ideological factors, which leads to many problematic arguments and predictions. The performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or major disasters in China. This is also explicitly warned by many who argue that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of argument implies that economic factors are the independent or dominant variables, while political factors are subordinate or dependent variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This book endorses White’s assertion (1986) on the primacy of politics – that proper political actions can fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties.¶ As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than on economic performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime; thus, how the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions of the crisis (i.e., discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy.¶ Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimize legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As discussed below, there is much room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and on its irreplaceable role during a crisis. This is especially true in China, where people’s dependency on the government is more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted China’s good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, and the official media also made efforts to project international recognition onto China’s crisis management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).¶ If economic crisis is not a direct threat to legitimacy, then by the same logic, economic growth should not be considered as a direct source of legitimacy. If we consider economic growth as a direct source of legitimacy, then rapid economic growth will definitely lead to strong popular support. However, if this growth creates a widening gap between the poor and the rich, and the majority of the population fails to benefit, this growth may even undermine popular support. This is why many societies such as Hong Kong still have high levels of discontent during a period of rapid economic growth.¶ Indeed, economic growth might cause many threats to regime legitimacy. In China, various socioeconomic problems caused by rapid economic growth have posed an unprecedented challenge to the CCP’s rule. As the next chapter reveals, the most perceived threats to the CCP’s legitimacy – socioeconomic equality, changing values, and corruption – by Chinese intellectuals are all problems caused by economic growth.

#### CCP adaptability ensures stability and economic resiliency

Li 13 — Eric X. Li, venture capitalist in Shanghai, serves on the board of directors of China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) and is vice chairman of its publishing arm CEIBS Publishing Group, a Henry Crown Fellow of the Aspen Institute, 2013 (“The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China,” Foreign Affairs, February, available online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2012-12-03/life-party>, accessed 6/30/16) JL

In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP's long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles. ¶ Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future. ¶ ON-THE-JOB LEARNING ¶ The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP's membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution-China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.

### Ext – No CCP Collapse – Survey Results

#### CCP stability is not derived from economic growth — survey results confirm that this is overly reductive

Panda 15 — Ankit Panda, Editor of *The Diplomat*, 2015 (“Where Does the CCP's Legitimacy Come From? (Hint: It's Not Economic Performance),” *The Diplomat*, June 18th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/where-does-the-ccps-legitimacy-come-from-hint-its-not-economic-performance/>, Accessed 6-29-16)

There’s a pernicious and persistent piece of conventional wisdom in conversations about China’s political stability that is often presented as a truism: the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy stems from its ability to deliver high economic growth; if economic growth disappears, so will its legitimacy; this in turn will lead to the beginning of the end of the CCP.¶ The a priori appeal is evident since the reason stands the test of common sense. After all, assuming a broad definition of “legitimacy,” it would make sense that keeping citizens happy through high economic growth would prevent social unrest or calls for a new form of government. How do you keep citizens happy? Well, you can expand the economic pie, ensuring that everyone gets a larger slice—more per capita GDP leads to more per capita happiness leads to less revolution and upheaval. For CCP elites, mass upheaval over economic outcomes is best avoided by keeping China’s year-on-year growth rates as high as possible.¶ New research challenges this conventional wisdom with evidence. A new Global Working Paper (PDF warning) from the Brookings Institution inverts the reasoning I outlined above. Measuring “legitimacy” is of course a tricky endeavor, so the paper instead measures well-being—roughly how happy citizens are—against China’s economic performance (the word “legitimacy” does not appear in the paper). The paper additionally looks at the prevalence of mental health disorders in China. The finding of interest, distilled in a Brookings blog post, is as follows:¶ We find that the standard determinants of well-being are the same for China as they are for most countries around the world. At the same time, China stands out in that unhappiness and reported mental health problems are highest among the cohorts who either have or are positioned to benefit from the transition and related growth—a clear progress paradox. These are urban residents, the more educated, those who work in the private sector, and those who report to have insufficient leisure time and rest.¶ The paper’s finding has already drawn intelligent commentary from a few commentators (political scientist Jay Ulfelder and blogger T. Greer have posted important reactions). The finding that well-being, particularly among Chinese economic “elites,” is decoupled—and even inversely correlated—with China’s overall economic growth would suggest that the CCP’s survival might be independent of China’s overall economic performance. Thus, the CCP thrives not because it makes Chinese elites happy, but despite Chinese elites’ unhappiness.¶ As Ulfelder summarizes:¶ These survey results contradict the “performance legitimacy” story that many observers use to explain how the Chinese Communist Party has managed to avoid significant revolutionary threats since 1989 (see here, for example). In that story, Chinese citizens choose not to demand political liberalization because they are satisfied with the government’s economic performance. In effect, they accept material gains in lieu of political voice.¶ The decline in overall well-being among elites does present a serious challenge to the conventional explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy. The authors of the Brookings report also highlight previous studies of well-being and life satisfaction in China that measured a large decline in happiness among “the lowest-income and least-educated segments of the population.” In previous studies, China’s “upper socioeconomic strata” exhibited a rise in happiness, somewhat confirming the conventional wisdom explanation. Additionally, the authors note numerous independent variables that affect happiness, including rural/urban status, internal migration status (urban households and migrant households report lower happiness levels than their rural, non-migrant counterparts).¶ Where does the CCP’s legitimacy come from then? As Greer notes, maybe looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been the wrong measure all along—it’s unnecessarily reductive and dismissive of the opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would attribute the legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting corruption, delivering justice to wrong-doers within the country’s power apparatus) as well as more diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCP’s “role in helping China, as a country and a nation, become wealthy, powerful, and respected on the international stage”).¶ The long-term survival of the CCP may be the most consequential question for China in the 21st century, both for external observers watching China’s rise and for internal stakeholders. It’s undoubtedly important thus to understand how Chinese citizens relate to their government and experience life as China continues to grow. Still, it’s best to update our beliefs on how the CCP sustains its political legitimacy when presented with new data. The often-repeated economic performance explanation of the CCP’s legitimacy is not only outmoded—it appears to have never really been based in reality.

### Ext – China Growth Kills Warming

#### Chinese economic growth destroys the environment ― air and water pollution make life unsustainable

Huang 13 ― Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council for Foreign Relations, Professor for Seton Hall University, founding editor of Global Health Governance, former research associate of the National Asia Research Program, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, 2013. (“China: The Dark Side of Growth”, *Yale Global*, June 6th, 2013, Available Online at: [http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-dark-side-growth Accessed 7-1-16](http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-dark-side-growth%20Accessed%207-1-16))

Contrary to the image of the China juggernaut, though, multiple crises have struck over the past decade. The sheer size of China’s economy and population only highlights the magnitude of health, environment and social challenges. ¶ Take air pollution. In northern China, readings of particulate matter no more 2.5 microns in size – or PM2.5, the most harmful types of toxic smog – have reached 40 times the maximum level allowed by the World Health Organization. The health consequences of such air pollution are enormous: A 2010 study conducted by the WHO and a group of universities found outdoor air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in China, accounting for almost 40 percent of the global total. And according to a recent Deutsche Bank report, China’s air quality will become 70 percent worse by 2025, due to the increases in coal burning and vehicle and industrial emissions, which combined, already contribute to 85 percent of PM2.5 air pollution in China in 2013.¶ Water pollution is another price paid for China’s meteoric economic rise. As a result of the rapid industrialization and poor regulation of the disposal of chemical products, over 70 percent of lakes and rivers in China are polluted, and nearly 40 percent of those rivers are deemed “seriously polluted.” Nearly one-quarter of Chinese lack access to safe drinking water. WHO recently estimated that nearly 100,000 people die annually from water pollution-related illnesses in China.¶ Some 20,000 dead pigs found in the Huangpu River in March added to concerns about food-safety regulations. A 2011 study published by Chinese researchers estimated that more than 94 million people in China become ill annually because of bacterial foodborne diseases, of which, about 8,500 people die. These numbers likely underestimate China’s food safety crisis, because statistics on health conditions caused by tainted food are often excluded. According to a 2011 research conducted by Nanjing Agricultural University, 10 percent of rice sold in China contained excessive amounts of cadmium, and some researchers estimate that as much as 70 percent of China’s farmland is contaminated with toxic chemicals. The widespread production and consumption of toxic chemicals in industrialization and agricultural production have polluted water and air and contaminated farmland, contributing to the emergence of as many as 400 so-called “cancer villages,” areas where rates of cancer are unusually high. Overall, China has had an 80 percent increase in cancer rates compared with 30 years ago.

#### China economic growth destroys the environment ― increase pollution from coal

Zeng 12 ― Tammy Zeng, research graduate at School of International Service, 2012. (“Environmental Degradation as a Result of Economic Development and its Impact on Society”, Spring 2012, Available Online at: <http://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/1112capstones%3A130/datastream/PDF/view> Accessed 7-1-16)

China’s economic development has meant a surge in energy needs and coal has been China’s predominant source of energy for the last 30 years. The use of coal is popular in China due to its relatively cheap market price and its large supply. In a competitive market the cheapest resources win the largest market share (Yang, 6), and for China the large scale use of coal has helped to fuel China’s growing economy. The breakdown of energy use in 2008 according to the US Energy Information Administration showed that coal made up 71% of total energy consumption, oil made up 19%, hydroelectric power made up 6% and natural gas made up 3%(US EIA). Therefore, China’s major source of energy is coal. In 2009, China consumed an estimated 3.5 billion tons of coal, which made up 46 percent of the world total (US EIA). 13 Coal use is also a popular in China because it is a relatively abundant natural resource within China. China has the third largest coal reserves in the world and since 1989, China was ranked first in its total production of coal (Thompson). Since the Chinese people rely heavily on the use of coal, the government has been actively supporting the coal industry. According to the 12th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government plans to consolidate the coal sector in order to fully utilize the coal resources within China (US EIA). China is slowly increasing its production and consumption of coal and although the market price of coal is inexpensive, the costs associated with coal use to public health and the environment is extremely high. The effects of coal can be measured through air pollution by looking at levels of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide. According to the a National Energy and Strategy Policy Report in 2004, the burning of coal accounts for 70% of CO2 emissions, 90% of sulfur dioxide emissions, and 67% of nitrogen oxide emissions (Grumbine). By 2020, SO2 levels are projected to increase by 150% beyond what Chinese experts describe as the maximum capacity for the entire country (Grumbine), and for NO2, projections to 2020 are expected to increase by 86% (Grumbine). These numbers show that the increasing levels of air pollution will likely cause the acidification of the land, and will result in negative ecological impacts. The connection between economic development and environmental pollution are apparent through the increasing levels of emissions. This is caused both by the increasing level of industrial output and rising living standards. More energy is constantly needed to satisfy the growing economy and this often comes at the cost of the environment.

#### Economic growth is unsustainable ― it collapses the environment and causes run away warming

Qin 15 ― Liu Qin, journalist for China Dialogue, citing Li Lin, WWF China’s Executive Program Director, IMD from Program for Executive Development, D Sc. in Environmental Policy from University of Massachusetts at Lowell, M.A. in Environmental Management and Policy from Lunds University, 2015. (“China pays heavy environmental price for economic growth”, *China Dialogue*, December 22nd, 2015, Available Online at: <https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8491-China-pays-heavy-environmental-price-for-economic-growth> Accessed 7-1-16)

Over the last half century China’s economy has grown 80-fold, but a huge environmental price has been paid. A recent report from WWF has tracked 2,419 populations of 682 species, finding that from 1970 to 2010 populations of land-dwelling vertebrates fell by 50%. The biggest fall, 97%, was seen in amphibious reptiles.¶ The WWF’s new report, Global Vitality: China 2015, provides an initial calculation of the environmental price China has paid for 50 years of rapid economic expansion. According to the report the world’s ‘biocapacity’ is limited and relatively constant – even under careful management the potential for growth is limited.¶ Biocapacity refers to the capacity of a given biologically productive area to generate a constant supply of renewable resources and to absorb waste or pollution wastes. Growth is judged to be unsustainable if an area, or in this case a country, has an ecological footprint that exceeds its biocapacity.¶ In the half century since 1960, China’s biocapacity doubled, mainly due to the development of agriculture and a limited degree of environmental protection. But over the same period the economy grew 80-fold. ¶ Li Lin, WWF China’s Executive Programme Director, said that in the long term economic growth that outstrips biocapacity and environmental capacity is unsustainable: “How to use limited biocapacity to support a rapidly growing economy is the first problem to be solved if China is to develop an ecological civilization,” Li added, referring to China’s plans for greener growth and to make environmental protection a much more urgent priority at all levels of government.¶ A study found that in 2012 only Tibet and Qinghai had an ecological surplus – biocapacity adequate to meet the needs of local consumption. Beijing would need 21 times its current biocapacity to reach ecological equilibrium.¶ Ecological overload is causing China a range of problems – drought, water shortages, soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity, and increases in greenhouse gas emissions that if unchecked, could lead to runaway climate change.

#### Chinese economic slowdown key to combat climate change

Margolis 15 – Jason Margolis reports on business-and-economics related stories and has been recognized three times for “outstanding reporting” by the Society of Environmental Journalism and has received multiple reporting awards from Northern California journalism associations, 2015 (“How China’s slowing economy could help battle climate change,” December 2, Available Online at <http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-12-02/how-china-s-slowing-economy-could-help-battle-climate-change>, Accessed 06-24-2016, AH)

Last summer though, that model looked like it was crashing to a halt. The Shanghai Stock Exchange plunged sharply, pulling down markets across the globe and creating a panic among investors.¶ It was stunning and scary to many, but economists who follow China’s economic growth weren’t caught off guard.¶ “We always knew that was not going to be sustainable for the very long term,” says [Robert Kahn](http://www.cfr.org/experts/international-economics/robert-kahn/b16114" \t "_blank), a senior fellow for international economics with the Council on Foreign Relations.¶ China’s economy had been growing by 10, 12, even 14 percent in recent years. Over the next few years, Kahn expects China to grow at closer to 5 or 6 percent annually, similar to [forecasts from the International Monetary Fund.](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/update/02/" \t "_blank)¶ “Now to you and me, that’s still a very good number,” says Kahn. ¶ Many environmentalists also say it’s a better number for the planet.¶ “The take-make-waste model that we have at the moment in our economy — you manufacture something, you throw it away in landfill — [it's not going to be what’s going to work](http://www.carbontrust.com/news/2015/12/cop21-consumers-behaving-badly/" \t "_blank) for the rest of this century. It can’t be, because we're running out resources and it will result in dangerous climate change,” says Jamie Plotnek with[The Carbon Trust](http://www.carbontrust.com/home?gclid=Cj0KEQiAyvqyBRChq_iG38PgvLgBEiQAJbasd7SMXw24E8wfSrYKtJPzenX5vPP30ymXl4NlDx55IHwaAtZ98P8HAQ" \t "_blank), a London-based organization that helps governments and businesses transition to a low-carbon economy. ¶ Climate change has been made more dangerous by how China builds things for the rest of the world.¶ [Follow all of our coverage of the Paris talks and the global climate crisis](http://www.pri.org/tags/climate-change)¶ A team of researchers recently [quantified the environmental costs](http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2800.html" \t "_blank) — the carbon dioxide emissions — in manufacturing 15 products in China.¶ “And what we show, the difference between making them in Europe and China is large,” says Laura Diaz Anadon, an [assistant professor of public policy](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/1441/laura_diaz_anadon.html" \t "_blank) at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and visiting[senior lecturer at the University College, London](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/steapp/people/anadon" \t "_blank).¶ “So on average, emissions per unit mass of each product are 4.4 times greater in China than if you make them in the EU.”¶ There are a few key reasons for this. First, China relies heavily on coal as its primary energy source, which produces a lot of greenhouse gasses. (China is [committing to reducing](http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/11/30-china-coal-consumption-context" \t "_blank) its reliance on that fuel source.) Second, Anadon says China tends to use equipment that is less energy efficient.¶ Now, it would be easy at this point for an environmentalist to say, OK, I’ll just buy less stuff made in China. Easier said than done. Consider your refrigerator — there’s a lot of parts making it go. Anadon’s research focuses on the parts inside made from copper, steel, and iron, the early part of the supply chain.¶ “In terms of the consumer, I think it is actually quite hard to know what you should buy,” says Anadon. “If you were able to find out, this is made from copper made in China, or something like this, than you would know that this product has a component that has a very high carbon intensity.”¶ “It’s an incredibly difficult question for most consumers,” says Jamie Plotnek with The Carbon Trust.¶ He says consumers can minimize their carbon footprint by doing things like buying a smaller car, rather than an SUV. But with most products it’s really up to manufacturers to build smarter. ¶ “And that might involve, for example, a more circular approach to manufacturing where companies will design products that are supposed to be remanufactured,” says Plotnek.¶ “You’re already seeing this now where companies, particularly in the automotive industry, are looking at remanufacturing engines and gear boxes. Then you don’t need to extract the same metals again. You can extract the economic value from that waste so actually it can be better for those companies.”¶ Besides manufacturing smarter, China may also be moving toward manufacturing less, transitioning to a different type of economy.¶ “That transition, or what we’ve been calling a rebalancing, meant shifting away from a manufacturing-driven model to one that was more consumer based, more oriented towards retail and financial services and the like,” says Robert Kahn.¶ Kahn says this transition should take 5 to 7 years and will also reverberate to countries that supply China’s raw materials, places like Brazil and Australia. The climate crisis is also forcing these countries to rethink how their economies grow.¶ Add it all up and the headlines about the next phase of globalization could read very differently.

#### Chinese economic growth causes climate change

Delingpole 15 - James Delingpole, 2015 ("Paris Climate Talks Are Doomed Because China Knows 'Climate Change' Is A Hoax," Breitbart, December 2, Available Online at http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/12/02/paris-climate-talks-doomed-china-knows-climate-change-hoax/, Accessed 6-29-2016, AH)

China, the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, is under intense international pressure to reduce its use of fossil fuels. Although China’s leaders aim to reduce the country’s fossil-fuel consumption to 80% of its energy mix by 2030, they will not forsake national economic growth for the supposed global good. This is because China’s Communist Party knows that to stay in power – its highest priority – it must maintain the economic growth rates that have raised the incomes of much of its population and kept opposition at bay. China’s leaders know that GDP growth is tied to fossil- fuel use.¶ So far so disastrous for the COP21 negotiations. But worse is to come, far worse.¶ Obama and other Western leaders like to pretend that China’s appalling air pollution – the “airpocalypse” afflicting major cities which kills at least half a million a year – gives it a strong incentive to reduce its CO2 levels. But in fact the opposite is true.

#### **China economic growth causes social, environmental and health problems.**

Yanzhong 13 – Huang Yanzhong is a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, and is also professor and director of global health studies at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, 2013 (“China: The Dark Side of Growth,” Yale Global Online, June 6, Available Online at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-dark-side-growth>, Accessed 06-22-2016, AH)

NEW YORK: Emerging from the ranks of one of the world’s poorest nations to second only to the United States, China is destined for a place in the history books. But history may also record the heavy price paid by the Chinese people and will continue to pay for years to come.¶ China’s steady rise against the backdrop of a sluggish global economy has emboldened Chinese leaders to claim “firm confidence” in their development model. Meanwhile, seemingly robust authoritarian capitalism in China has convinced some American scholars that the model offers a viable alternative to Western-style democracies. According to Asian expert Joshua Kurlantzik, China’s system in many ways poses “the most serious challenge to democratic capitalism since the rise of communism and fascism in the 1920s and early 1930s.” ¶ Contrary to the image of the China juggernaut, though, multiple crises have struck over the past decade. The sheer size of China’s economy and population only highlights the magnitude of health, environment and social challenges. ¶ Take air pollution. In northern China, readings of particulate matter no more 2.5 microns in size – or PM2.5, the most harmful types of toxic smog – have reached 40 times the maximum level allowed by the World Health Organization. The health consequences of such air pollution are enormous: A 2010 study conducted by the WHO and a group of universities found outdoor air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in China, accounting for almost 40 percent of the global total. And according to a recent Deutsche Bank report, China’s air quality will become 70 percent worse by 2025, due to the increases in coal burning and vehicle and industrial emissions, which combined, already contribute to 85 percent of PM2.5 air pollution in China in 2013. Water pollution is another price paid for China’s meteoric economic rise. As a result of the rapid industrialization and poor regulation of the disposal of chemical products, over 70 percent of lakes and rivers in China are polluted, and nearly 40 percent of those rivers are deemed “seriously polluted.” Nearly one-quarter of Chinese lack access to safe drinking water. WHO recently estimated that nearly 100,000 people die annually from water pollution-related illnesses in China.¶ Some [20,000 dead pigs](http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/03/13/dead-pigs-in-shanghai-failing-food-safety-regulations/) found in the Huangpu River in March added to concerns about food-safety regulations. A 2011 study published by Chinese researchers estimated that more than 94 million people in China become ill annually because of bacterial foodborne diseases, of which, about 8,500 people die. These numbers likely underestimate China’s food safety crisis, because statistics on health conditions caused by tainted food are often excluded. According to a 2011 research conducted by Nanjing Agricultural University, 10 percent of rice sold in China contained excessive amounts of cadmium, and some researchers estimate that as much as 70 percent of China’s farmland is contaminated with toxic chemicals. The widespread production and consumption of toxic chemicals in industrialization and agricultural production have polluted water and air and contaminated farmland, contributing to the emergence of as many as [400 so-called “cancer villages,”](http://ntdtv.org/en/news/china/2013-02-22/china-s-cancer-villages-acknowledged-by-government-report.html) areas where rates of cancer are unusually high. Overall, China has had an 80 percent increase in cancer rates compared with 30 years ago. ¶ Rapid growth has a price. The economic boom in the past decades has also been associated with a widening wealth gap. According to a report from China’s Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, the Gini coefficient – measured on a scale of 0 to 1 with higher figures associated with greater inequality – was 0.61 in 2010. While it’s not atypical for a fast developing economy to experience increasing inequality, China’s level of inequality is comparable to that of the Philippines and Russia and much worse than that of Japan, the United States and many countries in newly liberalized Eastern Europe. Based on the study of Wang Xiaolu, an economist at the independent National Economic Research Institute in Beijing, analysts have estimated that the wealthiest 10 percent of Chinese earned 65 times that of poorest 10 percent. High inequality has increased the danger for China to tumble into the “middle-income trap” – getting stuck at a level of development that falls short of that of more advanced economies. Worse, the government’s failure to address this social crisis may pit the underprivileged against an entitled minority.¶ The existing sociopolitical crises in China are exacerbated by entrenched corruption. The market-oriented economic transition has created new opportunities and made corruption more pervasive than in previous decades. More than 10 years ago, two eminent Chinese scholars suggested that some 80 percent of the Chinese government officials were corrupt, and the situation has not improved. A conservative estimate by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put the cost of corruption in China at about 3 percent of GDP annually, or about $200 billion. Similar to a Greshamite system, which rewards bad behavior, making it rampant and driving out good behavior, China’s corruption has reached a level that touches almost every sector and every member of the society. According to a nationwide survey conducted in October 2011, about 82 percent of responders agreed that China has experienced a significant moral decline over the past decade, and more than half of respondents did not think that complying with ethical standards was a necessary condition for success. In discussing the development paths taken by nations in a March speech delivered in Moscow, President Xi Jinping remarked, “Only the wearer knows if the shoe fits his foot.” As the social cost of development becomes increasingly unbearable, even those who benefited from the rapid economic growth do not think the existing model fits China anymore. When Beijing was engulfed by thick toxic smog in January, an actress born and raised in Beijing wrote: “The flood of emigration and every other type of temptation were not enough to get me to leave this lovable city. Today, this thought keeps circling in my mind: ‘Where will I go to spend my later years?’”¶ The regime’s call for more confidence in the system is also not echoed by China’s new rich, who vote with their feet by choosing to emigrate. According to a report issued by the Bank of China, 14 percent of those with a net worth of 60 million yuan, or $10 million, have already emigrated, and an additional 46 percent favorably regard relocation. Lack of confidence in the system is also suggested by money leaking out of China. Despite China’s restrictions on capital movement, as much as $3.72 trillion left the country over the past decade. ¶ Clearly, the profound sociopolitical problems are threatening China’s great achievements. Until China can address the immeasurable, if not irreversible social costs of development, it would be next to impossible for the nation to take a leadership role in the international system, what it sees as its rightful position. It’s hard to imagine, for example, that the country can regain its greatness if the Chinese people do not have clean air to breathe, safe water to drink, or uncontaminated soil on which to live and farm. Thus, it’s imperative to reexamine the China development model and make addressing domestic social-political problems a priority. Unfortunately, the alluring story of China’s rise can blind one to its dark side.

### Ext – Warming Impact

#### Global warming is happening – most recent and best evidence concludes that it is human induced

Muller ‘12

[Richard, professor of physics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former MacArthur Foundation fellow, “The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all]

CALL me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort **involving a dozen scientists**, I concluded that global warming was real **and that the prior estimates of the rate of warming were correct.** I’m now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the B**erkeley** E**arth** S**urface** T**emperature** project, which I founded with my daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earth’s land has risen **by two and a half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years**. Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of greenhouse gases. **These findings are stronger than those of the** Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change **[IPCC**], the United Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only **that most of the warming of the prior 50 years could be attributed to humans**. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our **Berkeley Earth approach used** sophisticated statistical methods **developed largely by our lead scientist**, Robert Rohde, **which** allowed us to determine earth land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that **none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions**; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful sunsets and cool the earth’s surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Niño and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream; because of such oscillations, the “flattening” of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (**exponentials, polynomials**), to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. **By far** the best match was to the record of atmospheric **carbon dioxide** (CO2), **measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice.**

#### Climate Change is real and anthropogenic

EDF ‘9

[Environmental Defense Fund, a US-based nonprofit environmental advocacy group, “Global Warming Myths and Facts,” 1/13/2009, http://mrgreenbiz.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/global-warming-myths-and-facts-2/]

**There is no debate among scientists about the basic facts of global warming**. The most respected scientific bodies have stated unequivocally that global **warming is occurring, and people are causing it** by burning fossil fuels (like coal, oil and natural gas) and cutting down forests. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences, which in 2005 the White House called "the gold standard of objective scientific assessment," issued a joint statement with 10 other National Academies of Science saying "the scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." (Joint Statement of Science Academies: Global Response to Climate Change [PDF], 2005) The only debate in the science community about global warming is about how much and how fast warming will continue as a result of heat-trapping emissions. Scientists have given a clear warning about global warming, and we have more than enough facts — about causes and fixes — to implement solutions right now. MYTH Even if global warming is a problem, addressing it will hurt American industry and workers. FACT A well designed trading program will harness American ingenuity to decrease heat-trapping pollution cost-effectively, jumpstarting a new carbon economy. Claims that fighting global warming will cripple the economy and cost hundreds of thousands of jobs are unfounded. In fact, companies that are already reducing their heat-trapping emissions have discovered that cutting pollution can save money. The cost of a comprehensive national greenhouse gas reduction program will depend on the precise emissions targets, the timing for the reductions and the means of implementation. An independent MIT study found that a modest cap-and-trade system would cost less than $20 per household annually and have no negative impact on employment. Experience has shown that properly designed emissions trading programs can reduce compliance costs significantly compared with other regulatory approaches. For example, the U.S. acid rain program reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by more than 30 percent from 1990 levels and cost industry a fraction of what the government originally estimated, according to EPA. Furthermore, a mandatory cap on emissions could spur technological innovation that could create jobs and wealth. Letting global warming continue until we are forced to address it on an emergency basis could disrupt and severely damage our economy. It is far wiser and more cost-effective to act now. MYTH Water vapor is the most important, abundant greenhouse gas. So if we’re going to control a greenhouse gas, why don’t we control it instead of carbon dioxide (CO2)? FACT Although water vapor traps more heat than CO2, because of the relationships among CO2, water vapor and climate, to fight global warming nations must focus on controlling CO2. Atmospheric levels of CO2 are determined by how much coal, natural gas and oil we burn and how many trees we cut down, as well as by natural processes like plant growth. Atmospheric levels of water vapor, on the other hand, cannot be directly controlled by people; rather, they are determined by temperatures. The warmer the atmosphere, the more water vapor it can hold. As a result, water vapor is part of an amplifying effect. Greenhouse gases like CO2 warm the air, which in turn adds to the stock of water vapor, which in turn traps more heat and accelerates warming. Scientists know this because of satellite measurements documenting a rise in water vapor concentrations as the globe has warmed. **The best way to lower temperature and** thus reduce **water vapor levels is to reduce CO2 emissions.** MYTH Global warming and extra CO2 will actually be beneficial — they reduce cold-related deaths and stimulate crop growth. FACT **Any beneficial effects will be far outweighed by damage and disruption.** Even a warming in just the middle range of scientific projections would have devastating impacts on many sectors of the economy. Rising seas would inundate coastal communities, contaminate water supplies with salt and increase the risk of flooding by storm surge, affecting tens of millions of people globally. Moreover, extreme weather events, including heat waves, droughts and floods, are predicted to increase in frequency and intensity, causing loss of lives and property and throwing agriculture into turmoil. Even though higher levels of CO2 can act as a plant fertilizer under some conditions, scientists now think that the "CO2 fertilization" effect on crops has been overstated; in natural ecosystems, the fertilization effect can diminish after a few years as plants acclimate. Furthermore, increased CO2 may benefit undesirable, weedy species more than desirable species. Higher levels of CO2 have already caused ocean acidification, and scientists are warning of potentially devastating effects on marine life and fisheries. Moreover, higher levels of regional ozone (smog), a result of warmer temperatures, could worsen respiratory illnesses. Less developed countries and natural ecosystems may not have the capacity to adapt. The notion that there will be regional “winners” and “losers” in global warming is based on a world-view from the 1950’s. We live in a global community. Never mind the moral implications — when an environmental catastrophe creates millions of refugees half-way around the world, Americans are affected. MYTH Global warming is just part of a natural cycle. The Arctic has warmed up in the past. FACT The global warming we are experiencing is not natural. **People are causing it**. People are causing global warming by burning fossil fuels (like oil, coal and natural gas) and cutting down forests. Scientists have shown that these activities are pumping far more CO2 into the atmosphere than was ever released in hundreds of thousands of years. **This buildup of CO2 is the biggest cause of global warming**. Since 1895, scientists have known that CO2 and other greenhouse gases trap heat and warm the earth. As the warming has intensified over the past three decades, scientific scrutiny has increased along with it. Scientists have considered and ruled out other, natural explanations such as sunlight, volcanic eruptions and cosmic rays. (IPCC 2001) Though natural amounts of CO2 have varied from 180 to 300 parts per million (ppm), today's CO2 levels are around 380 ppm. That's 25% more than the highest natural levels over the past 650,000 years. Increased CO2 levels have contributed to periods of higher average temperatures throughout that long record. (Boden, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center) As for previous Arctic warming, it is true that there were stretches of warm periods over the Arctic earlier in the 20th century. The limited records available for that time period indicate that the warmth did not affect as many areas or persist from year to year as much as the current warmth. But that episode, however warm it was, is not relevant to the issue at hand. Why? For one, a brief regional trend does not discount a longer global phenomenon. We know that the planet has been warming over the past several decades and Arctic ice has been melting persistently. And unlike the earlier periods of Arctic warmth, there is no expectation that the current upward trend in Arctic temperatures will reverse; the rising concentrations of greenhouse gases will prevent that from happening. MYTH We can adapt to climate change — civilization has survived droughts and temperature shifts before. FACT Although humans as a whole have survived the vagaries of drought, stretches of warmth and cold and more, entire societies have collapsed from dramatic climatic shifts. The current warming of our climate will bring major hardships and economic dislocations — untold human suffering, especially for our children and grandchildren. We are already seeing significant costs from today's global warming which is caused by greenhouse gas pollution. Climate has changed in the past and human societies have survived, but today six billion people depend on interconnected ecosystems and complex technological infrastructure. What's more, **unless we limit the amount of heat-trapping gases we are putting into the atmosphere, we will face a warming trend unseen since human civilization began** 10,000 years ago. (IPCC 2001) The consequences of continued warming at current rates are likely to be dire. Many densely populated areas, such as low-lying coastal regions, are highly vulnerable to climate shifts. A middle-of-the-range projection is that the homes of 13 to 88 million people around the world would be flooded by the sea each year in the 2080s. Poorer countries and small island nations will have the hardest time adapting. (McLean et al. 2001) In what appears to be the first forced move resulting from climate change, 100 residents of Tegua island in the Pacific Ocean were evacuated by the government because rising sea levels were flooding their island. Some 2,000 other islanders plan a similar move to escape rising waters. In the United States, the village of Shishmaref in Alaska, which has been inhabited for 400 years, is collapsing from melting permafrost. Relocation plans are in the works. <continues…> Scarcity of water and food could lead to major conflicts with broad ripple effects throughout the globe. Even if people find a way to adapt, the wildlife and plants on which we depend may be unable to adapt to rapid climate change. While the world itself will not end, the world as we know it may disappear. MYTH Recent cold winters and cool summers don’t feel like global warming to me. FACT While different pockets of the country have experienced some cold winters here and there, the overall trend is warmer winters. Measurements show that over the last century the Earth’s climate has warmed overall, in all seasons, and in most regions. Climate skeptics mislead the public when they claim that the winter of 2003–2004 was the coldest ever in the northeastern United States. That winter was only the 33rd coldest in the region since records began in 1896. Furthermore, a single year of cold weather in one region of the globe is not an indication of a trend in the global climate, which refers to a long-term average over the entire planet. MYTH Global warming can’t be happening because some glaciers and ice sheets are growing, not shrinking. FACT In most parts of the world, the retreat of glaciers has been dramatic. The best available scientific data indicate that Greenland's massive ice sheet is shrinking. Between 1961 and 1997, the world’s glaciers lost 890 cubic miles of ice. The consensus among scientists is that rising air temperatures are the most important factor behind the retreat of glaciers on a global scale over long time periods. Some glaciers in western Norway, Iceland and New Zealand have been expanding during the past few decades. That expansion is a result of regional increases in storm frequency and snowfall rather than colder temperatures — not at all incompatible with a global warming trend. In Greenland, a NASA satellite that can measure the ice mass over the whole continent has found that although there is variation from month to month, over the longer term, the ice is disappearing. In fact, there are worrisome signs that melting is accelerating: glaciers are moving into the ocean twice as fast as a decade ago, and, over time, more and more glaciers have started to accelerate. What is most alarming is the prediction, based on model calculations and historical evidence, that an approximately 5.4 degree Fahrenheit increase in local Greenland temperatures will lead to irreversible meltdown and a sea-level rise of over 20 feet. Since the Arctic is warming 2-3 times faster than the global average, this tipping point is not far away. The only study that has shown increasing ice mass in Greenland only looked at the interior of the ice sheet, not at the edges where melting occurs. This is actually in line with climate model predictions that global warming would lead to a short-term accumulation of ice in the cold interior due to heavier snowfall. (Similarly, scientists have predicted that Antarctica overall will gain ice in the near future due to heavier snowfall.) The scientists who published the study were careful to point out that their results should not be used to conclude that Greenland's ice mass as a whole is growing. In addition, their data suggested that the accumulation of snow in the middle of the continent is likely to decrease over time as global warming continues. MYTH Accurate weather predictions a few days in advance are hard to come by. Why on earth should we have confidence in climate projections decades from now? FACT Climate prediction is fundamentally different from weather prediction, just as climate is different from weather. It is often more difficult to make an accurate weather forecast than a climate prediction. The accuracy of weather forecasting is critically dependent upon being able to exactly and comprehensively characterize the present state of the global atmosphere. Climate prediction relies on other, longer ranging factors. For instance, we might not know if it will be below freezing on a specific December day in New England, but we know from our understanding of the region's climate that the temperatures during the month will generally be low. Similarly, climate tells us that Seattle and London tend to be rainy, Florida and southern California are usually warm, and the Southwest is often dry and hot. Today’s climate models can now reproduce the observed global average climates over the past century and beyond. Such findings have reinforced scientist’s confidence in the capacity of models to produce reliable projections of future climate. Current climate assessments typically consider the results from a range of models and scenarios for future heat-trapping emissions in order to identify the most likely range for future climatic change.

#### The impact is billions of deaths.

Cummins ‘10

(Ronnie, International Director – Organic Consumers Association and Will Allen, Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

### Reject their Authors/Empirically Denied

#### Prefer our evidence — their authors misinterpret reality

Chen 15 — Dingding Chen, Assistant Professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, Founding Director of the Intellisia Institute—an independent think-tank focusing on international affairs in China, PhD and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“Sorry, America: China Is NOT Going to Collapse,” *The National Interest*, March 10th, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-america-china-not-going-collapse-12389?page=2>, Accessed 6-22-16)

Then, why do so many Western analysts not see this reality? What do Shambaugh’s article and similar writings reflect about the mentality of some Western thinkers and analysts?¶ Perhaps implicit in such arguments is the collective worry or fear that China will continue to become stronger, more prosperous, and more assertive in international affairs. The West has not prepared for a possibility where it is no longer the dominant force in the world. After the Cold War, many Western democracies have adopted the triumphal “End of History” thesis.¶ However, now that a strong and authoritarian China has emerged, one not compliant with the standard “liberal democracy model” advocated by the West, it is seen as a threat. The “China threat” narrative is understandable, as people tend to fear something they do not understand or that looks different. And China today is a great “other,” but because it is strong, it is more threatening than a weak “other.” A strong China causes cognitive dissonance among many Western analysts because according to their theories, an authoritarian China should be weak. This explains the selective reading by Western scholars of China’s political reality.

#### Predictions of CCP collapse are inherently biased

Kroeber 15 — Arthur Kroeber, Managing Director of GaveKal Dragonomics—an indepdendent global economic research firm, Editor of *China Economic Quarterly*, non-resident Senior Fwllow of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, where his research focuses on China’s engagement with global economic institution, member of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, the Fernand Braudel Institute of International Economics, and the board of the Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business at Indiana University, 2015 (“When Will China’s Government Collapse?” *Foreign Policy*, March 13th, Available Online at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/>, Accessed 6-22-16)

Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works — which could create insights into why it might stop working — critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. That it refuses to do so is disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness.